

JAPAN MUST FIGHT BRITAIN

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HURST & BLACKETT, LTD.
(Publishers since 1812)
LONDON

First published in Great Britain, February 1936.

*Made and Printed in Great Britain for
Hurst & Blackett, Ltd., Paternoster
House, London, E.C.4, at The Anchor
Press, Tiptree, Essex.*

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE

I have to acknowledge the help I have had from Mr. Tatenno Mamoru : without it, many passages would have remained unintelligible to me. If, in spite of his pains and his patience, I have failed to do justice to the author, I trust I may be forgiven.

I have also to thank the staff of the London Library for their unfailing courtesy and their timely aid in unearthing many references and quotations.

G. V. R.

October 1935.

NOTE

Grateful acknowledgments are hereby made to Messrs Jonathan Cape, Ltd., for permission to use extracts from André Siegfried's *England's Crisis* and Nicholas Roosevelt's *America and England* ; to Messrs. John Murray and the Doubleday Doran Company for permission to use extracts from Admiral Sims' *Victory at Sea* ; to Messrs. George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., for permission to use extracts from Warren S. P. Thompson's *Danger Spots in World Population* ; to Messrs. Charles Scribner's Sons, for permission to use extracts from Nicholas Roosevelt's *The Restless Pacific* ; to Messrs. Constable and Co., Ltd., for permission to use extracts from Hector C. Bywater's *Navies and Nations* ; to The Rt. Hon. David Lloyd George, M.P. ; to the Hearst Press, to the *Morning Post*, and to *The Times*.

“By continual fighting and many victories few have gained the throne, many have been brought to ruin.”

WU Tzŭ

“The successful fighter plans his victory and then gives battle : the unsuccessful gives battle and then looks for victory.”

SUNG Tzŭ

(Both Wu and Sung are ancient Chinese writers on the Art of War. The work of the latter has been translated into English by Mr. Lionel Giles, and was published by Luzac in 1910.)

FOREWORD

THE time has come when we Japanese must drastically revise our opinions of England and the English. At the present day, an Anglo-Japanese War is not the dream of a fool nor even an unreasonable hypothesis. It is inevitable unless either Japan stops the policy of expansion that she has been driven to adopt under the most severe pressure, or unless England, with her excessive number of colonies, abandons her policy of the preservation of the *status quo*, in which she holds firmly what she has already and will relinquish nothing.

The truth is that the relative positions of Japan and England today are very closely similar to those of England and Germany before the Great War. I think that my readers will be astonished to find how true this statement is, for all that it may not be new to them. England took alarm at the sudden rise of Germany and endeavoured to nip it in the bud, but it was not until the World War that she attained her object. So true is this that one can see at a glance what the future holds for England in relation to Japan, against whom, as this book clearly shows, she cherishes similar aims.

Germany was strong in war. When it came to fighting, she was certainly the strongest Power in the world. How was it, then, that she was beaten in the end? In one word, she was beaten from the start in diplomacy. The military clique ignored the diplomatists and did what they liked with German foreign policy. If, in any country, the soldiers and sailors control the conduct of foreign affairs, that country will be beaten in war. This is the truth, though it sounds untrue.

On the other hand, there can be no doubt that England is the world's oldest hand at diplomacy. Was it not she who,

when a clash with Russia in the Far East appeared inevitable, made an alliance and got Japan to do the fighting with Russia, while she looked on with her hands in her pockets, and secured what she wanted in the end? Was it not England, too, when war with Germany seemed inevitable, who adopted an attitude of neutrality, inveigled Russia and France into war with Germany, and then, when the fighting had started, came out in her true colours and declared war herself? It's a smart fellow who, instead of jumping into the ring himself, can get others to do the fighting for him while he calmly looks on from a safe place secure of the prize. That is the way England does things. On the other hand, the sabre-rattling type of fellow who sticks a dagger in his belt and jumps in among the young bloods rapping out, 'I'm your man!' is all very well, but a little out of place among the diplomats.

Sung Tzū said : The successful fighter plans his victory and then gives battle : the unsuccessful gives battle and then looks for victory. The Chinese warrior foretold, many hundred years ago, the result of the war between England and Germany.

To come to ourselves, don't we Japanese of today think that a diplomacy of sabre-rattling and gallantly jumping in among the young bloods is the way to make our country great? Intoxicated with the fine words, 'Freedom of action', are we not always finding fault with our diplomats and gradually forcing upon them a foreign policy in which there is no spirit of compromise? In general, a measure of elasticity is essential to the successful conduct of foreign affairs. Uncompromising and direct methods may be very effective at the start of a war, but to win one they must strictly be avoided. The conduct of foreign intercourse reflects the ideas of the people : if it ignores them it can never be effective. To encourage our diplomats, or to direct them, may be well enough, but, forgetting that essential elasticity, vainly to delight in smothering them with abuse, or, in the name of the High Command, to ignore diplomatic methods altogether, is most dangerous : it is the way to lead the country to destruction.

Just look at England ! How do the people think that foreign affairs should be conducted? The English people

are not always worrying their Government or Foreign Office, or trying to expose diplomatic secrets. That is because they know they must be careful lest they do anything that might put their own country at a disadvantage in its dealings with others. So much is this the case that, the more serious foreign affairs become, the more do they support their Government and Foreign Office. If the Japanese people will compare this way of doing things with what occurs in their own country, they will find food for thought.

It is no exaggeration to say that the diplomatic battle will be a deciding factor in an Anglo-Japanese war. And, as our opponent has long and wide experience, it behoves us all the more to gird up our loins in earnest. Ignoring diplomacy, setting up a military despotism, or, in unnecessary haste, shouting down our diplomatists, is to repeat the mistake that led Germany to disaster : it is not the way to make our country great.

The writer is not a militarist desiring to cause a war between Japan and England. He does not wish, in the conceit of ignorance, to cause needless irritation to other countries and by belittling their navies and their armies to provoke war. Nor does he imagine that by juggling with empty words a reputable and honourable peace may be established. He has no such ideas or intentions. However, the more he studies the Anglo-Japanese situation the more he is forced to the definite conclusion that the only peaceful solution is for England to make way. He has thought it essential to appeal to the consciences of both peoples in a bold, direct, and public statement.

To repeat, this book is not the work of a militarist. No ! It sounds a warning note calling upon the Japanese and English peoples alike to give the matter their earnest and careful consideration.

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JAPAN MUST FIGHT BRITAIN

CHAPTER I

THE FRIEND OF YESTERDAY THE FOE OF TODAY

(1) *British Statesmen Attack Japan*

TWENTY years ago Japan and England bound themselves together in an Alliance, a memorable event pregnant with history. The third revision of this Alliance, in July 1911, marked a turning point, whence England's friendship began to cool. Ten years later, at the Washington Conference, the intimacy of relations was broken off. After another ten years, England headed the League of Nations in its opposition to Japan over the affair with China. Today, England appears as a tyrant, and relations, such is their uncertainty, are changing from bad to worse, from those of unfriendliness to those of hostility.

Simon.

The hostility has been boldly and frankly expressed by Sir John Simon and by Mr. Lloyd George. According to a London telegram of February 2, 1933, Sir John Simon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, replied to a question put to him by Mr. Lansbury, leader of the Labour Party in the House of Commons, in very strong terms. He said that he wished plainly and frankly to say that, in his opinion, Japanese action in Manchuria had not been in conformity with the Covenant of the League of Nations. Japan had, beyond all question, used armed force, which the Covenant forbade. He added that until an international decision was reached, the British Government would not authorize the issue of licences for the export to either China or Japan

of any of the articles mentioned in the Arms Export Prohibition Order of 1931.

For a British public man, let alone the brain behind foreign affairs, thus openly to insult Japan was a thing unheard of.

Lloyd George.

In March 1933 Mr. Lloyd George, who had been Prime Minister of England during the Great War, contributed an article to the Hearst group of newspapers. It attacked Japan even more violently, as the following extracts show, and it created a great sensation in America :

. . . Manchuria, a great Chinese province, has been overrun by Japanese troops, torn from the Chinese Empire and set up as a puppet state under Japanese control. . . . And, to leave no uncertainty as to the friendly nature of these operations, there was thrown in a raid on Shanghai. . . . It must be fairly admitted that whatever faults can be attributed to it, the League certainly has not failed to give the Sino-Japanese issue the fullest possible judicial examination : that it has reached its verdict in unhurried calm : that it has tried every avenue for conciliation : and that the unanimity, first of the Council, then of the Lytton Commission, then of the Committee of Nineteen, leaves no shadow of room for doubt that the weight of evidence against the Japanese is quite overwhelming. The naked fact stands out that after scrupulous care the judgment of the civilized world is unfaltering in denouncing Japan's action in Manchuria and its continued occupation of that territory as a breach of justice, of treaty pledges, and of international law.

. . . Japan promises to stop her victorious march at the Great Wall—unless trouble threatens beyond. This means that she will go forward until China surrenders her national rights in Manchuria completely and abjectly. I cannot see any responsible Chinese Government accepting that humiliation : so that the hitherto unacknowledged warfare between the two countries may not improbably change to avowed hostilities, and the flame will then run up and down the China coast, and through the cities where Japanese trading colonies are established, spreading ruin and destruction everywhere. . . .

What will the League of Nations do about it ?

In theory, the League disposes of considerable powers.)
By defying the League and continuing against China in Manchuria and Jehol what are beyond all logomachy acts of war,

Japan renders herself liable to the sanctions of Article 16 of the Covenant. . . .

But the difficulty of this is that the League is not a unit. . . . It is no more than a collection of States in membership with it. They are independent sovereign States. None of them will allow another State or group of States to dictate to them what they shall do in face of this crisis. . . . Article 16 of the Covenant looks formidable on paper, and has caused some statesmen a good deal of uneasiness. But it is like a fake pistol for scaring burglars, which only serves its purpose if you are careful not to pull the trigger and thus betray the fact that it is not loaded. Japan knows it is not loaded. . . .

None of the countries in membership with the League will be eager to put Article 16 into force themselves. And certainly none of those whose action really counts will be prepared to do any such thing without the co-operation of the United States and Russia. . . . The fact that no League decision affects the attitude of these two great Powers rules out any really drastic action by the League alone.

So the next question that arises is : What will the great Powers do, singly or in concert ?

It may, I think, be taken for granted that they will strain every nerve to avoid actual warfare with either China or Japan. Developments in China may compel them to despatch naval or military forces to defend their own nationals and Concession areas. But nobody wants war if it can possibly be avoided. At the outset of the struggle in 1931, joint action promptly and resolutely taken by Britain and the States would have forced a settlement out of hand, without involving any country in actual hostilities. But the chance for that has now gone by. Japan has come to the conclusion—for which the fussy irresolution of most countries has given her ample grounds—that nothing would induce anyone to interfere with her : that is why she calls the bluff when there is any bluster.

The price of the lost opportunity will prove heavy, and China will not be the only country to pay for it. After the League's failure and Japan's withdrawal, there can be little hope for the further progress of the Disarmament Conference. What is the use of preaching disarmament when the events in the Pacific prove that weapons are still the only effective national defence or diplomacy, and that the League of Nations is powerless to prevent wars of aggression against a defenceless nation ? . . .

International co-operation will receive a severe set-back, and the hope that we were moving on to an era of greater

solidarity and closer world-fellowship will founder and sink in the Yellow Sea. . . .

Everyone knows that a chivalrous blood flows in Lloyd George's veins and that his pulses throb to help and befriend the weak. His championship of the small farmers against the landlords and of the Armenians against the Turks are instances of it. It is natural, therefore, that he should take China's part against Japan. But a more important point is that he always works in with the people and always follows the times. He does not cling, like a doctrinaire, to some abstract principle : as a practical statesman he acts as the occasion demands. Current public opinion so strongly influences him that his anti-Japanese article, taken with the strong language held by Sir John Simon, may be regarded as characteristic of it, and therefore worthy of serious consideration in Japan.

How, then, has this growing ill-feeling between England and Japan arisen ? How will our relations develop ? Is there no means by which a peaceful solution can be found ? If not, must Japan and England ultimately come to blows ? By way of answering these interesting questions I shall first discuss England's object in making the Alliance.

(2) *Retrospect of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.*

It may be said that the friendliness or estrangement of international relations, and even the groupings of countries and the divisions between them, centre more on considerations of gain and loss than on popular feeling. This means that if the material interests of two peoples are not mutually opposed, then, when they have to adopt a common line of action against some third country, their relations grow more and more intimate and may, ultimately, find expression in an alliance or treaty. On the other hand, where material interests clash, it is no rare thing for the friend of yesterday to change completely into the foe of today. We find a remarkable instance of this truth in the history of Anglo-Japanese relations.

Beginning of friendship.

England was the first country to agree to surrender her extra-territorial rights in Japan. Later, at the time when the

three Powers—Russia, France, and Germany—interfered between Japan and China, she rejected their advances and thereby successfully earned the gratitude of Japan. Lord Kimberley, Minister for Foreign Affairs at the time, did not think that British interests would, of necessity, be affected, but he regarded the interference as tyrannous and unreasonable, and disliked being made a party to it. There was at that time, of course, no idea of an alliance with Japan. However, one thing leads to another, sometimes of unforeseen importance. A liking for England had been so deeply implanted in the Japanese people of those days that they let their Government abandon Russia and grasp the hand of Britain in opposition to the common enemy.

The first Alliance.

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which was thus rendered possible, was a precaution against encroachments by a third Power on Japanese and British interests in eastern Asia. The third Power was, of course, Russia. The stated objects of the first Alliance were : (i) To recognize the independence of China and Korea ; and (ii) to recognize and mutually to respect the special positions of Britain in China and of Japan in China and Korea.

Put in another way, the fact that Russia was stretching forth an invading hand over Korea was recognized. If Korea were swallowed up by Russia, neither Japan herself nor the position of Britain in China would be secure any longer. It was the aim of both Japan and England to make common provision against such an eventuality. But the idea of abandoning his 'Splendid Isolation' and grasping the hand of a Far-Eastern yellow man appears to have given the Englishman some sleepless nights. It was characteristic of John Bull to fail to recognize that the advantages accruing from an alliance were mutual, and when Lord Lansdowne, Minister for Foreign Affairs at the time, made his announcement in Parliament, he said, "We have allowed Japan to contract an Alliance with us." The English did not ask themselves who first proposed an alliance, and seemed to have forgotten that they were a great deal more anxious to conclude it than the Japanese.

Japan trims her sails.

In reviewing the history of the formation of the Alliance, it must not be forgotten that Japan pursued a somewhat disreputable policy of double dealing. The reason for which was that her political crowd of the day was too ignorant to be able to penetrate the designs of the other Powers, and particularly those of Imperial Russia. We must go back to August 26, 1901. On that day a high official, Count Inouye, invited Katsura, the Prime Minister, to his house to discuss with him a proposal that the visit of the Marquis Itō Hirobumi to the centenary celebrations of Yale University should be cancelled and that the Marquis should, instead, be sent to Russia to open negotiations for a treaty. It may have been that Japan was wearying of her efforts to maintain her rightful interests in Korea in face of Russian aggression. More and more bewildered by Russian guile, unable to appreciate the ulterior motives of such far-seeing statesmen as Nicholas II and Muravieff, and forgetting the earlier example of Russia's treatment of Roumania, she thought to try the effect of a treaty. Count Inouye believed that he could not find a better man to carry out this important mission than the Marquis Itō, who, fortunately, approved of its object. He therefore proposed to send him to the Russian capital, giving out that he was making a tour of Europe and would visit Siberia.

By this time, however, Baron Hayashi Kaoru, the Japanese Minister in London, had made considerable progress in negotiations for an alliance with England. Count Katsura, for this reason and because he did not regard Japan's relations with Russia as seriously as did Count Inouye, did not take what was said to him entirely at its face value. He was, however, too adroit a politician openly to dissociate himself from Inouye, and he remarked that negotiations with England being already in progress, it was an open question which of the two policies presented the greater possibilities. He said that he would agree on condition that a final decision was not taken until Itō had been to Russia and had fully informed himself of her views.

On September 30 Katsura gave a farewell banquet to the Marquis Itō, to which he invited Yamagata and Inouye. During dinner Itō asked, "If Russia should agree to all we ask, what are we going to do? Will there then be

any need for an Anglo-Japanese Alliance?" Yamagata replied, "The Anglo-Japanese Alliance covers the whole of the Far East, of which Korea is a part only. If we can also come to a separate understanding with Russia about that part, it will be excellent. The matter is, however, too important for one person to deal with independently, and I think you should report on Russia's attitude and await the Government's decision. I would beg you to give this point your best attention."

This made Itō furious. What he wanted was an agreement with Russia, not one with Britain: he did not think a solution to the Russian question could be found in any other way. And here was Yamagata talking about the Anglo-Japanese Alliance as the principal thing and the agreement with Russia as a subsidiary measure affecting Korea alone! This was not at all what he intended. Worse, in the very negotiations by which he set so much store he was to be restricted by Yamagata! No wonder he burst out, "If I'm going to have all that bother, I'm not going. In any case, I didn't ask to go."

Inouye couldn't have this, so he turned to Itō, who was sitting next to him, and tried to reassure him by saying that he did not think that even Yamagata and Katsura meant to insist on an Anglo-Japanese Alliance at all costs. It was of no use trying to arrange things to suit themselves in Japan; nothing could result unless the other party agreed. Katsura immediately followed suit with "Of course", and between the two of them they calmed Itō down. With that, the mission to Russia was decided on.

Baron Hayashi had received on October 8, from his Foreign Minister Komura, full powers to negotiate with England. He had made such good use of his opportunities that by November 6 he had been handed the draft of a treaty. But on the 13th of the same month he received from his own Government an unexpected telegram of instructions. It was to the following effect: *'You will be informed of the Government's decision on the draft of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty as soon as possible. In the meantime proceed to Paris to meet the Marquis Itō. Show him all telegrams on the subject and use your best endeavours to secure his support for the English draft. The results of your conversations with him should be reported by telegram.'*

Hayashi had already learned from his private corre-

spondence from home of the meeting of the Genrō at Katsura's house. He knew that the chief subject of conversation had been an agreement with Russia and that, in consequence, Itō was proceeding to St. Petersburg. He was, however, in possession of an official telegram from his own Foreign Office appointing him plenipotentiary. His Government must have known that his negotiations with the British were proceeding on the accepted lines, and for it to engage at the same time in separate negotiations with Russia, with a view to entering into an agreement with her, was quite wrong. Even if an agreement with Russia was compatible with the proposed Alliance with Britain, Japan's reputation would be adversely affected if she trimmed her sails in this manner. It would be better first to conclude the Alliance with Britain, and to defer the negotiations with Russia, if still considered desirable, to a later date. He could not think that his Government intended to play a double game, and was not a little astonished by the telegram of instructions.

Hayashi knew that Itō had passed through England on his way from America and that he had arrived in Paris. On November 14 he went over to France himself and rendered a full account of the progress of his negotiations to Itō. The Marquis, for his part, had never dreamed that the negotiations with England had advanced as far as they had, and Hayashi, for his, had never imagined that his Government was sending Itō to Russia with the set purpose of negotiating a treaty. Both of them were very puzzled. After thinking the matter over, Hayashi telegraphed home suggesting further consideration, and was informed in reply that there was no change in the policy that his Government had hitherto pursued in regard to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. When this telegram was shown to the Marquis Itō he was still more puzzled. However, negotiations with England were so far advanced that it was impossible to draw back, and, after some further discussion, he agreed to support the Alliance in principle. But he had already informed the Russian Government that he was coming, and to cancel his visit would awaken suspicion. It was agreed that he should continue his journey to Russia, and that Hayashi should withhold his reply to the British draft until informed of his arrival in St. Petersburg.

On the British side there was great astonishment when it was learned that Japan was contemplating an agreement with Russia while in the act of negotiating an alliance with England. Lord Lansdowne warned Baron Hayashi, informing him that it was regretted that the Marquis Itō had not come to London, and that the British Government would be highly indignant were the Japanese Government to approach Russia with a view to a treaty while negotiating an alliance with Great Britain. Sir Francis Bertie, the Under-Secretary of State, bluntly and openly asked, "Isn't the Marquis Itō going to Russia to negotiate for a treaty?" And when Hayashi repudiated the suggestion, added, "If anything of our conversations leaks out to Russia, she'll be sure to try to make a treaty with you. It is quite on the cards that she may offer you far more favourable terms than we do, but you can't rely on her, she'll repudiate them when convenient." "That's what I think," replied Hayashi. "Well," said Bertie significantly, "you'll have to be careful, very careful."


Hayashi reported this to his Government at once, pointing out that the British Government was evidently aware that they were approaching Russia and was watching Itō's doings very closely. He urged that the Alliance should be concluded as quickly as possible, and that, until that had been done, all idea of negotiations with Russia should be dropped; they could be resumed later on some more suitable occasion. The reply was to the effect that there was not the least intention of playing a double game between Russia and England, and that Itō's visit to Russia was private and entirely unofficial: Hayashi was to reassure the British Government. After that, the business of the Alliance went ahead smoothly and very rapidly; the Japanese amendments to the British draft were handed in and seemed likely to prove acceptable.

On the other hand, Itō had arrived in St. Petersburg and had been so well received by Nicholas II, Muravieff, Lamsdorf, Witte, and others that he imagined Russia's intentions with regard to Japan to be entirely peaceful and thought that she would seriously co-operate in solving the Korean question. He therefore telegraphed to Katsura on December 7, suggesting that the ratification of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance should be deferred until it had been

decided whether or no to enter into an agreement with Russia. This telegram was received on the 9th, and on the next day Katsura summoned a Cabinet meeting to discuss it. The Cabinet resolved that as the negotiations with Russia were secret, while those with England were public, and also all but completed, the best thing to do would be to ratify the Alliance. The same day Katsura, and Komura the Foreign Minister, sought audience and laid this resolution before the Emperor, together with Itō's telegram, and asked his decision. The Emperor immediately summoned a meeting of the Genrō—Yamagata, Matsukata, Ōyama, Saigō, Inouye, and others—and referred the matter to them. They submitted a report in favour of the Cabinet's resolution. The Emperor, after remarking that Itō had on April 16, being then Prime Minister, submitted to him a proposal for a triple alliance between England, Germany, and Japan, and that on November 14 he had telegraphed from Paris concurring in the proposed Alliance with England, decided that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was to be ratified. And so it became an accomplished fact.

Thus Itō's visit to Russia ended in one of the rare failures of his life—failures as rare, one might say, as wrong characters in Confucius or Mencius. His mistake was that, failing to see through Russian duplicity, he wanted to come to an understanding with her and to discard the Alliance with England. If he had first effected an Anglo-Japanese Alliance and afterwards taken opportunity to go on with an agreement with Russia, the situation in the Far East would, in all probability, have been much improved. As it was, his mistake aroused the suspicions of the British Government and made it press on with the Alliance, fortunately for Japan. It should not be forgotten that, to this extent, his mistake turned to Japan's advantage.

Remembering all this, it behoves us Japanese to reconsider our adverse criticism of China's diplomacy. We invariably speak of it contemptuously and describe it as letting dog eat dog. But, in the days when Japan was herself a weak country, it must not be forgotten how we trimmed our sails and attempted a somewhat similar policy. It would seem, therefore, that we are not qualified to criticize the Chinese. May it not be said that when Japan was making the Anglo-Japanese Alliance she too was, in a sense, letting dog eat



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dog? But though we may have done this, it was in an extremity of doubt and suspicion. It is all a question of national strength. When there is no real national strength to back it, foreign policy must, naturally, lean on other countries. Before we condemn the Chinese we should think of this.

[Note.—The events recorded in the preceding section are taken principally from *Recent Foreign Policy*, by Professor Hirai Kumazō.]

The first Alliance was not offensive and defensive. That is, if one contracting party went to war with one country only, the other could remain neutral. Should, however, an ally appear on the scene to support the enemy, then, but not till then, would it be incumbent on the other contracting party to come to the assistance of the first. The effect of the Alliance was, then, that Japan was enabled to fight Russia without any fear of encountering other enemies, as she did at the time of the 'Three Power Interference'.

Breaches of neutrality by the Russian Fleet.

During the Russo-Japanese War, the Russian Fleet went so far as to commit breaches of neutrality on several occasions. For example, the Baltic Fleet, under Admiral Rozhdestvenski, transgressed the limits imposed by international law in Madagascar, where it received coal, water, provisions, and other facilities from the French authorities. Similar breaches occurred when the Fleet reached the waters of French Indo-China. Japan could have pointed to these and, maintaining that the action of the French had transgressed the limits of neutrality, could have demanded appropriate action by England, in accordance with the terms of the treaty of alliance. Earl Grey, formerly British Foreign Minister, has recently pointed out that Japan had the right to do this.* However, the Japanese Government was so complacent as to abstain from making a single demand of any kind: it must have possessed considerable self-control. What would England have done if Japan had put forward a demand? Would the war have been confined, as it was, to

* Grey: *Twenty-Five Years*, 1892-1916, Vol. I, p. 53.

Russia and Japan? That is a very interesting question. In any case, it is hardly too much to say that England might have thanked Japan for her self-restraint. ✓

The second Alliance.

After the Russo-Japanese War, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance required revision to meet the changed conditions in the Far East. So, on August 8, 1905, while the peace negotiations were in progress at Portsmouth, a second Alliance was concluded. The treaty went a step farther than its predecessor, which had imposed neutrality only on one of the contracting parties, and provided for a whole-hearted offensive and defensive Alliance. Further, England recognized Japan's special sphere of interest in Korea and accorded her freedom to advise, oversee, and protect that country. The form and scope of the Alliance were also extended, it being agreed :

- (i) Firmly to maintain the peace of the whole of the Far East and of India.
- (ii) To maintain the independence and territorial integrity of China and to respect the principle of the 'open door'.
- (iii) Mutually to respect the colonial rights and special interests of the contracting parties in the Far East and in India.

The chief thing that Japan and England hoped to get by this second treaty was mutual assistance in defending Korea and India against an attack by a third Power. Also, Japan was left free to annex Korea.

For many years before this Russia had been doing all she could to obtain an ice-free port. When, however, she planned to come out into the Mediterranean, she was stopped by England, under Lord Beaconsfield. When she tried again, in the Persian Gulf, she was again stopped by England, under Lord Lansdowne this time. Later, she attempted to come out into the China Sea through Port Arthur, but her plans ended in smoke owing to the Russo-Japanese War. In which direction was she to turn for an outlet? The English, aware of all this, were naturally perturbed about India. After her defeat by Japan, Russia

turned her attention to Central Asia, where she redoubled her activities : she laid a military railway to the borders of Afghanistan and became remarkably busy in Thibet. There was good reason for including India in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

But 'firmly to maintain the peace of the whole of the Far East and of India' would entail Japan acting as watch-dog should the people of India rise against the extortions of British administration. For Japan, the strong country of Asia, whose duty it is to lead the rest, to do this would be highly discreditable and would eventually place her in an insupportable position. In the face of this, how did our political crowd come to make such an agreement? One is tempted to think that the price was British tacit acquiescence in the annexation of Korea and an offensive and defensive alliance. None the less, it must not be forgotten that it was morally inadmissible for Japan to accept the duty of watch-dog over India.

Britain's dual foreign policy.

As has been said above, at the time when the first Anglo-Japanese Alliance was under discussion, certain of our statesmen got into difficulties trying to trim their sails ; they were unable to see through Russia's evil designs. That old hand England, however, used a dual foreign policy effectively to strengthen her position.

We have already seen how England made an alliance with Japan against their common enemy Russia, whose advance southward in the Far East she desired to check. Two years later, in 1904, she came to an understanding with France, directed against the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria, and Italy. This meant that her relations with Russia, who was already allied to France, became much closer, and, in 1907, developed into a formal agreement. Thus England made, on the one hand, an alliance directed against Russia and, on the other, treated the same country as a friend and came to an amicable agreement with her. The two actions were logically inconsistent.

It is in his ability calmly and unhesitatingly to do things like this that John Bull is so great and shows that he is a past-master in diplomacy.

There are two things that should not be overlooked in

this matter of England's treaty with Russia, apart from any question of that with France. One is the persistent threat of war from the Triple Alliance. The other is that Japan's *rapprochement* with Russia, over American activities in regard to Manchuria, may have been the indirect result of England's *rapprochement* with the same country. What we have to learn from England is to avoid indecision and trimming, and to adopt a dual policy with one definite object in view.

The third Alliance.

Japan and England, who had revised their Alliance to make it offensive and defensive, were freed from anxiety for a while after Russia had been driven from the Far East. But very soon the situation changed again. The development of Japan began to cause concern to England, and America began to take a part on the Far Eastern stage. The first of these two will be dealt with in a later section (Cap. I, section 3), the second will be discussed here.

As the curtain fell on the Russo-Japanese War, there was a sudden change in America's attitude which, till then, had been friendly to Japan. Her obstruction of Japanese expansion in Manchuria and Mongolia and her own forward policy there : Japan's protests at the annexation of Hawaii and over the immigration question : all these tended to estrange the two peoples, and relations became so strained that the possibility of war was freely discussed.

As the talk of war went on, Yankee concern at the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which was to them like 'a cist over the eye', deepened and began to find expression in denunciations of England. This was only natural, for the second Alliance being offensive and defensive, England would find herself in the awkward predicament of having to come in on the side of Japan in a war against America. The Americans began to get excited and to indulge in hysterics. It was claimed, for instance, that 'Japan designs to absorb China and to capture the Philippines. Her abettor in these criminal actions is England.' And again, 'If Japan goes to war with us, England will have to join her and is therefore equally our enemy. America should start a spiritual crusade against England.'

England was seriously concerned at these denunciations.

The idea of being obliged to fight America was very far from anything she had in mind when she made the Alliance. It was repugnant to Englishmen, and especially so to the self-governing Dominions in the Pacific. Australia, New Zealand, and Canada had already prohibited Japanese immigration and made no secret of their disapproval of the Alliance. Australia had even decided to have a navy of her own as a defence against a possible Japanese invasion. In addition, England herself had to humour America in order to maintain her position in Europe. These considerations led the British Government to propose a revision of the Treaty. This was effected in July 1911, the only important alteration being the insertion of a clause exempting either contracting party from making war on a third country with whom it had a comprehensive treaty of arbitration. The object of this clause was to free England from the obligation of making war on America, with whom she was, at the time, negotiating a treaty of arbitration. The Japanese Government naturally objected, protesting that there was no prospect of war with America, but England, obsessed as it were by a bogey, did not agree. Our Government again displayed the most praiseworthy forbearance and, on the ground that without the clause England would be in a very difficult position, sympathetically accepted it.

Looked at from the Japanese point of view, all fear of Russia had been removed and the only potential enemy was America. If that country were to be excluded from the scope of the Treaty, the offensive and defensive value of the Alliance would be lost. Further, considered as a legal instrument, the clause 'with whom it has a comprehensive treaty of arbitration' does not specify America, but is of general application. Whenever England wished to evade her obligations she would be able to put forward a pettifogging plea that this clause applied. The Alliance had, in fact, become distasteful to England, and at the third revision she took opportunity to render it ineffective and thereby sacrificed Japan.

Did we receive any thanks, from either England or America, for our forbearance? Or any apology for the way in which we had been sacrificed? That I will discuss later on: here I shall confine myself to recording the utterly senseless way in which we were treated.

Japan in the Great War.

The attitude of England during the Great War is a remarkable example of the fact that she does not forget, even in the hour of national peril when her very existence is at stake, to provide against possible future calamities by discreetly limiting the activities of other countries.

As everyone knows, in the Great War Japan planned, in accordance with the terms of the Alliance, to attack Tsing-Tao and to take the German Pacific Islands. And who of all people tried to restrain her but England, her ally?

Earl Grey, who was British Foreign Minister at the time, has described the Alliance at the beginning of the Great War as embarrassing. Britain knew that she could rely on her Far Eastern ally, but feared that extensive operations by her might adversely affect public opinion in America. Further, neither Australia nor New Zealand would welcome Japan as a successor to Germany in the Pacific. The British Government found themselves, therefore, in the unenviable position of having to ask a loyal ally to limit both her action and her prospects of ultimate territorial gain.*

The Alliance was, in fact, so embarrassing that at the beginning of the war the British Government did not ask of us anything so handsome as a declaration of war against Germany. All they asked for were such minor matters as seeking out and destroying German ships of war in the Pacific and protecting British trade. They were astonished when they heard that we proposed to attack Tsing-Tao and to take the German Pacific Islands. When they were informed that we proposed to declare war, they tried by every means at their disposal to stop us. However, our Cabinet had already decided to go to war, our preparations were well advanced and we could not turn back.

So the Japanese Government addressed the following Note to the British :

In view of the British requests, the Japanese Cabinet has already decided on war and the necessary preparations for military and naval operations are being made : it only remains to declare war. Were we to stop now, the fact that we did so at the unexpected request of the British Government would, we fear,

* Grey of Fallodon : *Twenty-Five Years*, Vol. II, pp. 99-100.

seriously detract from the value of the Alliance. Public opinion in this country is for war with Germany : to change it in a short time would be well-nigh impossible. England has already applied to Japan for assistance, and we would beg you most carefully to consider the position of the Japanese Government were that request now to be cancelled.

After receiving this Note, the British Government reluctantly consented to a declaration of war by Japan. When giving their consent, they expressed the hope that Japanese operations would be limited to certain areas and asked for a declaration that they would not be extended beyond the south-western part of the China Sea, the North Pacific, and the Bay of Kiaou-Chōw. As Earl Grey says in his memoirs, the reason for all this was a desire to remove all possibility of offending the susceptibilities of America and the self-governing Dominions in the Pacific. Such embarrassing limitations were not, however, possible in practice : difficulties were bound to arise. And, in addition to British requests for armed assistance, there was the question of our 'face' to be considered. Our Government drew attention to this difficulty and refused to comply. Eventually the British gave way, but only agreed to a declaration of war without any clause limiting the sphere of operations on the understanding that in actual fact they would be so limited—a most unfriendly attitude.

As might have been expected, this question gave rise to difficulties over the disposal of the German Pacific Islands. After the fall of Tsing-Tao, our Fleet proceeded to take the islands of Yap, Angaur, the Marshalls, the Marianne Group, and the Carolines. Japan represented to the British Government that, as the natural reward of her action, the islands should become Japanese territory. The British reply was to the effect that the occupation of the German Pacific Islands by the British and Japanese naval forces was a temporary measure, and that their disposal would have to be discussed, together with that of other occupied territories, at the Peace Conference. While concurring in principle, the Japanese Government asked the British to support, at the proper time, their contention that all the German islands north of the Equator should be handed over to Japan *in perpetuo*, as the natural reward of the work done by the Japanese Navy. The British

Government repeated what they had said before and refused to commit themselves. A temporary settlement of this question was reached later on, for, when we sent destroyer flotillas to the Mediterranean to protect Allied, or, more particularly, British trade routes, we made this demand one of our conditions, and England at last agreed. But, at the Paris Peace Conference, the principle of annexation was repudiated and that of administration by mandatories of the League of Nations substituted for it. Now that Japan has withdrawn from the League this action has provided fuel for another conflagration.

[On the question of our mandates in the Pacific, reference to the author's *War Clouds over the Pacific* is requested.]

Continuation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Although Japan earnestly desired that the Alliance should be continued, it had been viewed with disfavour in England from the time of its third revision. There was a variety of reasons for this : The principal aim and end of England's policy in China was the maintenance of her possessions and of her financial supremacy ; after the war with Russia, Japan was thought to have inclined towards militarism ; England considered that Japan's commercial and industrial activities in Manchuria interfered with her own ; in 1920, England, on her own initiative, proposed a four-power loan to China, the object of which was to check Japanese financial activities in Eastern Asia ; after the making of the Anglo-Russian Treaty in 1907, the Alliance, as directed against Russia, had lost its point and was considered no longer necessary. But a much stronger reason than any of these was the thought, as relations between Japan and America grew more strained, of being dragged in willy-nilly to fight America. Japan's representatives protested that even if, by any chance, she did go to war with America, it would not mean that England would have to come to her assistance. And in order to pacify England, they went so far as to make offers and advances which were hardly consistent with Japan's dignity. However, the English were too obsessed with their bogey to listen.

On the American side, denunciations of the Alliance grew louder and more insistent. The Americans pointed to

the Twenty-one Demands presented by Japan to China ; they saw in the dispatch of troops to Siberia a military clique making the most of its opportunities ; they made the Alliance their special butt, arguing that it encouraged Japan's aggressive militarist policy.

In June 1921, just one month before the third Alliance was due to expire, a British Empire Conference was opened in London. The representatives of Australia and New Zealand rose several times to advocate the abolition of the Alliance. Before this, on the occasion of the visit of an American squadron to Australia in 1908, it had been stated, in public, that 'To make an alliance with Japan who is only waiting her opportunity to seize Australia is simply madness. If we are to take anyone's hand, let it be America's.' This slogan of Wood's, the Premier of New Zealand, made the Americans shout ' 'Rah ! 'Rah ! ' and was taken up like a college yell again and again. What especially attracted attention was the fact that Canada, who had hitherto opposed the abolition of the Alliance, now warmly advocated it. Meigen, the Canadian representative, said that his people were much perturbed at Japanese economic penetration in British Columbia, and that they detested the Japanese. And, more than that, the continued existence of the Alliance accelerated American naval and military expansion and thereby would, he feared, increase the financial burden that Canada had to bear for national defence. Under these circumstances a majority of the Conference was in favour of abolition.

However, there were well-informed people in England who did not overlook the fact that the abolition of the Alliance might adversely affect British trade in China. They knew that it was a strong pillar supporting the profitable position held by Britain in Eastern Asia. Among them was Earl Grey, who had always attached importance to it. Even after he had retired from office, in 1916, he continued earnestly to hope that the Alliance would not be dropped.

The Prime Minister at the time, Lloyd George, with his well-known opportunism, having first persuaded the Overseas Dominions to agree, made a public and official announcement, through Lord Birkenhead, the Lord Chancellor, to the effect that the term of the Alliance was prolonged *sine die*. After this announcement, and only six days before the

Alliance was due to expire, the following Note was sent to the League of Nations :

The two Governments, of Japan and England, sent a joint Note to the League of Nations of date the eighth of July, 1920, in which they recognized the principle that any prolongation beyond July 1921 of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of the thirteenth of July 1911 should conform to the articles of the Covenant of the League of Nations. They now inform the League that as a provisional measure they have agreed to the following : If the steps directed to be taken by the Treaty of Alliance in any matter that may arise while it is in force are at variance with those which the Covenant directs, the latter should be preferred.

The effect of this Note was theoretically to cancel England's treaty obligation to lend military assistance to Japan. In particular, questions at issue between Japan and America could be referred to the League and settled by it (Art. 17 of the Covenant). In such a case, England's obligation would be simply to conform to the League's dispositions. The special military complexion of the Alliance, then, had gone. In the words of the *Ōsaka Mainichi*, 'the Anglo-Japanese Alliance has, in the end, become a ghost' : hardly an overstatement.

The Alliance strangled.

Although the Alliance had become a ghost, the British Government was still anxious. For one thing, relations between Japan and America were becoming more and more strained, and it seemed possible that war might break out at any time. It decided, therefore, to cancel the Alliance, but it could not do so with a clear conscience unless Japan fully concurred. After considerable thought, it proposed to call a Pacific Conference with the object of preventing strife between America, over whom the difficulty had arisen, and Japan and England. The three countries, and, if necessary, a few others, were to be invited to attend and to exchange views. America was sounded as a start, but at that moment she was set on a conference on limitation of armament to be held at Washington, and, in preparation for it, had got as far as privately consulting England. Further, as the American Government did not at all like the idea of England usurping its place as originator of such an important

conference, it suggested that a discussion of Far Eastern and Pacific questions should be added to that of limitation of armament. In the end England gave way, and the conference was opened at Washington.

Before this happened, well-informed people in England had been advising the Government to make the conference its opportunity to get rid of the Alliance. I will give a characteristic example of the sort of thing that was being said from an article by Wickham Steed, a leader writer in the *Review of Reviews*, the sort of person who had been advocating from behind the scenes co-operation with America to do away with the Alliance :

Japan comes to the Washington Conference a militarist Power : her statesmen and her diplomats have no voice in the determination of policy. With her very strong Navy she is ready to make war. If she does so, she can take the Philippines and Guam, establish herself in financial and political control of China, and become the dominating Power in the Far East. All this is directly contrary to British interests. Further, although England might wish to keep out of a war between Japan and America, there is always the danger that her Self-Governing Dominions in the Pacific might be drawn in. The wisest policy is for England to go hand-in-hand with America.

Note, reader, that the same idea cropped up again at the next disarmament conference two or three years later.

In the end, the Washington Conference succeeded in strangling the Alliance. The fourth article of the Four-Power Pacific Convention says, 'As this Treaty comes into force, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance comes to an end'.

This brief process brought to their close twenty years of history and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance with its honourable record of having maintained peace in the Far East.

Grey on the Alliance.

To end these reflections I cannot do better than to refer my readers to that great diplomat Edward Grey. He speaks of Japan as a fair and honourable ally, always considerate of British difficulties. He refers to the restraint with which she took advantage of her opportunities in the Great War, and he asks those who may have to deal with her in the future to remember her constant loyalty to an Alliance

that was in force during the whole eleven years of his tenure of office.*

All that Grey says is true, and if it be that God is revealed in the honesty of man's intentions, England has indeed gone against His will.

And if, after that wrongful strangling of the Alliance, she suffered the pain of disillusionment, she deserved it.

(3) *The Pain of Disillusionment.*

After abandoning the Alliance it was not long before England tasted the bitterness of disillusionment. This was most noticeable in the recrudescence of Russian schemes to encroach on British preserves by expanding to the southward, and in what befell the British in China. I will deal with the second of these first.

The affair of May 30.

At the Washington Conference China achieved, with the backing of the Powers and of America in particular, a very advantageous position. She used it to press vigorously for the restitution of her sovereign rights. As, however, she failed to produce the desired effect on the foreigners, she changed her tactics and started an anti-foreign boycott. Her attack was first directed against Japan, then against Japan and England together, and finally, when Japan adopted a tolerant attitude, against England alone. Being singled out for attack, England suffered more than any other country.

In February 1925 anti-foreign action opened with a strike at the works of the Home and Foreign Cotton Company, a concern at Shanghai administered by Japanese, and spread rapidly. On May 30 an anti-Japanese demonstration of students and labourers came unexpectedly into collision with the Indian Police in the Nankin Road, one of the principal streets in the International Settlement at Shanghai. A police patrol fired on the mob and there were several casualties. As it seemed probable that the anti-foreign movement would spread, the authorities declared a state of emergency in the Settlement, mobilized the

* *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 100-101.

volunteers, and got landing parties ashore from the foreign ships of war to act as patrols.

The rioters were, however, much encouraged by the sympathetic attitude of the Chinese officials, and the Wai Chiao Pu steadfastly refused to allow the Chinese troops in the Arsenal to be used, although three applications were made to it by the foreign consular body. Representatives of the Chinese Government, sent from Peking, asserted themselves to the extent of presenting three demands to the consular body and were generally aggressive. Finally, the rioting spread to the whole of Shanghai, and mobs even attacked the police-station and the volunteers. If this sort of thing continued there was no knowing where it might end.

After a while, however, the Chamber of Commerce came to an understanding with the Shanghai Industrial Council (Tsung Kung Hui), which was the centre of the movement, and the incident was closed for the time being. But the anti-foreign boycott went on as before and, in connexion with it, attacks on Imperialism and demands for the cancellation of unfair treaties and for radical changes in the semi-colonial character of the foreign concessions were most insistent and even violent. The following extract from a telegram sent by Tuan Chih-Chang and the Wai Chiao Pu to all the military and civil provincial Governors is worthy of note :

England alone is responsible for the Shanghai affair, the other countries were not concerned in it. If the people indulge in anti-foreign proceedings generally, the other countries will draw together and we shall lose their sympathy.

Mark ! The anti-foreign movement was started against Japan : in a short time England was bearing the brunt of it. We may sympathize with her, but it may well have been retribution, the inevitable and natural result of her own misdeed, in that she, of her own accord, strangled the Alliance. The affair of May 30 gave a great impulse to the anti-foreign movement in places other than Shanghai, and anti-British activities started everywhere.

Anti-British Movement in Hankow.

During the afternoon of June 11 thousands of out-of-work coolies, incited by student agitators, burst into the

British Concession at Hankow. The authorities dispersed them for the time being with the aid of the volunteers and of landing parties from ships. But the disorder increased : the mob came into collision with the volunteers and there were many casualties.

Fortunately, the mob was put off by the strenuous efforts of Su Tu-pien and by a sum of money subscribed by the Chamber of Commerce and paid into the fund of the movement. But the anti-British activities went on as before, and the British were compelled to modify their uncompromising attitude and ultimately to restore their Concession to China.

Anti-foreign Movement in Kiukiang.

On June 13 Kiukiang met with a similar fate. Students egged on a large mob to force its way into the British Concession, where it got completely out of control. The Municipal Office of Works asked for a ship to be sent, but none was near enough. While the Concession was in this defenceless state the Japanese and British Consulates and the British municipal offices were pillaged and destroyed. Before long a Chinese patrol arrived, and parties were landed from Japanese and British ships. Eventually, even this disturbance was quelled.

Anti-British Movement in Hongkong and Canton.

The affair of May 30 was the precursor of serious troubles in Canton and also in Hongkong, the special features of which were a pronounced Communistic tendency and vociferous demands for the expulsion of the British.

Students in Canton had been very excited over the affair of May 30 and, under instructions from the leader of the Communist party, had been organizing an anti-foreign movement. On June 21 they got all the Chinese 'boys' employed in the British Concession to leave Shameen, and from that time on matters grew so much worse that the Concession was in imminent danger of attack. On June 23 a mob of students and labourers, who had been joined by two thousand Chinese soldiers under arms, came into collision with the armed parties that had been landed from British and French ships. There were casualties on both sides, and the outlook was very black.

About the same time the Hongkong students, instigated

by Canton, became active. On June 19 they started a strike of the Chinese employees of the Hongkong, Macao, and Canton Steamboat Company, a British concern. Next, the Seamen's Guild declared a general strike of all Chinese seamen in foreign ships. Then all the newspaper and tramway men went on strike.

By way of combating the movement, the Hongkong Government declared a blockade of Canton and forbade the export of food-stuffs, gold and silver specie, fuel, wines, and coal. It also took steps to break the strikes in the island, relying, as always, on strong measures.

The Canton Government retaliated by declaring a blockade of Hongkong and by stopping all trade with that place and with Macao. It refused to allow any goods from either of those two places, whether in transit or not, to be landed, and forbade the sale of any British goods in store. At the same time all Chinese were withdrawn from British factories and shops both in Canton and in Hongkong. This was a severe blow to both British and Chinese merchants, and especially to those in Hongkong.

At this, the British threw up the sponge and opened unofficial negotiations with a view to coming to terms. But the proposals put forward by the two sides were so much at variance that there was no prospect of an immediate settlement. The anti-British party in Canton became more active than ever, and the English reverted to their strong measures, sending landing parties to recover by force the British wharves and motor-boats that were being used by the strikers.

However, just at this moment the Party of the Right got the upper hand of that of the Left in the Canton Government and, realizing that it would not pay to prolong hostilities with England indefinitely, came to terms.

The Wan-hsien affair.

The next incident occurred at Wan-hsien. It started in August 1926 with the swamping of two boatloads of Chinese soldiers on the Upper Yangtze, near Wan-hsien in Szechuan, by the wash of a British vessel. On hearing of it, the local Chinese officials promptly seized two British ships that happened to be in port. The British protested and pressed for their return, but the Chinese obstinately refused.

Eventually, two gun-boats were dispatched to Wan-hsien, where parties sent from them to recapture the two ships came into collision with Chinese troops.

British distress.

The continued occurrence of anti-British outbreaks in China caused England great distress.

Since the nineteenth century England has ruled the world, helped 'by great lumps of coal and iron', as the French critic Michelet put it, and riding on the flood-tide of Free Trade and Industrial Revolution. With the Great War her prosperity reached its climax : it remains for her painfully to stumble down the slope beyond ; electricity and oil are replacing coal as the motive power of industry ; international trade is changing its complexion ; Free Trade is being replaced by Protection and by block systems of tariffs. As the result, British trade, when compared with that before the War, shows a remarkable decrease. John Bull's throne is, at last, in danger. On top of all this has come the Chinaman's anti-British movement. For the English, indeed, 'bees have stung a crying face'.

Just consider British trade with China. It has been harder hit than ever before. In 1925, the year of the May 30 affair, British imports into China dropped to 338 million taels, a fall of 113 million taels from the year before. At this rate it will not be long before America or Japan captures the British commercial position in China.

The next phase of the anti-British movement was a positive agitation to recover the lost Concessions—the leases of Hongkong [*sic*] and Kowloon, as a matter of course, and the Concession at Shanghai, the return of which was vociferously demanded during the May 30 affair. These special rights are the mainstay, the very heart, of England's influence in China. To lose these three Concessions, apart from any others, would amount to being driven out of China. Under these circumstances, should England fail to put a stop to the anti-British movement, she would not only lose her status in the Far East, but also, later on, her dominion over India and her prestige in Persia and Afghanistan would be affected. In other words, England would receive a fatal blow. She had to alter her methods of dealing with China.

From coercion to conciliation.

The English tried to suppress the anti-British movement when it first started with strong measures, but as they continually burned their fingers they began to realize that this did not pay. Not long after the Wan-hsien incident they changed their attitude and adopted a policy of conciliation. This is seen in the new proposals circulated in December 1926 to the signatories of the Washington Treaty by O'Malley, the British Chargé d'Affaires in Peking, and by the eloquent speech of Chamberlain, the British Foreign Minister, in January 1927. The main points of the new proposals were :

- (i) The Powers should respond to China's legitimate aspirations and no longer maintain that her political and financial prosperity is only possible with foreign support.
- (ii) If China should desire to impose new customs duties, the Powers should at once recognize her autonomous right to do so.
- (iii) China's legitimate demands for the revision of treaties should be agreed to.
- (iv) Extra-territorial rights, such as those attaching to Church property, should be revised at once. Increases in customs duties should be accepted at once and unconditionally.
- (v) Steps should be taken, in due course, to return to China certain British leased territories.

This announcement marked an astounding change from the high-handed policy England had pursued up to that time and in her attitude to such questions as the supervision of finance and of the railways, and also to that of granting tariff autonomy, a matter in which she had opposed Japan at the Customs Congress.

It is an open question whether England would have given way to this extent had the Alliance still been in force. In the first place she would have endeavoured, in co-operation with Japan, to maintain peace in China. She would never have been reduced to currying favour with China in order to steal a march on Japan. In the second she would not, in all probability, have driven China into

the arms of Russia and so given a dangerous direction to the movement for the restitution of sovereign rights.

England's new proposals met with little response from the Powers. It was not that a liberal policy in China was thought to be wrong in principle. It was rather that since the Washington Conference the Powers were no longer in accord: they looked on the British proposals with something approaching suspicion and, with different interests at stake, were not prepared to agree to them without discussion. The British proposals, then, must be described as a splendid failure, and once again England learned how 'bees sting a crying face'.

The return of the Hankow and Kiukiang Concessions.

The Wu-han Government took no notice of England's overtures, but in league with Soviet Russia fanned the anti-British movement of the masses. The incidents of May 30, at Wan-hsien, and at Shameen had made so deep an impression that disturbances broke out again with fierce energy. At length, on January 3, 1927, a mob rushed into the British Concession at Hankow and defied the English with insults and abuse. The British landed armed parties and stationed volunteers at the police offices, but with the bitter experience of the incident of May 30 in mind, they avoided coming into conflict with the mob, and left it to do as it pleased. Almost directly afterwards the British residential quarter at Kiukiang went through a similar experience. There, too, the mob captured the Concession, and the British officials let it alone to do as it pleased. In this way the administration of the Concessions passed completely into the hands of Chinese officials.

One thing in particular should be noted. It might naturally have been expected that the other foreign Concessions would have met with a fate similar to that of the British. But the Chinese were aiming at England only: they left the other Concessions alone. The Chinese leaders knew very well that it would be a great mistake to involve the other Powers, who, though they gave England their sympathy, were taking no action, but standing aside and looking on. At this time more than at any other, England had reason to regret the abandoned Alliance.

Even Great Britain found herself in dire straits, and sent 20,000 troops to China from home and from India, and assembled them at Shanghai. This, however, served but to stimulate the Chinese and to make negotiations about the Concessions more difficult than ever. In consequence, Chamberlain, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, realizing that he would have to give way instead of using ball-cartridge, recognized the Wu-han National Government and opened negotiations. To save further loss of face the Concessions to Hankow and Kiukiang were returned to the Chinese.

Return of the Concessions at Chinkiang, Weihaiwei, and Amoy.

To give way one step is to give way ten. This is especially true in China. England had already lost Hankow and Kiukiang : China was sure to take advantage of her weakness to deprive her of other Concessions and leased territories. The expected happened : Chinkiang was the first to go, in November 1929, the leased territory at Weihaiwei followed in April 1930, and the Concession at Amoy in September of the same year. The return of Weihaiwei was natural enough, as it had been agreed to at the Washington Conference. Leaving on one side the effect on England's prestige, it can hardly be said that the return of these Concessions and leased territories did not affect her business interests. The England of the old days would have taken a very strong line and there might well have been another Opium War. We can picture to ourselves what she went through, the British Empire suffering in silence with the tears running down its cheeks ! It is no exaggeration to say that England lost her position in China because she had abandoned the Alliance.

Russia comes south.

Another calamity that befell England was the red hand of Soviet Russia reaching out to the southward. As has already been explained, all the backbone had been taken out of the Alliance on the ground that Russia, the common enemy, no longer threatened. But when at last England 'strangled' it, she had not long to wait before she found herself, such is the irony of Fate, threatened by the southward advance of the Red instead of the Imperial Russia.

From the first, one of the principal objects of the Communist International has been to deal British finance a mortal blow and so to remove the great obstacle to the accomplishment of the World Revolution it wants. To this end it stirred up the masses of China to deprive the English of their valuable privileges and to drive them out. It hoped by this means to embarrass British rule in India and to make England lose her position in Afghanistan and Persia. In the incidents of May 30, at Hankow, Canton, and Hongkong, it was the Russian Communist International and none other that controlled the Chinese Communist Party and waved the flag 'Away with England'.

Russia and Outer Mongolia.

Russia stretched out her Red Hand not only over China Proper but also over the outlying territories. On earlier occasions she had intruded into Outer Mongolia, she sent troops there in 1921, and in November of that year, ignoring the existence of China, recognized a Mongolian Government and concluded a treaty with it at Moscow. Each Government agreed to forbid the formation in its territory of organizations hostile to the other, and not to allow the transport of arms. In January 1924 Russia went farther and interfered in the internal administration of Mongolia. In November of that year she imposed a constitution on the Russian model, and in the end reduced the country to a protectorate. This spread of Russian influence was fraught with danger to the historically and intimately related country of Thibet and, in consequence, to India. England, as guardian of India, was interested in Thibet, and naturally had to take steps to counteract Russian influence there.

Afghanistan and Persia.

England had recognized the independence of Afghanistan in the Treaties of 1919 and 1921 in the hope of maintaining her position. But in more recent years Russian activities have been gradually estranging that country from her and drawing it nearer to Russia.

Then again, Persia, as a country rich in oil, has attracted the attention of England, who made a treaty with it in 1919 and converted it into a protectorate. But since then Russia

has begun to supplant her, after weakening her influence by successful diplomatic activities.

In addition to this, Turkestan, Bokhara, and Khiva, in Central Asia, were annexed by Russia in 1924. Bokhara and Khiva have acted as buffer states between her on the one hand and Afghanistan and India on the other. Now that they have become nothing more nor less than a part of Russia, one might prophesy that they will be used by her to facilitate an invasion of India.

Revival of the Alliance.

We have seen that the position of England today is very poor as compared with that which she held while the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was in force. It is small wonder, then, that Englishmen, regretting past glories, have been discussing its revival. The following is taken from a leading article in the *North China Daily News*, a British paper.

England, with her diplomatic vision obscured in the uncertain atmosphere after the War, and under a deep sense of responsibility to her creditor America, sacrificed the valuable Anglo-Japanese Alliance to please Canada and Australia. But we are convinced that the spirit of the Alliance is still of the greatest importance to both countries.

Further, Mr. Chamberlain, in an unofficial speech in November 1924, expressed the hope that England and Japan would draw together again. In the responsible position of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs he had had, as we have seen, a bitter experience of affairs in China.

Then there was Garvin, in a long article in the *Observer*, saying that the Alliance ought to be renewed, and speaking of it in almost affectionate terms. Presumably he expressed the views of educated and well-informed people.

But a renewal is far from easy ; there are many difficulties. First of all there are the feelings of the Japanese people. England had little thought for them when she so unjustly strangled the Alliance : all she thought of was casting up the account of profit and loss. We Japanese feel that a casual renewal would touch our national dignity. We have a tradition of keeping our hands clean, and are wont to despise people that are too calculating.

On the British side, too, there are difficulties. The first is the commercial competition with Japan in China. As explained later on, England used to hold first place in the China trade, but since the Great War Japan has rapidly been overtaking her and will soon, it seems, oust her from that desirable position. Of more recent years, the same state of affairs has obtained in the British overseas possessions, and it is today the greatest obstacle to the growth of friendly feeling.

The second is British relations with America. After the Great War England weighed Japan against America as a country with whom to act in concert. While not overlooking the disadvantages from which she might suffer in Eastern Asia and India were she estranged from Japan, or the possibility of serious conflicts of opinion with America, she preferred a *rapprochement* with a country which was of her own kin and at the same time the strongest in the world. In a word, she chose to play for safety. This was, beyond question, both inconsistent and disgraceful. The England of today is not the England of pre-War days. Even if we assume that every nation in the world had to bow to America, it makes it all the worse that England should have taken her hand, while dropping that of Japan, and have yielded to force of circumstances in spite of the disgrace and the inconsistency.

The third obstacle to a renewal of the Alliance is the anti-Japanese and pro-American attitude of the British Self-Governing Dominions. Of these, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, all of whom are intimately concerned in the Pacific question, have always been against the Alliance. Canada marches with the United States, but has not a single soldier or a single fort on the frontier. If Japan went to war with the United States and England were drawn into the maelstrom by the Alliance, the first to be drenched by the spray would be Canada, and her people do not for a moment forget it.

Australia, committed to the principle of a 'White Australia', naturally dislikes a stream of Japanese immigrants, and is afraid of Japanese expansion to the southward. On broad lines, very similar considerations apply to New Zealand.

Nowadays these Self-Governing Dominions have a

voice in foreign affairs, they are no longer slaves, they consider themselves sister countries under one king. Should, then, England insist on renewing the Alliance, it is possible that they might break away from her and join America.

For reasons such as these, there is but little prospect of a renewal of the Alliance, for all that a certain section earnestly desires it. If it has become impossible for the two countries to go hand-in-hand, their ways must lie apart. Their relations in the Pacific permit of no middle course.

As might be foreseen, the Manchurian question proved a turning point, and the friend of yesterday has become the foe of today.

Speaking broadly, it is the natural result of the denunciation of the Alliance.

CHAPTER II

BRITISH PRESSURE ON JAPAN

(I) *England Heads the League of Nations*

England's clever diplomacy.

DURING the Chino-Japanese affair, Mr. Stimson, United States Secretary of State, sent a wireless-telephone message, at a cost of \$45 for every three minutes, peremptorily telling the League of Nations not to recognize Manchukuo, in the formation of which the Nine-Power Treaty and the No-War Pact had been violated. The Japanese people flared up and retorted with 'Mind your own business'. But none of them realized in the least that behind the scenes prompting America was a clever actor called England.

'England influences 70 per cent of the League.'

'The leading part in the thirteen-to-one turn was played by England.'

'England has let Japan down at the last moment. It is mainly her fault that Japan has to withdraw from the League.'

The truth of these statements was not realized by the Japanese delegates until later, until, in fact, it was too late. So that the diplomacy of the British was clever.

John Bull's method of conducting his foreign affairs, when his own major interests have not directly been affected, and even when he has been acting in concert with another Power against a common enemy, has always been to let someone else bear the brunt, while he himself, all unconcerned, has avoided making any sacrifices. But once it has appeared to him that his interests are at stake, he has sprung up fiercely enough to take a hand himself. That is

England's way of doing things, and is exactly what she did in the China-Japan affair. Where the Japanese failed at Geneva was in their inability to see through this trick.

England and the China affair.

What did England really want in this dispute between Japan and China? She had three main objects :

- (i) To uphold the Convention of the League of Nations, the Washington Treaty, and the No-War Pact.
- (ii) To preserve the territorial integrity of China.
- (iii) To maintain her own political and economic supremacy in China.

Of these, the first was to preserve peace in Europe and to protect her world-wide interests, and the second and third to help her to retain the pre-eminence she had succeeded in attaining in China. She was prepared silently to acquiesce in Japanese activities only so long as they did not violate these three principles. Once they did so in the least degree, she moved other countries to oppose them and, if she thought that they directly affected any of her major interests, took the lead herself. It is of the first importance to an understanding of England's behaviour in the affair with China that this fact should be fully appreciated.

Upholding the Treaties of Peace.

As will be seen from the instances cited below, England has steadfastly and continuously opposed Japan's action and claims in China, under cover of upholding the League of Nations, the No-War Pact, and similar Treaties of Peace. Although *The Times* has upon occasion shown in very fair articles a certain amount of sympathy for Japan, its general tone is anti-Japanese. The two following articles may be taken as representing its views. One appeared directly after the League had invited America to act as 'Observer', in accordance with the thirteen-to-one resolution : the other was published when it was confirmed that Japan had withdrawn from the League.

Is force to rule the relations between States or are they to be governed by arbitration and judicial settlement? In other words, are we to follow the methods of the new diplomacy or those of

the old? That is the immediate and fundamental question; the answer to be given to it may be of immense importance to the future stability of the world. That consideration must indeed take precedence over the merits of the dispute itself.

The Japanese Government has many grievances against China, and until today has been very patient. But its forces have taken matters into their own hands, have occupied Manchuria, and have dropped bombs in many places. These are, clearly, acts of war, but the Japanese Government denies it and makes out that the occupation is defensive, and proposes to enter into direct negotiations with China from the position of vantage it has obtained. This is nothing more nor less than the old diplomacy. Such methods were frequently adopted in the nineteenth century, excited no comment and seemed to have been effective, but they are directly contrary to the fundamental diplomatic principles of the recently founded League of Nations and also to the spirit of the No-War Pact.

If Japan had resorted to the arbitration of the League first, and then, having failed to gain satisfaction, had taken action, she would have commanded wide sympathies and could have turned the convention of the League to her own advantage. But the action of her soldiers has enabled China to appeal to the League as an invaded country and has made it necessary for the League to exert its authority to the full in order to effect a peaceful solution. Should the League fail in this, it will lose its power and the new diplomacy will be shaken to its foundations! (16/10/31.)

Mr. Matsuoka, the Japanese delegate, referred to the confusion that reigns in China and pointed to the fact that her Government is one in name only. But this state of affairs is not new, it obtained at the time of the Washington Conference, and was taken into consideration by the Powers concerned. The Nine Power Treaty was made to maintain the territorial integrity of a China that was in that condition and to prevent other countries from taking advantage of its weakness.

Japan is censured because, disregarding this Treaty, she has occupied a large tract of Chinese territory by military force and has declared it independent. Actions such as these are beyond question contrary to both the letter and spirit of the Covenant of the League of Nations and the No-War Pact. In each of the above-mentioned three Treaties, Japan agreed to co-operate with the other Powers in regard to China and to submit disputes with her to arbitration. But the action taken by the Japanese forces in September of the year before last did not conform to this agreement.

We do not doubt the truth of Mr. Matsuoka's statement that Japan is anxious to maintain peace in the Far East, and we do not deny that she will establish good government and act generally in the interests of Manchuria. But the fact remains that in contravention of the Treaties she has had recourse to armed force without appealing to the League. The League does not wish to force on her its solution, which she has rejected, but it is the duty of all its members to deny support to a country that insists, as she has done, on her own independent solution. (25/2/33.)*

Anti-Japanese speech by the Leader of the Labour Party.

A recent discussion in the House of Commons shows clearly that the hostile attitude to Japan over the China affair is not confined to one political party. On February 17, 1933, during the session that opened directly after Japan had withdrawn from the League, Mr. Lansbury, in explaining the position of his own party, said that he desired to elicit from the Government a comprehensive statement of its policy in regard to the situation in the Far East and to the decisions of the League of Nations upon it. There were many points in the policy adopted by the Japanese Government in its dispute with China with which the Labour Party found itself unable to agree, but that did not alter in the least the feelings of goodwill that it entertained for the Japanese people. Nothing could alter the fact that the Japanese forces had advanced into Manchuria without any official declaration of war. Chinese villages had been brutally destroyed. If that was not war, a reasonable man would want to know what was. If the League was to exercise its function of preserving peace at all, it would have to take appropriate action much sooner than it had done in this instance. If, instead, it wasted time in vacillation and indecision, the war would have run its course before any steps had been taken to prevent it. It was not impossible that the situation in Manchuria might develop into a war between Japan and Russia. It was an insane idea to attempt to carry out a policy which had for its keynote the prevention of the spread of Communism in the Far East. The Covenant of the League of Nations had been flouted by Japan. If England could not make up her mind to uphold the League

* English translator's note: The above is a translation of the Japanese text made with the help of articles in *The Times* of October 16, 1931, and of February 25, 1933, on which it appears to have been based.

in those circumstances, she had better withdraw from it herself. Inasmuch as Japan had heedlessly broken faith, she ought most clearly to be informed that she would not be given any assistance whatever. The Government ought not to wait and abstain from action until the committee had reported.

This speech met with frequent interruptions from the Conservative benches—that party being friendly to Japan—among them being the remark, ‘Does the hon. Member propose to use the British Fleet to stop exports of arms from America to Japan?’ In reply, Mr. Lansbury urged the necessity of severing economic relations with Japan, and said he was sure that the American Government and people would do what they themselves considered to be right. He had no doubt that they would decide to do what was just. He demanded the prohibition of export to Japan of credit, currency, cotton, and of everything that could be of the slightest use to her.

Sir John Simon, in replying to this question, insisted that the action of the Japanese forces in Manchuria constituted an infringement of the Covenant of the League of Nations. He went on to explain the decision of the Government in regard to the prohibition of export of arms. He said that he wished clearly, definitely, and frankly to say that, in his considered opinion, Japan’s action had not been in conformity with the Covenant and that she had, beyond all question, done that which was forbidden by it. Japan had, however, been in a most difficult position ; she had had a very bitter experience. Her position could not be understood unless it was recognized that she had had to negotiate with a neighbour with whom it was exceptionally difficult to deal. The position she lawfully held in Manchuria was unique in the world. He went on to explain that the action taken by the League in this dispute was indeed a contribution to the peace of the world, and that he rejoiced in the appropriate part England had played in determining it.

He maintained that an embargo on arms could not be expected to be effective without international co-operation, and announced that, from that day until an international decision was reached, the British Government would not authorize the issue of licences for the export to either China or Japan of any articles mentioned in the Arms Export

Prohibition Order of 1931. He explained that if England alone prohibited the export of arms, it was not possible to exercise discrimination against one only of the belligerent countries. He was convinced that no effort should be spared and no sacrifice refused that would reduce the risk of a widening of the field of conflict or of a prolongation of the tragic shedding of blood. Existing contracts to supply arms must be respected, and the prohibition order would not apply to them.

Mr. Samuel, former Home Secretary, then rose and said that public opinion was running strongly against the action of the Japanese Government. In view of the fact that China relied for her arms on imports in far greater degree than Japan, he feared that to stop the export of them to both countries would be injurious to her interests. He believed that the British people desired not merely to cut off the supply of arms, but to withhold from Japan every kind of assistance, and especially facilities for raising loans and obtaining credit.

Mr. Chamberlain, former Foreign Secretary, followed on the Conservative side, remarking that his sympathies with Japanese policy had gradually diminished as the situation had developed. A stage had been reached at which it was impossible to contend that the action of Japan in Manchuria was compatible with the Covenant of the League, with the Pact of Paris, and the Nine Power Treaty.*

What all this amounts to is that British public opinion, without distinction of party, condemned the action taken by the Japanese forces on the ground that it was contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations, to the No-War Pact, and to the Nine Power Treaty. It is especially worthy of note that Mr. Chamberlain, who, up to that time, had shown sympathy with Japan and had just been loudly advocating a revival of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, turned right round and condemned her. British public opinion was unanimous in attacking Japan and in demanding that she be restrained. England immediately abrogated the Indo-Japanese Trade Agreement, and followed it up by persuading other countries to join her in applying economic pressure.

* English translator's note: The above reports of speeches are translations of the Japanese text, made after reference to Hansard.

In what respect were the Treaties violated ?

In view of the foregoing, the following points from the League of Nations report are mentioned by way of answer to the question, 'In what respects did Japanese action constitute a violation of the Treaties ?'

- (i) The Lytton Committee of Investigation found that the dispute between China and Japan was capable of settlement by arbitration. In spite of this, Japan, without consulting the League, had recourse to armed force.
- (ii) The Council of the League held that the Japanese military action in the neighbourhood of Mukden on the night of September 17-18, 1931, and subsequently throughout Manchuria, could not be regarded as taken in self-defence. Neither could the extension of Japanese military operations during the whole period of the dispute be regarded in general as a measure taken in self-defence. Further, it was held that the fact that action was taken in self-defence did not exempt a country from compliance with Article 12 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.
- (iii) The declaration of independence by Manchukuo was not spontaneous. On the contrary, a party of Japanese officials, both civil and military, planned, organized, and brought about a movement for independence as a means of dealing with the situation that had arisen after the incidents of September 18. To this end, they made use of the names and services of certain Chinese, and at the same time availed themselves of a few groups of malcontents. This movement, which received support and encouragement from the Japanese General Staff, was only successful on account of the presence of Japanese troops. It could not, therefore, be regarded as spontaneous or genuinely Manchurian.
- (iv) The China-Japan affair was not one in which one country had declared war on another after making every effort to avail itself of the opportunities for arbitration offered by the League of Nations. Nor was it a simple affair in which the troops of one country had crossed the frontier of a neighbour.

On the contrary, there was no room for doubt that, without any declaration of war, an extensive part of Chinese territory had been forcibly seized and even occupied by Japanese and, as the result of this action, that part had been detached from the rest of China and had been declared independent.

- (v) The responsibility for the tension that existed prior to September 18, 1931, was shared by China and Japan. But China was in no degree responsible for the various incidents that had occurred after that date. For these Japan alone was responsible.

Japan's contentions.

Omitting minor details, Japan's principal contentions were : In the first place, the Peace Treaties should not be applied to a country like China, with no real Government. Too great importance should not be attached to theory, but the facts should be faced and suitable measures considered. In other words, some latitude should be allowed in the interpretation of the Treaties.

In regard to the contention that China had no real Government, *The Times* countered with, 'The confusion in China has not started just now. It began before the Washington Conference and was considered by the participating Powers. The Nine Power Treaty was made to help countries in the condition of China and to prevent their weakness from being exploited by others. Japan must have been aware of this !

To quote the Lytton Report again,

The state of affairs in China today, when she is passing through a period of transition, is disappointing to her impatient friend, but in spite of many difficulties, changes and failures, she has certainly made some progress. . . . Although there are still a few provinces in which the Central Government can exert but little influence, they do not openly refuse to recognize its authority. If this Central Government can be maintained as at present, it may be expected that the local governments, forces, and finance will gradually assume a national aspect. It is for this reason that China has been elected a member of the Council of the League of Nations.*

* Translation of the Japanese text.

This shows a considerable amount of sympathy with China.

If these two contentions were placed in the scales, a correctly adjusted instrument would assuredly go down on the foreigners' side, so that there are weak points in what Japan has put forward. Her case might have been presented differently, and we regret that it was not.


Next, Japan's contention that some latitude must be allowed in the interpretation of the Peace Treaties is, on the whole, right and proper. But to admit it when respect of sovereignty or the use of armed force is involved would be to destroy the whole basis of the Treaties. This contention of the League's carries great weight.

Manchuria is an area of special significance to Japan : it must be regarded as an exception. This is Japan's contention, but, for all its truth, once latitude in or exceptions to the Peace Treaties are admitted, there is no knowing where matters will stop. Germany, for instance, might demand the return of her captured colonies, and there are questions, too, relating to numerically small nations that might arise. They might indulge in what the Lytton Report stigmatizes as 'War in disguise' and start fighting without any declaration of war, saying that it was not war, but an incident. If that happened, Europe would undoubtedly get tangled up like so much hemp.

The Peace Treaties help to preserve the peace of Europe and to protect England's world-wide interests. They are an ideal, and are of advantage to England with her utilitarian and calculating policy. She therefore demands that they be respected, and it is not surprising that she should take the lead of the minor Powers in opposition to what Japan has been doing.

Political and economic supremacy.

England's support of the Peace Treaty can hardly be reconciled, on the plea of necessity, with her policy of preserving the territorial integrity of China in order to maintain her political and economic supremacy in that country. This supremacy is of the greatest importance to her, and one day she herself may have to ask for latitude in interpretation. In refusing to grant it now, she is but making a rope for her own neck.



H.M.S. "HOOD"

England has special political and economic interests in China, as has already been explained. Owing, however, to the fierce agitation for restoration of sovereign rights, she is steadily losing her political position and being deprived of her lead in the China trade. It is worthy of remark that in the latter respect both Japan and America are outstripping her. For instance, the value of British trade with China was 12,107,645 taels in 1907, 96,910,944 taels in 1913, and 119,148,969 taels in 1929. The corresponding figures for Japanese trade were, 39,347,476 ; 119,346,662 ; 323,141,626, the proportion of Japanese trade to British having grown to as much as three to one. It is small wonder that the *Manchester Guardian* has become entirely and venomously anti-Japanese.

The tendency of Japanese trade to outstrip British continued until shortly before the affair in Manchuria, but on account of it the proportions were reversed. The fact was that the anti-Japanese boycott, with which China attempted passively to resist when her relations with Japan were strained, gave England an excellent opportunity to recover her lost position, an opportunity not to be missed. Previously, however, the anti-British boycott had provided a good opportunity to push Japanese goods, but the tension that arose shortly before the Manchurian affair was as a bugle sounding the advance and telling England that her goods had a clear field.

In these circumstances, the policy of England since the Manchurian affair has been to win over China, without offending Japan, always with an eye to trade. It is well known that Sir Miles Lampson, the British Minister, has made every endeavour to establish friendly relations with the Nankin Government and Chang Hsiao-ling, in the hope of recovering the trade not only of the Yangtze Valley, but also of North China.

The movement to revive British trade is of a somewhat submerged kind, but should England think that her interests are being injured by another country she invariably rises in her wrath and attacks it on the surface. For example, at the time of the Shanghai affair it was England who, as soon as she saw that her trade and her rights were endangered, invited the Powers to protest to Japan. It was England, too, who, after circulating a bitter appeal against Japan, called

a meeting of the Council of the League of Nations and confronted her with a resolution. As soon as our troops advanced into the neighbourhood of Tientsin and it appeared that British rights were endangered, it was England who promptly changed her attitude and moved that a warning amounting to an ultimatum be sent to Japan by the League.

Preservation of the territorial integrity of China.

Today British trade, like that of Japan, has spread all over China ; it has penetrated not only into the Yangtze Valley but also into Kuang Tung and North China. The territorial integrity of China is essential to its maintenance and further expansion and is, for that reason, the main purport of England's China policy. It is said that for the same reason the British Foreign Office was much concerned, when the third revision of the Alliance was under consideration, as to how far England could connive at Japanese activities in Manchuria. After mature deliberation it confidentially informed the Japanese Government that while it had no hesitation in conniving at Japanese peaceful penetration in its economic aspects only, it must refuse to recognize any monopoly of political influence. But at the time of the affair in Manchuria, England went behind the Japanese Government and its representatives at Geneva in exaggerating the area occupied by Japanese troops, and in putting it about among other nations that Japan, dominated by a military clique and animated by a militarist spirit, had invaded China. She represented that the recognition of Manchukuo was but a preliminary to annexation, and held that the action taken there was an open violation of the territorial integrity of China. One influential Englishman said :

Japan maintains that the independence of Manchukuo is a spontaneous expression of the will of the people and that separation from China is a natural process, but it was effected during a Japanese invasion, and by means of it Japan has secured a complete monopoly of the whole area. They may call it independence, or a split, or what they will, but what it really is the future alone can show.

In these circumstances, England, true to her traditional

policy of preserving the territorial integrity of China, must oppose it.

Another Englishman said, with reference to the advance of Japanese troops into the neighbourhood of Tientsin :

Japan says that she took Jehol to ensure the independence of Manchukuo, but what excuse has she for unnecessarily crossing the Great Wall? Manchukuo may swell like a balloon till it bursts, but the Great Wall is its boundary. It can't have the Great Wall as a boundary and bulge out over it at the same time !

One thing to note here is that the setting up of Manchukuo as an independent country was a severe blow to British interests in North China. As an instance, England, in conjunction with Chang Hsiao-ling, got a Dutch company to complete the harbour works at Hulutao, and by connecting that place to the railway system of Manchuria hoped to compete with the South Manchurian Railway and to cut out Dalny : this scheme was entirely frustrated. Another instance was the seizure by Japan of the British-controlled Pekin-Mukden Railway eastward of Shanhaikuan. Yet again, England controls the Chinese Customs and has the revenue paid into the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank. She has lost some of the huge profit she derives from this source. No wonder she objects.

England's foreign policy exposed.

The above gives the principal points at issue between England and Japan over the North China affair. The issues with the other countries in the League, though varying in degree, are similar. Japan's opponents can, of course, count on the support of an American Government in which Mr. Stimson is Secretary of State. He followed up his curt 'No recognition of Manchukuo' with, 'What Japan says openly flouts America as convener of the Washington Conference. It rides rough-shod over her traditional policy in China.' These remarks were, it goes without saying, applauded in England.

John Bull's diplomacy was, however, as cunning as ever. When Stimson butted in and took upon himself to protest to Japan, John Bull lay low, kept quiet, and avoided coming

to the surface. He let America appear as Japan's opponent and, all unconcerned, pulled the strings from behind. But when at last Japan took the plunge and withdrew from the League, it was England more than anyone else who, with a smile of sympathy, advised her to give way. Japan replied with an exhibition of her usual uncompromising methods by curtly rejecting the advice. England promptly changed her attitude to that of 'Please yourself'. Later on, England offered advice again, but again it was rejected and Japan became more unpopular than ever. The second offer was actually made by Sir E. Drummond, head of the League of Nations office, to our delegates.

"Surely" (he said), "Article 15 is only advisory. As such, it is not necessarily incumbent on Japan to comply with it. Her reluctance in accepting the League's advice is not a new thing. She has already attached reservations to Article 15. I don't know how many divisions you have sent to Manchuria, but the League doesn't propose to restrict you under Article 16. You say you are not at war and therefore won't listen. Can't you dissemble a bit and remain in the League for a while?"

But to dissemble has never suited the Japanese temperament. If Japan did anything so mean-spirited she would lose all her self-respect, the more so as the League's proposal involved non-recognition of Manchukuo. In these circumstances it was but natural that she should withdraw from the League.

England, then, continued to let the protests against Japanese action come from the American, Mr. Stimson, and to confine herself to applauding him. But he himself, was gradually becoming unpopular with his own people, and, indeed, appeared to have been repudiated when a Democratic Government, with Mr. Roosevelt in the principal rôle at the White House, succeeded the administration of Mr. Hoover and adopted a negative policy of non-interference with Japan. England then, at last, had to come out into the open. The result was that, after Japan had withdrawn from the League, she was no longer content as a casual spectator unobtrusively to applaud America, but came out into the centre of the Grand Stand to lead the

lesser nations of the League in imposing restrictions on Japan.

(2) *England's Restriction of Japan (a)*

A knowledge of the resolution passed at a general meeting of the Council of the League of Nations is essential to an understanding of the nature of the restrictions imposed on Japan at the instance of England. This resolution was moved by England, and there are reasons for believing that she staged the whole proceeding. It was passed by the Supreme Council of the League sitting at Brussels on the same day, February 27, 1933, as that on which Sir John Simon so strongly denounced Japan in the House of Commons. It called for :

- (i) The withdrawal of diplomatic representatives from Japan.
- (ii) The prohibition of export to Japan of the raw materials used in the manufacture of arms.
- (iii) The discontinuation of all financial support to Japan.
- (iv) An embargo on imports from Japan, if necessary.

This resolution endorsed the opinions of Lords Cecil and Lytton, and meant that British contentions were generally supported. It is also interesting to note that the British Government proposed to put into effect, or did put into effect, some of its clauses. It can be no exaggeration to say that the whole resolution and its passing were the work of England. The first measure she took, though it prohibited the exports of arms to both China and Japan, was aimed at Japan.

Embargo on arms.

Originally, America had been the principal advocate of prohibiting traffic in arms : England merely a servile imitator. The facts were that on January 10, 1933, President Hoover asked the Senate to empower him to prohibit American merchants from exporting munitions of war to any countries between whom disputes or conflicts had arisen, should he consider that such exports would encourage or

facilitate the use of armed force. The Senate, however, imposed so many conditions and added so many amendments to the Bill that nothing came of it.

England promptly took advantage of this. In the Lower House, Mr. Nathan, a Liberal, maintained that the export of arms to Japan should be prohibited, and Mr. Lansbury, leader of the Labour Party, asked Sir John Simon, the Foreign Secretary, what action the Government proposed to take. In his reply, Sir John Simon referred to the President's message and said that there was no point in one country alone prohibiting the export of arms. Mr. Lansbury then asked whether any provision had been made for conferring with the American and other Governments with a view to prohibiting the export of arms should war break out. Sir John Simon replied that the British Government and others were exchanging views on the subject. The American Bill had not yet been passed. The question must be regarded as an international one.

Opinion in England on this matter was divided. The Conservatives did not approve of an embargo. The Liberals and the Labour Party demanded absolute prohibition. The Government, after carefully considering the opinions of both sides, decided for prohibition, and on February 27 Sir John Simon informed the House of Commons, in reply to Mr. Lansbury, that the Government had decided not to permit the export, either to China or Japan, of any of the articles mentioned in the Arms Export Prohibition Order of 1931, the decision to take effect from that day and to remain in force until some international understanding had been reached.

However, the British Government was disappointed of its expectation that others would follow its lead. Not only America, the originator of the idea, but also France, Czechoslovakia, and other important arms-exporting countries refused to co-operate, and on March 13 the British Government, after some hesitation, raised the embargo completely.

After the question of arms, that of prohibiting the export to Japan of credit, currency, raw cotton, and every other kind of merchandise, as a means of bringing pressure to bear on her, was debated in the House of Commons in similar strain.

Effect of breaking off economic relations with Japan.

What was the effect of all this? Was England likely to succeed in making Japan give way by this means? We are afraid that she was more likely to find herself in the foolish position of 'one who has poked a canebrake and started a snake'.

First, take the embargo on arms. At the present time it is China that imports large quantities of arms rather than Japan: she would be the sufferer, not Japan. That the effect of this embargo would be the opposite of that intended stares one in the face.

Next, the question of raw cotton and other commodities: what was the result? A glance at the state of trade will show. The major part of Japan's foreign trade is with America and the British Empire. That with America comes first, with 35 per cent of the total, and that with the British Empire second, with 26 per cent. On the other side, Japan is one of the best customers of the British Empire; India's exports to her are second only to those sent to England: she buys large quantities of wool from Australia. It is evident that if India refused to sell raw cotton to her and Australia refused to sell wool, both these countries would be badly hit by effects similar to those of over-production.

The withholding of credit and currency facilities would have less effect than the other embargo. In these days of world depression Japan has given up all idea of raising money abroad. A loan for Manchukuo might prove an exception, but the capitalists of America and France are quite ready to disappoint England's expectations and come forward to put money into the country. Of the existing foreign loans, one of six million sterling is due for repayment in three years' time and the others have still ten years to run. In fact, restrictive measures of this kind are obviously and totally ineffective. Why, then, did England decide to apply them? She hoped that other countries would follow her lead—there is reason to believe that the Netherlands East Indies have already done so—and one can see how the psychology of the English, apart from any considerations of profit and loss, has fanned their hatred of Japan. However, the more the English try to stir up animosity and induce other nations to follow in their train, the more the Japanese, as is their wont, will draw together to present a united front to

the enemy, with very grave consequences. Financial pressure exerted by England alone is not such a serious matter, but as soon as other countries are brought in the whole question assumes a political aspect and can only end in war. Therein lies the danger.

(3) *England's Restriction of Japan (b)*

The next step that England is taking to restrain Japan is the denunciation of the Anglo-Japanese Trade Agreement, that of the Indo-Japanese Agreement being but a preliminary skirmish. At first sight, this question seems to be one of simple economic competition with no political reasons behind it. It is, however, doubtful if it would have arisen so suddenly and unexpectedly if there had not been a popular demand in England for more restrictive measures to be applied to Japan. A point to be noted is that the very success of these measures will draw other countries into England's orbit, the more so as she is encouraging them directly and indirectly.

Denunciation of the Trade Agreement with India.

The British Empire boasts that the sun never sets on it, but the sun of its prosperity has been setting for some time. The decline has been accelerated by the depression due to the world crisis. England has had to do something to break through the ring of difficulties that besets her. The Ottawa Conference was opened to this end. At it, England, discarding in a night the principles of Free Trade to which she had adhered for so many years, proposed to form an economic block by means of preferential tariffs calculated to cement together her Dependencies and Dominions.

One of the results was the denunciation of the Indo-Japanese Trade Agreement of 1904. On April 10 a Note stating that the Agreement would be terminated on the following October 10 was handed to our Ambassador in London. This meant that in six months' time Japan would cease to be treated as a most-favoured nation. On April 11 the Legislative Council of India was informed to the same effect by its Commercial Secretary, in the course of a speech,

introducing a so-called Anti-Dumping Bill. On April 12 this Bill was passed amid great applause.

This action was so unexpected that it startled and roused everyone in Japan, officials and people alike. It sharpened acutely their resentment of the policy pursued by England, who had added this restrictive measure to the pressure she had got the League of Nations to put on Japan with a majority of forty-two to one behind her.

England's ulterior motive.

As a matter of fact, the question of denouncing the Indo-Japanese Trade Agreement was not new at this time ; it had first arisen when Japanese cotton goods and artificial silks appeared on the Indian markets. Their remarkable success, added to a fall in the exchange values of the pound sterling and the yen, intensified the competition between Japan and England for the Indian market. To protect her own industries and, if possible, to drive out Japanese goods altogether, England conceived the expedient of cancelling the Agreement. It should, however, not be forgotten that behind the success of Japanese goods in India lay the fact that their presence in the market facilitated the anti-British boycott—the punishment of heaven for British mal-administration of India (cf. Chap. xi, section 2).

The present financial world is in the grip of a 'War in Peace' fought with tariff walls and rates of exchange. The capitalist system is in a state of chaos, with symptoms of an approaching end. Great efforts have been made to break away, of which the Washington Conference and the London Economic Conference are examples. It is inconceivable that England, at a time like this, should have rushed into irrational attempts to restrict Japan, regardless of their inconsistencies and contradictions, unless public opinion had been behind her.

The figures quoted below will serve further to elucidate what has been said above. The Trade Agreement was concluded in 1905 [*sic*], but Japan does not appear to have figured much as a most-favoured nation. It might even be said that the Treaty was made to protect British trade, or, in other words, that it was a one-sided arrangement with its advantages all for the British.

JAPANESE TRADE WITH INDIA

(UNIT 1000 YEN)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Exports to India</i>	<i>Imports from India</i>	<i>Excess of Imports over Exports</i>
1905 ..	7,997	90,226	82,229
1910 ..	18,712	106,361	87,649
1915 ..	42,202	147,585	105,387
1920 ..	192,249	394,930	202,681
1925 ..	173,413	573,563	400,150
1926 ..	155,951	391,136	235,185
1927 ..	167,580	270,592	103,012
1928 ..	146,006	284,798	138,792
1929 ..	198,056	288,119	90,063
1930 ..	129,262	180,405	51,143
1931 ..	110,367	133,165	22,798
1932 ..	192,491	116,865	— 75,626

(N.B. — sign denotes excess of exports.)

These figures show that from 1905 to the end of 1932 Japanese imports from India amounted to 5,941,000,000 yen, while her exports during the same period did not exceed 2,594,000,000 yen, less than half that amount. The excess of our imports over our exports was represented by the huge sum of 3,346,000,000 yen. This shows that the profit derived from the Treaty was all made by England. Last year (1932), however, Japanese exports to India exceeded her imports from that country, the difference being 75,626,000 yen. As soon as England found this out, she discarded the Treaty like an old shoe, without a thought to the huge profit she had made in the previous thirty years. The Japanese should remember how their favours have been requited.

But how was it that England came to be afraid of our trade with India? The next table will show.

PRINCIPAL JAPANESE EXPORTS TO INDIA

(UNIT 1000 YEN)

	1932	1931	1930
Cotton Tissues ..	80,654	49,866	61,216
Silk Tissues ..	32,957	21,525	16,782
Cotton Yarns ..	14,343	5,592	6,576
Knitted Goods ..	6,699	3,901	7,949
Glass	4,106	2,239	2,888
Ceramics ..	3,463	1,392	1,867
Ironware ..	3,322	1,762	1,712
Brass	2,990	1,151	1,859

The most important commodities were cotton and silk tissues, cotton yarn, and knitted cottons. Together they accounted for about 70 per cent, and cotton goods alone for exactly 53 per cent, of the Japanese exports to India in 1932.

What does this tell us? It is a commonplace that Japanese textiles have of recent years appeared in the world's markets and have been competing with those of Lancashire, which for so long have held a virtual monopoly. They were introduced into South China and thence into India, where they are cutting out the English cottons. In order to restore her declining fortunes in this, her vitally important Dominion, England has committed the outrage of denouncing the Trade Agreement.

Effect on Japan.

How will this denunciation affect Japan? Hitherto, America has held the first place, China the second, and India the third in Japanese foreign trade. Since the affair with China, trade with her has declined and that with India has occupied the second place. The actual figures for last year, 1932, show that, of our total exports, 31 per cent went to America and 10 per cent to India, while of our total imports, 35 per cent came from America and 8 per cent from India. Our trade with India both ways reached the high figure of 10 per cent of our total overseas trade.

What we stand to lose, then, by the denunciation of the Agreement is very considerable, and our shipping engaged in the Indian trade will be hard hit.

Principal exports to Japan.

The principal Indian exports to Japan are shown in the following table, in which the unit is 1000 yen.

<i>Commodity</i>	1932	1931	1930
Indian Cotton ..	91,746	113,262	147,688
Pig-iron	1,964	2,508	3,572

This table shows that raw cotton occupies the first place and pig-iron the second. In 1931, the former accounted for 113,000,000 yen of a total of 133,160,000 yen, and in 1932 for 91,700,000 yen out of 116,860,000. Of India's annual output of 4,800,000 bales of cotton, 1,100,000 were exported to Japan proper in 1932 and 1,500,000 in 1931. If the quantities consumed by the Japanese factories in Shanghai, Tsing Tau, and Manchuria were added, these proportions would be considerably increased. All this shows how hard the people of India would be hit if Japan, out of resentment at England's treatment of her, refused to buy Indian cotton.

Why, then, has England, regardless of the prosperity of the 300,000,000 people of India, been in such a hurry to denounce the trading agreement? We shall not be far wrong in assuming that the cotton industry of Lancashire has been pulling wires from behind. All the world knows how hampered it is by fixed capital, out-of-date machinery, high wages, and lack of unification. Many expedients have been tried to escape from these embarrassments, but none has been successful. At a conference of cotton manufacturers opened at Manchester the following resolutions were passed :

- (i) The Indian import duties on British manufactured cottons should be lowered to relieve unemployment in Lancashire and to benefit the people of India.

- (ii) The import duties in British Possessions on cotton goods of foreign manufacture should be raised sufficiently to prevent them from competing with British goods.

The industry was, in fact, pulling wires from behind in the hope of recovering the Indian market and getting out of its difficulties.

Indian oppression.

The powerful weapon of a preferential tariff was used by Lancashire to suppress the import of Japanese goods into India for the reasons given above. What happened was that, in 1930, a Bill to protect the Indian cotton industry discriminated between British goods and those made in other countries to the extent of imposing a general duty of 20 per cent *ad valorem* on the latter and a preferential duty of 15 per cent only on the former. Later on, the preferential duty was gradually raised to 25 per cent and the general duty to $31\frac{1}{4}$ per cent in consequence. In August 1932, in order to stop a rush of Japanese goods consequent upon a fall in the exchange value of the yen, the Government of India raised the general duty to 50 per cent, without altering the preferential duty. In April 1933 the duties were raised a fifth time, and a mortal blow was struck at Japanese goods by subjecting them to a duty of 50 per cent more than those from Britain. The following table shows the effect. (The unit is 1000 yen.)

	<i>British cottons</i>	<i>Japanese cottons</i>
1932, June	54,936	62,694
July	57,405	69,989
August	59,448	67,657
September	59,574	62,657
October	32,180	56,242
November	47,195	51,602
December	53,050	52,634
1933, January	44,560	32,098
February	54,430	38,547
March	65,048	43,087

(N.B.—The duty was raised for the fourth time in August 1932.)

British cry of distress.

The distress of the Lancashire cotton industry, which 'had dared to bring about this outrage', is revealed in a speech made in the House of Commons by Mr. Levy, a Conservative member, on May 2, 1933. He said that Japanese competition was becoming more severe, especially in the many lines in which British patterns had been imitated and which were being imported at ridiculously low prices. The question had been discussed in December 1932, at a conference between England, Germany, France, Italy, and Switzerland. It was maintained that Japanese hours of labour were excessive, and Switzerland afterwards prohibited the import of Japanese manufactured silks. In his own constituency, silk-weaving factories had been reduced to working at one-quarter of their normal output, with a corresponding increase in unemployment. It was impossible for British goods which cost 4s. 1d. a yard to produce to compete with Japanese goods which were sold in London at 2s. 9d. a yard duty paid. The cheapness of the Japanese goods was due to the facts that working hours in that country were 60 per week as against 48 in England, and wages were 7s. 6d. a week as against 35s. No European country could hold its own against that.

He added that a similar state of affairs obtained in the artificial silk trade. Japanese goods were replacing the finest products of Yorkshire and Lancashire. The competition also extended to wool, steel and rubber goods, ceramics and dyestuffs. Unless some action were taken, British industries would be gradually destroyed. The extraordinary thing was that Japan herself had a law to stop unfair cutting of prices. It would not be unreasonable for Britain to pass a corresponding law.

Views of British newspapers.

England had, moreover, her own ways of justifying herself, as the following extract from a leading article in the *Morning Post* of June 22 shows.*

At the same time we do not conceal from ourselves that economic differences cast, at the moment, a cold shadow over an

* English translator's note : The report of Mr. Levy's speech has been translated from the Japanese, after reference to Hansard. The article from the *Morning Post* is as it appeared in that paper.

old friendship. Japan, with cheap labour, an efficient industry and an expanding commerce, has invaded markets created in the first instance by British enterprise and maintained by British power. Both in India and Africa and, indeed, throughout our whole Eastern Empire, she is now a formidable competitor, and both Great Britain and India have been compelled by this economic pressure, and the crisis of which it is a part, to modify their commercial policy. Notice to abrogate treaties and agreements is sharply resented in certain Japanese quarters, which profess to see political hostility behind economic measures. It is, therefore, wholesome for our Japanese friends to remember that Japan also has been through a crisis, and took in that predicament much the same precautions as we are taking now. The Great Earthquake, a decade ago, precipitated a national depression, to escape from which Japan raised her tariffs to something like double their height, taking values into account. There is no doubt that that revolution in policy dealt a heavy blow to British trade ; but Great Britain did not deny the right of Japan to take such steps as she thought wise for the good of her people. So now, when Great Britain, bearing a heavier burden and staggering under the impact of a greater crisis, takes similar measures, it would be wisdom in Japan to remember that we are following her example and acting under the same obligation. These are indefeasible rights, which, we hope, neither country would think of denying. . . .

The *Herald*, in an article entitled, 'Japan Attacks British Industry with a Nine-hour Day', said that the Japanese use of armed force in China was all part of a vast scheme of economic aggrandisement. Japan was aiming at an economic subjugation of the Far East. She intended to squeeze the Chinese peasant to get from him cheap food and cheap raw materials and, with a nine-hour day, to flood the markets of the world with goods.

These excerpts are enough to show the fear that Japanese competition has inspired.

Japan refuses to buy Indian cotton.

The Japanese Government instructed Mr. Matsudaira, its Ambassador in London, strongly to protest against the denunciation of the Indo-Japanese Trade Agreement. On April 25 Mr. Runciman, the President of the Board of Trade, offered to call a conference between British and Japanese manufacturers to see if a better understanding could not be arrived at.

Our Government accepted, but on condition that although officially it continued to deal with the British Government, the real business discussions should be with the Government of India. On May 4 it instructed Mr. Miyake, the Consul-General at Calcutta, to approach the Government of India with a view to negotiations with it direct.



The Japanese manufacturers put forward three demands, viz. :

- (i) That the Ottawa Conference should not be taken as a premise.
- (ii) That cotton goods only should be discussed.
- (iii) That the British Government should accept responsibility for enforcing the terms of any agreement that might be reached. In other words, that the British Government should guarantee that the Dominions would not raise duties.

The British, however, would not agree, and the Conference ended in a deadlock. Thereupon the Japanese Government instructed Mr. Kadono, its adviser at the subsequent World Economic Conference, to lose no time in attempting personal negotiations with British officials in London. The British Government avoided the issue and put difficulties in the way. The Government of India, too, managed to avoid replying to a request for direct negotiations for some time, and, on June 7, raised the duty on non-British cottons (principally Japanese), by Art. 5, Section 3 of the Customs Bill. This meant that :

- (i) A duty of $6\frac{3}{4}$ annas the pound weight was imposed on grey shirtings.
- (ii) The duty on other cotton goods was raised by amounts varying from 50 per cent to 75 per cent according to kind.
- (iii) These increases did not apply to goods certified to be of British manufacture.

This, clearly enough, was a final challenge to the Japanese cotton industry.



H.M.S. "CANBERRA"

To impose a large increase of customs duty on the one hand, and on the other to propose a conference about it, is a nice way to treat people ! For England first to arrange matters to her own advantage and then to begin to think about discussing them is an outrageous way of conducting foreign affairs.

This dishonesty on the part of England drove our manufacturers to extremes. A meeting of the Spinners Association on June 13 resolved to boycott Indian cotton from that day forward. The Weavers Association had, on the previous day, resolved not to buy any wool, wheat, timber, machinery, steel, or woollen goods from anywhere in the British Empire. So the battle was fairly joined.

British insincerity.

While business men were thus eyeing each other, our Government continued its endeavours to find some peaceful solution, and made further attempts to negotiate with the British and Indian Governments. The former replied that it was unable to put pressure on the latter over a question of customs duties and asked us to negotiate with it directly. Our Government lost no time in attempting to do so and, while calming down our business men, got so far in its preparations as to nominate a representative. The Indian Government, however, said that diplomatic relations were the province of England and that it was not entitled to enter into them. The question would have to be referred to the Autumn Session, and what with this and that would not fix a date. This meant that the suggested conference at Simla, India's summer capital, was indefinitely postponed.

But that was not all ; England fell back on further evasions. When Mr. Kadono called at the Board of Trade to discuss the matter, he was informed by Mr. Horace Wilson, the Secretary, that the British Government would prefer to have the conference held in England and not in India. Exactly the opposite of what had been said before.

In thus playing fast and loose with Japan, England was manœuvring for position. Presumably, she expected that the last increase of duty would reduce the exports of Japanese cotton goods to India and also the stocks of Indian cotton held by Japanese spinners, and she intended to defer negotiations until the consequent financial difficulties had

placed a trump card in her hand. Could anything be more cunning ?

British Dependencies follow India's lead.

The abrogation of the Indo-Japanese Trade Agreement produced an immediate effect in the British Colonies. On June 20, the London *Times* published the following report from Melbourne :

It is announced that the Customs Department is investigating the allegations of Japanese dumping in Australia. The Tariff Board has already recommended an increased duty on gum boots and the Customs Department is demanding a cash deposit from importers of these articles. Referring to Japanese hints of prohibitive tariffs on wool, wheat, and other Dominion produce, the *Age* says that 'Australians have never surrendered to threats in any part of their national life', and adds, 'Japan purchases our products, especially our wool, because it happens to suit her'. The cheapness of Japanese goods is not due to superior technical skill or industrial organization, but to methods which Australia will never adopt—mean wages, serf conditions, long hours, a seven-day week, and child labour. There is an obligation to resist this menace on every Australian Government.*

On June 26 *The Times* published a telegram from Nairobi to the effect that the Legislative Council of East Africa had decided on drastic alterations in the customs duties. A specially determined *ad valorem* import duty was to be imposed ; where two commodities of the same kind differed in price, the higher price was to be taken as that on which the duty was calculated. The import of low-priced Japanese goods would thus be checked. Further, owing to a customs agreement, the neighbouring mandated territories of Uganda and Tanganyika imposed corresponding duties.

The British Colonies and Dependencies were not unjustified in thus raising tariff walls. Japanese goods had penetrated not only into India, they had spread over Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, and Egypt, where they had captured the markets and had driven out British goods. Japan had beaten England by two to one in Egypt and by four to one in East Africa. In the Straits Settlements, Japanese cottons and artificial silks had the upper hand, and it was only in

* Eng. translator's note : The above has been copied from *The Times* of June 20.

South and West Africa that British goods predominated. If England put an 'anti-Japanese spider's web round her colonies', none could blame her.

Japan must be prepared to face a change for the worse in her trade with the Netherlands East Indies, as a natural reaction to what has happened in the British Possessions, and also considerable changes in that with other countries who may 'dance to England's piping'.

Relations between Japan and England are thus getting worse, from day to day and from month to month. To borrow a phrase from the Lytton Report, the two countries are already fighting a 'War in Disguise'. None can recall the glorious past of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance without emotion, but facts are facts and we cannot alter them.

Will, however, Japan and England really come to blows in the end? I will endeavour to discuss this weighty question in the next chapter.

CHAPTER III

WILL JAPAN AND ENGLAND COME TO BLOWS IN THE END?

(I) *Irreconcilable Differences*

An Anglo-Japanese clash inevitable.

ARE the differences between Japan and England that have been described in the last chapter temporary? Or are the interests of the two countries fundamentally irreconcilable? If the former, some treatment might be discovered whereby their causes might be removed. Unfortunately, it has come to this, that either Japan must stop her expansion, or England must willingly give up to her some of what she has or hopes to have. Therein lies a cause of war.

We Japanese are aware of our differences with America, but very few of us realize how much more serious are our relations with England and what an element of danger they contain. Our interests, for instance, may clash politically with those of America, quite apart from the immigration question, in connexion with her positive policy in China, but nowhere do they clash economically. Japan and America are, in fact, each other's good customers, and trade in China in different commodities. By appreciating Japan's special position in the Far East and by adjusting and restraining her policy in China and Manchuria accordingly, America can reduce all the talk about war to vain and empty babbling.

But our position in regard to England is another question altogether. Serious and irreconcilable economic and political differences are involved. A revision of the Anglo-Japanese Trade Agreement might temporarily remove some of the economic difficulties. But that would only postpone the evil day: a collision is inevitable. The Japanese and British peoples should look this fact in the face. But what are the reasons for it? Why must the two countries inevitably come

to blows? These are questions of which we Japanese ought to have a clear understanding.

British traditional policy.

Those who have read Chapter II will have been astonished at the way in which England, who, in order to check the advance of Russia, had gone so far as to make an alliance with Japan, suddenly and completely altered her attitude after the Russo-Japanese War. One reason for this sudden change is to be found in her relations with America, as explained in Chapter I, section 2. But the Japanese people ought to realize that there was yet another. It was that England was becoming afraid of the progress of the country that had overthrown Russia, and altered her policy to one calculated to check it. This will not be fully appreciated without some account of her traditional policy.

England, by defeating her competitors on the sea one after the other, gained the mastery of the world and brought vast tracts of it under her sway. To retain these in peace and safety it has been essential for her to prevent the rise of more than one other Power at the same time. This necessity has been the basis of her traditional policy on the Continent of Europe, and was the reason why she endeavoured to nip in the bud Germany's challenge to her supremacy. Her policy in Asia has been precisely the same, and Japan has the honour (?) of receiving her attentions in this respect. England knew what she was doing when she made the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. She had already devised a means of keeping Japanese expansion within definite limits. This is clear enough from the so-called 'Bertie Memorandum', which was published officially after the Great War.

'Bertie' is Lord Bertie of Thame, who, at the time of the making of the Alliance, was Assistant Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and who, as Sir Francis Bertie, was British Ambassador in Paris during the Great War. The memorandum was dated March 11, 1901, three years before the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War. Russia, in combination with France and Germany, had constrained Japan to withdraw from Port Arthur, which she had captured from China some six years before, and had subsequently occupied that place and the whole of the Liao-tung Peninsula herself.

She was also rapidly extending her influence into Korea. This had brought her into direct collision with Japan, and it was anticipated that, sooner or later, the two would fight. Bertie referred to the danger to British interests in the Far East of Russian encroachments, and the still greater danger of a combination in that part of the world of Russia, France, and Germany, and discussed how Japan might serve to avert it. He argued that a defeated Japan, for all that Britain might support her after the event, would count for little. A victorious Japan might, in herself, prove as great a danger as that which it was hoped she might serve to avert. But a great country like Russia would not readily resign herself to defeat and, should Japan capture and occupy the Liao-tung Peninsula, would eventually attempt to recover it. In Lord Bertie's own words, 'the yellow danger would be kept in check by Russia and the Russian danger by Japan'.

That shows plainly enough what England was after ! It wasn't to help Japan : nor was it to have it in for Russia so that she shouldn't rise again. No ! England's game was to let Japan and Russia fight while she stood by to rake in the spoils. She hoped that the Liao-tung Peninsula would become a second Alsace-Lorraine and remain a bone of contention between Japan and Russia to the exhaustion of both. From the very first, she made the Alliance to get Japan to fight Russia for her, while she looked on with her hands in her pockets waiting for 'the fisherman's spoils'.* Russia was encroaching on British preserves in North China and threatened to come into the important Yangtze Valley. India, too, was in danger. It seemed as though a collision between the two Powers could hardly be avoided. It was to meet this contingency that England gave an exhibition of her traditional and masterly diplomacy. Instead of fighting Russia herself, she got Japan to do so, while she played the part of the fisherman.

In brief, in accord with her traditional policy, England is endeavouring to keep Japanese progress and expansion within bounds. So long as Japanese growing influence does not extend into her preserves, she can hardly complain.

* The reference is to a fable about a fisherman watching a kingfisher and a clam fight and bagging both when exhausted.—Translator.

But once it does, she will rise in her wrath, as she always has done, to counteract it. This traditional policy shows us why she led the League of Nations in opposition to Japanese expansion in Manchuria. It also accounts for her sudden change of attitude when she began to be afraid of Japan's rapidly increasing power and prestige after the Russo-Japanese War.

Economic clash.

What England feared has come about : she has, in actual fact, come into serious economic collision with Japan.

As has been explained in Chapter II, section 3, Japanese trade in China has gradually been overtopping British, and has now gained a position in which it predominates in the proportion of three to one. But it is not only in China that this has happened. Japanese trade has penetrated into India and has attacked the very stronghold of British commerce in Asia, where Japanese goods are rapidly supplanting British. Beyond this again, Japanese goods are capturing the markets in Australia on the east, and in Africa on the west, they are winning in both directions. In other words, from Manchuria to North China, from North China to South China, from South China to India, from India to Australia, New Zealand, and Africa, the gallant advance of the Japanese commercial army goes on and the fierce fight for the mastery continues. Before it, the British crying aloud are being driven back without respite.

As seen from the British side the advance of this army is inflicting grave, if not fatal, injuries. For Britain depends for her national prosperity on her trade, and her Overseas Dominions are among her best customers, as may be seen from the following table.

BRITISH EXPORTS ACCORDING TO DESTINATION
(The figures represent percentages)

	1913	1925	1927
British Dominions	37	43	46
Europe	35	25	25.5
Others	32.5	32	30.05

A glance at this table is sufficient to show that European and other foreign countries are not such good customers as they were : the Dominions alone are better ones. In other words, the British Overseas Dominions have not only close political, but also close economic, ties with the Mother Country.

It is but natural that England should wave an anti-Japanese flag when she sees her possessions, not to mention China, being devoured by Japan like mulberry leaves by a silkworm.

The Japanese commercial advance from China to India, Australia, New Zealand, and Africa has, then, come into head-on collision with the British advance from Africa to India, Australia, New Zealand, and China.

The result of the breakdown of the London Economic Conference has been the consolidation of economic blocks. The British Imperial block is in opposition to our Japanese-Manchurian block. There is every prospect of a fierce diplomatic struggle in which each party will strive to bring into its own block any countries that remain outside it. This struggle for the economic mastery very seriously affects Japan's progress and expansion : for her it is a matter of life and death : so also is it for England. Either Japan must stop her natural expansion and the increase of national strength that accompanies it, or England must voluntarily make some sacrifice to her. This is the first point to be noted if the gravity of the relative positions of Japan and England is to be understood.

Clash over the question of population.

The economic circumstances of the two countries are, then, incompatible, and therein lies the danger of a serious collision in the near future. In the distant future, too, are other weighty causes which enhance that danger, and which, when combined with the economic causes, may lead to war. This, too, should be borne in mind. These more remote causes arise in connexion with the questions of Japan's population and natural resources.

Manchukuo, now that it has been established as an independent country, may serve to relieve Japan's excess of population and shortage or lack of natural resources for some ten or twenty years, but not for much longer. The

greatest obstacles to Japanese emigration thither are the intense cold and the difficulty of competing with the Chinese labourer, who is content with small wages and a low standard of living. Our people, therefore, if they desire our country to continue to flourish, must look ahead and think of what may be done when Manchuria and Mongolia, though completely opened up, no longer provide an outlet for our excess of population owing to the competition of the Chinese labourer.*

It is greatly to be regretted that our people seldom see more than that which lies at their feet, and do not take long views. People in both Europe and America are already asking where Japan will go after she has developed the natural resources of Manchuria, Mongolia, and China, and are saying that she is quartering the ground like a hawk and searching the waters like a cormorant.

The following passages from *Danger Spots in World Population*, by Warren S. P. Thompson, Professor of Sociology in the University of Miami, will be of interest to any student of the future of Anglo-Japanese relations.

In the western Pacific area by far the most urgent needs are those of the Japanese. Japan is decidedly overpopulated now as compared with most other countries. It needs more territory for agricultural expansion and it needs larger mineral resources for the development of its industry. Japan's policies with regard to China are today being determined by this really urgent economic need. . . . Their policy towards China is being, and will be, determined by their estimation of the best way to exploit Manchuria as well as certain resources in other parts of China. Since this is the customary method of procedure in international relations today, it does not in any way reflect discredit upon Japan.

. . . But even if the Japanese have as free a hand in Manchuria and China for the next twenty-five or thirty years as they have had in the recent past, this will only postpone a little while the time when they must seek new resources and new lands. In the meantime, they will be growing stronger and will be preparing to take what they need if it is not freely given them. Furthermore, as economic pressure comes to be more and more keenly

* Translator's note: The reader is, presumably, expected to know that if the districts are opened up, Chinese labour will migrate there as well as Japanese.

felt by the working population, the securing of more land will become truly a *national*, rather than merely a *class* cause, and a movement of expansion will receive full popular support.

The facts being what they are, the direction which such a movement will take is already fixed. In saying this I do not mean to impute any definite plans to the Japanese, but the logic of circumstances points to their expansion in a certain direction. North America may be considered closed to Japanese immigration ; South America, particularly Brazil, admits them, but it is not certain that it will admit more than a very limited number, not enough to relieve effectively the situation in Japan ; Asia offers no foothold, save in Siberia, which is too cold. (Japanese translator's note : Professor Thompson means that Manchuria and Mongolia are unsuitable for Japanese immigration on account of the cold and of Chinese labour.) The natural direction of expansion for the Japanese is to the south and east. They would probably prefer the temperate regions of Australia and New Zealand, which are much like Japan ; but without doubt, if tropical lands were available, they would much prefer them without war to the chances of gaining temperate lands through war. If no grants of territory are made to the Japanese, however, and they are compelled to resort to war for new lands, they are less likely to take chances on the climate when they do strike. They will be more disposed to go directly to those climates where they know they can succeed and where labour competition will be easy. (Pp. 114-117.)

After remarking that if Australia and New Zealand were attacked by Japan, the British Fleet could not arrive in time to relieve them and that assistance from the United States is doubtful, the Professor continues :

In view of the fact that Australia would have to face a Japanese attack alone and unaided, it would seem that she would be extremely eager to search out some plan by which the really urgent needs of Japan could be met. For, if by giving Japan some of the unused lands in this area Australia could avert the possibility of attack by Japan, it would seem the part of common sense for Australia to help Japan secure these lands. Certainly, if Japan is compelled to fight to secure new lands and additional resources, it will do like other nations and seize all the territory it possibly can ; whereas if it is allowed to expand without hindrance, it will, no doubt, be quite willing to get along with much less than it really thinks it needs. Thus it appears to us that it would be good politics on the part of Australia to work for an enlarged Japan. The Australians, however, do not

see things in this light, and seem quite likely to oppose the expansion of the Japanese in every way possible. They would much like to see a close alliance of all European peoples who have an interest in the western Pacific, for the purpose of maintaining the *status quo*. If such an alliance could be formed and could be stabilized, it would no doubt be able to hold Japan in check for the next half-century ; but I do not believe that it can be formed, in the first place, or maintained long even if it can once be formed. British, Australians, Dutch, and Americans—what have they in common that will hold them steadily vis-à-vis Japan for the next half-century? . . . The only reasonable answer to this question must be that they have not enough in common to hold together for any great length of time.* (Pp. 123–124.)

People of Japan ! This is the openly expressed opinion of a fair-minded and well-informed man. What are your reactions to it? Those of you that have been under the impression that Manchuria and Mongolia are Japan's only hope stand sharply corrected.

But America is not alone in this opinion : it is held by some people in England herself, as a recent article in the *Tōkyō Asahi* shows. According to a telegram from *The Times* special correspondent at Brisbane, some remarks made by the Dean of Canterbury at the Guildford Diocesan Missionary Festival on July 5, 1933, created a sensation in Australia. The Dean said :

I have great sympathy with Japan, a vast industrial country seeking an outlet for her population and still more for her goods. She sees empty land : the United States struck me as empty country, so did Australia. I should like to have seen a great English gesture—and I know it is rank heresy—in presenting to Japan that part of Australia which we cannot colonize ourselves. I believe that would change the whole atmosphere of the East. [*The Times*, July 7, 1933. Slightly abbreviated in the Japanese. —Translator.]

Mr. Forgan Smith, Premier of Queensland, is reported to have described this as both mischievous and dangerous and as revealing the Dean's ignorance of Australian sentiment. Other influential people also denounced the idea.

* English translator's note : The author has slightly abbreviated the first and last sentences of this quotation, without altering the sense.

This opposition on the part of Australia really means that she is afraid.

Japanophobia in Australia and New Zealand.

The fear that Japan wants Australia and New Zealand because of her difficulties of population and sources of supply, behind which lies an idea of Japan as a militarist country, does not tend to improve Anglo-Japanese relations.

There was a time when Wilhelm II, German Emperor, preached the theory of a 'Yellow Peril' and warned the world against Japan. Australia and New Zealand, more than any others, welcomed his preaching, for they thought that the British Self-Governing Dominions would be the first victims. When Japan, after her victory over Russia, rose to be a Power in the Pacific, these same Dominions became obsessed with a fear of her military strength. It was then that the principle of a 'White Australia' was established and the immigration of Japanese labour strictly prohibited. It was then, too, that Australia decided to have a navy of her own as a defence against Japan.

Later on, during the Great War, when Japan presented the 'Twenty-one Demands' to China, sent troops into Siberia and was thought to be waiting opportunity to seize territory there, Europe and America began to study her political system and to represent her to the world as a dangerous militarist Power, whose civil officials had but little influence and whose affairs of state were at the mercy of a military clique.

Japan was still being condemned as militarist at the opening of the Washington Conference, and Australia and New Zealand were so insistent in their denunciations that they intensified American feeling against her. These ideas have led to the construction of the Singapore Base, which is directed principally against Japan. However, when Japan meekly accepted at the Washington Conference the three-to-five ratio of naval strength vis-à-vis America, signed the Nine Power Pact to abstain from aggression in China, and became a party to the Four Power Treaty, by which she undertook not to attack possessions or colonies in the Pacific, the accusation of militarism was dropped immediately. The reason was that China, as well as Australia, thought that these agreements were an effective

safeguard against the use of military force by Japan. In actual fact, the Four Power Treaty has replaced the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. In compensation for the strangling of that Alliance, Japan has been allowed solemnly to undertake to abstain from aggressive action against British possessions in the Pacific! She turned the other cheek: very foolish, perhaps, but that is where British diplomacy is so clever. But after all the Japanese are so imbued with a belief in England that they can hardly be blamed.

The denunciations of Japan's militarism started again with the Manchurian business, the more so as her military operations began to affect British interests. It is said, and it is the conclusion to which all foreigners have come, that the Japanese appear to have adopted Western civilization, but they only wear it as a garment and they remain militarist at heart and have militarism in their blood. This is not the place to discuss whether the foreigners have hit the mark or not, but it is undoubtedly the acceptance of this conclusion, combined with the spread of Japanese trade to the southward, that has made the Englishman's 'heart and liver turn cold'.

The above gives some account of the principal reasons for the critical state of affairs that obtains between Japan and England today. To what will it lead in the end? War, or Peace? As a preliminary to solving these questions, let us glance at past history and reflect on the closely similar state of affairs that obtained between England and Germany. There we may find sure guidance.

(2) *The Anglo-German Position that of England and Japan*

Before discussing whether the ultimate fate of Japan and England is war or not, I would invite the attention of my readers to the relative positions of Germany and England before the Great War. Those of Japan and England today are exactly the same.

If history repeats itself—and I am one who believes that it does—one is forced to the conclusion that war provides the only solution to the Anglo-Japanese deadlock. Let us review the story of England and Germany.

England dominates the world.

From the close of the Napoleonic Wars till the time of the

Franco-Prussian War, the British Empire held the sceptre of the world. On the economic side, Britain was the workshop of the world, the world's greatest exporter and greatest trader: the leading banks and the greatest insurance companies, too, were hers. That is what Sir Michael Hicks Beach said in March 1876. Up to that time British trade and commerce had been far, far greater than those of any other country. They had been built up with investments and undertakings in every part of the globe. All this is literally true.

On the political side, Britain administered far larger territorial possessions than any other nation, in Europe, in Asia, Africa, Australia, and in North and South America, in fact, in every continent.

As a military Power, Britain had a powerful army and a great navy the equal to those of the two next strongest Powers combined.

In brief, England dominated the world.

The rise of Germany.

The rise of Germany as a world Power began about 1870, and from then on she was frequently at variance with England over questions of the distribution of colonial territory and on account of economic competition. In much the same way, Japan's great increase of national strength since her victory over Russia has brought her into conflict with England.

Originally, Germany, like the United States of America, was an agricultural country and a very good customer of Great Britain, from whom she bought manufactured goods. When Bismarck first set out to build an Imperial Germany, he concentrated on unity and strength at home: he had no time to look abroad. Later on, when he did direct the attention of this agricultural people to lands overseas, it was too late: other nations had forestalled him and had occupied almost all the parts of the world suitable for colonization. In 1879 he adopted a policy of protection for German industry, and in 1882, after inspiring a band of scientists and merchants with enthusiasm, organized a conference on colonization at Frankfort and thereby greatly stimulated the desire for colonies. He had his reasons.

It appears that the population of Germany was, at that

time, second only to that of Russia among the countries of Europe and, like that of Japan today, was rapidly increasing. In 1871 it was 40,000,000, but by 1890 it had risen to 49,400,000, and by 1913 it exceeded 66,000,000. Further, Germany is enclosed on three sides by powerful states and on the fourth by the Baltic Sea. She was driven to seek an outlet for her surplus population overseas. For this reason many Germans emigrated, those that went to the United States in the twenty years—1866–1885—numbered over 2,000,000. These emigrants, however, too frequently preferred to give up their German nationality and adopt that of the country to which they had migrated. This the German Government endeavoured to prevent by obtaining colonies of its own. The energy of Bismarck succeeded in securing colonies in Togoland, the Cameroons, and in East and South-west Africa. But it was soon found that the climatic and general conditions of these districts made them unfit for white men to live in. It was this that gave rise to the German cry for 'A place in the sun', the 'place' being a fertile land with a temperate climate, under the German flag and part of the German Empire. In every attempt, however, to acquire a suitable colony, Germany found herself face to face with the nation that had already established colonies all over the world. It was, in fact, inevitable that she should come into collision with England.

Matters were made worse by Treitsche, a lecturer in the University of Berlin, who maintained that the progress of all nations follows a natural law, and that Germany as the Great Empire of the world must, of necessity, come into collision with England. He said :

If our German Empire decides to adopt a policy of having colonies of her own and puts it into practice, it will be impossible to avoid collision with England. It is both natural and logical that the new Central European Power should contend with all the other countries. We have already had a settlement with Austria, France, and with Russia. The last remaining settlement is with England, but it will take a long time and be very difficult.

Germany, like our Japan, became a great Power by force of arms, and the idea of developing national prosperity by that means has, from the earliest times, been advocated by historians. Well, Treitsche's theory met with a good


reception in Germany, and anti-British sentiments became prevalent.

At the same time, in Germany itself manufacture was making rapid strides, owing to the industry of the people and the application of science under suitable Government direction. The German output of coal, iron, ships, machinery, chemicals, textiles, in all of which England had had almost a monopoly, increased remarkably. Cheap goods, stamped 'Made in Germany', inundated the markets all over the world, in much the same way as Japanese goods today. They achieved immediate and remarkable success, and competed with and surpassed those of England. German shipping grew far more rapidly than that of Britain. The German money market was ever busier. German exports increased by 220 per cent, from £125,000,000 in 1872 to £403,000,000 in 1910, as compared with those of England which increased by 127 per cent, from £263,000,000 in 1870 to £599,000,000 in 1910. British alarm was only natural.

Germany was outstripping England in a 'War in Peace'. She had, of course, other enemies, France and Russia, for instance. But France, though politically thirsting for revenge, was not an obstacle to her economic development. And the Russians, though racially as different from her as 'ice from charcoal', were among her best customers and not in any way enemies in time of peace. England alone was the political and economic enemy: the world could not contain them both. That was why Germany, with an army that she boasted to be the finest in the world, started to build a great navy to match that of England. Economically, she did not, of course, expect to do more than equal England. And, as a naval Power, she did not demand even that. None the less, the fundamental cause of the Great War was the struggle between Germany and England for the mastery of the world. That other countries were apprehensive of Germany's unrestrained militarist activities was, of course, a contributory cause, but the real cause was the fact that German and British aims were mutually exclusive.

The Anglo-German situation that of England and Japan.

What has the above brief sketch suggested to those who have read it? Will any of them deny that the story of



H.M.S. "YORK"

Germany and England is being repeated today by England and Japan? It must not be forgotten that mutually exclusive national interests are a principal cause of war.

How was it that Germany was beaten in the end and that England was the ultimate victor? There were many reasons: among them the manner in which diplomacy was co-ordinated to war. Let us be warned by what has happened before and stop to consider this highly important question.

Diplomacy and war.

In the days of Bismarck war and diplomacy ran together, like the wheels of a cart: one did not try to rush ahead when the other was inextricable in the mud. It will be remembered how Wilhelm I, King of Prussia, during the war with Austria in 1866, disregarded the opinion of his military advisers and stopped the advance of his troops on Vienna to forestall armed intervention by the Emperor of the French.

Bismarck died, and the times changed to those of the masterful, haughty and reckless Wilhelm II. Diplomacy was ignored, and the most important affairs of state were left dependent on the whim of the Emperor and the military clique with which he had surrounded himself. The Germany of those days may be likened to a luxury liner on a pleasure cruise threading her way in a current as swift as an arrow between a rock and a whirlpool, and hardly under control. Just as the quartermaster is putting over the helm to avoid the whirlpool, a disorderly, drunken tourist takes hold of the wheel and the ship runs on the rock.

That this was the state of affairs in Germany before the Great War is confirmed by Viscount Grey of Fallodon. He says that the German military clique ignored diplomacy and, regardless of its attempts to find a peaceful solution to the situation that arose between Austria and Serbia in 1914, was determined on war and on the humiliation of France. Neither Bethmann-Hollweg nor von Jagow, with whom alone other Governments could deal, had influence or weight. In Austria, too, Berchtold, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, could obtain no hearing: Vienna listened to the military clique in Berlin and to it alone.*

As has already been explained, when England desired

* *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 32-33.

to check Russia's advance in the Far East and towards India, she made an alliance with Japan and let her fight, while she kept her hands in her pockets. She pursued exactly the same cunning policy with Germany. She herself was the real enemy, but she behaved as though France and Russia were, and let it appear that she would remain neutral should Germany fight them. There may have been other reasons why Sir Edward Grey, as he was then, would give France and Russia no definite assurance of help, but one of his objects was as has been stated. Bethmann-Hollweg, the German Premier, was so taken in that the curt refusal of what Grey calls 'the bid for neutrality', which he made on July 29, the day on which it was decided to make war on France and Russia, came to him as a severe shock.

The bid was in the form of a telegram from Bethmann-Hollweg offering to abstain from seizing any French territory in Europe if England would undertake to remain neutral. In Grey's view this offer could not be accepted with honour: he was astounded that Bethmann-Hollweg had not seen it in that light.*

In fact, Germany was fooled by the cunning of British diplomacy. Could anything be plainer? But we Japanese must not ignore this fact as being the affair of another country and one with which we are not concerned. During the affair with China it was England, more than anyone else, who skilfully manipulated America and brought about a clandestine understanding in the League. It was she too who calmly posed as a friend to Japan when she let America make the protests and egged her on from behind. It is highly probable that at the next Pacific Conference, where the Manchurian question will finally be decided, England will endeavour to secure concerted action against Japan by letting America lead the opposition while she instigates her from behind with her hands in her pockets. We must not, for one moment, overlook the possibility of some such action by England. If there are Japanese who think that we shall have things our own way now that matters are going more smoothly with America, they have shut their eyes to the story of the cunning of British diplomacy.

And how do England and America stand at present?

* *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 327.

Their relations are always delicate, and the state of them closely affects the possibility of an Anglo-Japanese war. I will endeavour to discuss them in the next section.

(3) *Anglo-American Relations*

Two opinions.

At the present time two views of Anglo-American relations are held in Japan. One is that England and America will ultimately come into conflict, and that therefore they will never co-operate in fighting Japan. The other is that, on the contrary, the two will eventually combine against Japan.

The exponents of the first theory hold that important material interests prevent the two countries from combining and that a collision between them is inevitable. It has not yet occurred because of Japan, who is spoken of as a separating wedge. It is also said that the Japanese navy has the casting vote. Should the two make common cause and defeat Japan, the wedge would be knocked out and an end-on collision would ensue. In these circumstances a war of England and America against Japan is out of the question. After the affair in Manchuria, optimistic theories such as these sprang up like mushrooms after a shower. Controversialists, whose self-esteem would bring ruin to any country, loved to quote them. They are beneath our notice, but it is worthy of remark that they are taken seriously by some of our more thoughtful politicians and fighting men.

Those who hold the second view admit that British material interests conflict with those of America, but they remember history and how, in the past, the two countries have invariably come together to oppose a third. This view seems the more worthy of consideration now that relations between Japan and England are in a state of strain.

One thing is certain, England will not go to war with Japan unless she is sure that America will join her. A similar statement is true of America, who would hardly fight Japan unless she felt sure that England would be on her side and not decline to fight.

Which, then, of the above two theories is right? The question is one of the first importance to Japan.

Clash of British and American material interests.

The facts are that American trade has gone ahead of that of Britain quite suddenly, and that the two countries are in fierce competition all over the world. For instance, up to 1913 England was still the premier exporting country, with 13.93 per cent of the world's total exports, America coming second with 13.43 per cent. But by 1925 there had been a radical change in these positions. In that year England had only 12.43 per cent of the world's exports as compared with America's 16.35 per cent. Since then the latter has been forging ahead. American trade has very rapidly been eating its way into British preserves, in the all-important Dominions of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, and in the markets of Latin-America, Africa, and Asia, on which England has so greatly relied in the past.

It is not only in commerce that this has been happening : there has been a similar change in the financial field. Before the Great War, London was the money-market of the world, whence exchanges were regulated. Now it is New York instead of London, and the American bankers have possessed themselves of the financial network that England had spread over the world.

Of all Anglo-American questions that of the war debts is the most difficult. Before the Great War, America was a debtor country, England alone had 3500 million dollars invested there. Today, however, she has suddenly become a creditor country. The amount due to her each year up to 1932 was 165 million dollars, and from 1933 to 1984 it will be about 185 million. It is small wonder that England, worn by the War, persists in demanding the cancellation of the war debts. But America will not relent. Just before the London Economic Conference Mr. Macdonald purposely made an earnest appeal to the White House. The only result was the startling remark, 'Settle the War debts', made at the opening of the Conference by the American delegate. The English were naturally annoyed and showed it.

Another bone of contention is the control of oilfields. The American, Ludwell Denny, discusses this in his book, *America Conquers Britain*. He maintains that Britain has been conquered, and says that America would not hesitate to fight over the oil question should occasion arise.

In the end, England must either regain her economic

supremacy or surrender her political supremacy. History teaches that one of the two must happen. If this is so, an unpleasant experience is in store for her : she will appreciate to the full the historical fact that two great heroes cannot stand together.

The struggle extends to the sea : both the fighting and the merchant navies—the two are interdependent—are in competition. At the Washington Conference in 1921 England abandoned her traditional position as the greatest naval Power and was obliged to accept equality with America with a good grace. The resentment of her people can well be imagined.

There is keen competition all over the world. It is frequently the subject of controversy across the Atlantic, when compliments are exchanged. Lloyd George has already raised the question several times, and Kenworthy has talked of the possibility of war and has drawn attention to the state of affairs.

England's pro-American policy.

England, however, realizes the folly of war with America, and has not hesitated, since the Great War, to turn pro-American, or, rather, to humour America almost to the extent of kow-towing to her. This attitude was first adopted by the Liberal Cabinet of Lloyd George, and has been the keynote of the foreign policy of those of Baldwin and Macdonald.

It is not difficult to see the motive behind this volte-face. The Great War can be regarded as marking the climax of British prosperity, and to restore her falling fortunes England may have thought it wise on the economic side to endeavour to act the part of America's broker, and on the naval side to join with her to control the Seven Seas. She realizes that she has no hope of defeating America in war. For one thing, she would be compelled to abandon Canada and would lose completely her foothold on the American Continent. That alone would be a severe blow at the start. If, in addition, her sea communications were cut by the American navy, dependent as she is on supplies from abroad, her very existence would be threatened. That is the reason why she kow-towed before America and resigned herself to the pangs of disillusionment in surrendering her position as the leading naval Power.

There is another point to be considered. Did England really swallow her national pride and adopt towards America the attitude that she appeared to? What was the reason for this apparent craven-heartedness? André Siegfried says in his book, *England's Crisis* :

Today, in a mere decade, without a war, without a struggle, without seeming to care, this same England—is she the same?—has renounced her supremacy, at least in principle, at the request of the United States. We are forced to regard this renunciation as a loss of prestige. The English would have you believe that it is simply common sense, and that it had to be done. If they feel humiliated they certainly do not show it.*

Needs must . . ., the English seem to say. The Americans are not absolute strangers. We both have the same origin, the same civilization, the same language—almost! After all, we made them. We know—or at least we prefer to believe—that when they build a Fleet equal to ours they have no aggressive intentions against us. With Napoleon or William II it was entirely different. In the future the British and American Fleets will work together to police the seas and maintain the peace of the world, and it will be an Anglo-Saxon peace. There is surely neither objection nor humiliation in that? †

The English console themselves in this way, but at the bottom of their hearts is a strong under-current of dissatisfaction. The more the Americans boast, the more they look askance at them. To quote Siegfried again :

Though their political watchword ought to be friendship, the English can hardly contain their antipathy for their American cousins. They rail against their accent, their manners, and their lack of culture ; for the first time they show an inferiority complex towards these all-powerful *nouveaux riches*. In their humiliation they hope that they have made no decisive concessions. "Even if the Americans do build this Fleet," they say, "will they know how to use it? Will they ever be able to man it? Seamanship requires long training, and cannot be improvised." They consider that the United States, being essentially a continental country, is ill-prepared for a seafaring life. Also, it is scarcely better equipped for the complications of international commerce and politics. They comfort themselves with the thought that for years to come America will need them to act as intermediary !‡

* André Siegfried : *England's Crisis*. Tr. H. H. and Doris Hemming. p. 239.

† *Ibid.*, p. 241.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 242.

That is the English attitude to America. What of that of America to England? Let us see what an American author who knows his Far East says :

Even though an Anglo-American Alliance is impractical there is no reason why there cannot be an effective working agreement between the English-speaking nations. They have much the same objectives. As great trading nations both are vitally concerned to see peace maintained so that prosperity may flourish. In matters political they *are bound to co-operate* by joining forces in bringing pressure to bear against any nation which attempts to embark on a dangerous naval or military programme.*

It stands to reason that once parity on a reduced basis between the British and the American Navies is an accomplished fact, it will be to the interest of both nations to see that no other Power builds a fleet to threaten either.†

If the United States better appreciated her strength she might more easily understand England's burdens. If England more clearly recognized the close kinship between the United States and the Dominions, she would find it easier to work out a form of partnership which could be based not on rivalry but on the pursuit of common interests to mutual advantage.‡

The fact is that there is much in the psychology of both English and Americans that one who is neither cannot understand. That is the reason for the conflicting views expressed at the beginning of this chapter. There is no doubt that the two countries compete : there is no doubt that they co-operate. We Japanese are not alone in thinking that their quarrels will end in an appeal to the sword : there are others. But what we must never forget is that, should a third party appear on the scene, they will drop their quarrel and attack him together. America's participation in the War and the Anglo-American co-operation at the Washington and London Conferences are actual instances. It was just the same over the Manchurian affair, but there the probability of joint action against Japan was incomparably greater than in any of the other three cases.

It is precisely for this reason that war with America

* Instead of the words in italics, which are a translation of the Japanese, Mr. Roosevelt says, "have the opportunity of co-operating in the interest of actual world disarmament".

† Nicholas Roosevelt : *America and England*, p. 226.

‡ *Ibid.*, 231.

means war with England, and conversely. This fact held good throughout each phase of the Manchurian affair: that is the wisest view for Japan to take. The only doubt is whether they will conjointly make war from the start, or whether one will join in after the other has started. The point is of importance as materially affecting the whole situation.

(4) *Will Japan and England Ultimately Fight?*

Possible occasions of war.

As we have already seen, the relative positions of Japan and England are incompatible. The teaching of history is that war is inevitable, unless, indeed, England gives way. We will imagine two possible occasions, one in the near future, the other at a far more distant date.

(1) If, at the next Pacific Conference to be held in two or three years' time, England, in the hope of nipping Japanese expansion in the bud and anticipating a serious collision, attempts actively to coerce Japan, not only over Manchuria, but also over the closely related question of armaments.

(2) If, with the lapse of time after the Pacific Conference, at which we will suppose a peaceful settlement to have been reached by one means or another, the economic clash becomes more pronounced and is complicated by the questions of Japan's population and natural resources.

Let us take the first of these.

England and the Pacific Conference.

As has been explained in Chapter II, section 1, the principal objects of England's China policy are to uphold the Treaties of Peace, to preserve the territorial integrity of China, and to maintain her political and economic supremacy in that country. Her refusal to recognize Manchukuo was in accordance with this policy. In other words, it is more to her advantage for Manchuria to remain under the sovereignty of China. It is therefore quite possible that at the next Pacific Conference she may incite other countries to demand the cancellation of the declaration of independence. What I mean is this, according to the London Naval Treaty a conference on reduction of armament is due in 1935 or

1936. At it, not only the question of armaments in the Pacific, but also the whole Manchurian question will be raised by England and America, and the conference will be turned into one of the Powers acting in concert against Japan.

It seems probable that England will endeavour to stir up the Powers, and especially America, to present with her a united front against Japan and to refuse to recognize Manchukuo. If America does not prove amenable, England's next step will probably be to get her to join in putting pressure on Japan over the armaments question. Then, if Japan will not listen, a third step directed towards the cancellation of her mandate for the Pacific Islands may be expected.

These are all possible steps for England to take to oppress Japan. What line of action will Japan take to meet them? Let us first discuss the American attitude to Manchukuo.

America and Manchukuo.

The statements of the Japanese diplomats were frequently belied by the actions of the Japanese soldiers. This appears so to have annoyed Mr. Stimson that he burst into salvos of protests and, maintaining that the No-War and Nine Power Pacts had been violated, eventually declared that Manchukuo would not be recognized. But a change came, and it was realized that this declaration had been somewhat hasty. Stimson was becoming unpopular in America, and he got Mr. Castle, former Assistant Secretary of State, to make a speech foreshadowing a change of attitude. This was on April 7, 1933 (?), at the thirty-seventh annual meeting of the American Association of Political Science at Philadelphia.

In effect, what Mr. Castle said was that the description of Manchuria as an integral part of China needed qualification; the hold of the National Government of China over that province had all along been precarious. Japan had interests there which she had had to protect, and her action was regarded by her own people as taken in self-defence: there had been, in the first instance, no intention to annex the province. Too little consideration had been given to these points, and America as well as other Powers had been

too ready to place all the blame for what had occurred on Japan alone. A possible, and perhaps a very satisfactory, solution of the whole trouble would have been for China to make Manchuria a self-governing dominion under a governor who could be relied upon to respect Japanese rights and interests. The Government of the United States and those of other Powers had principally been concerned to preserve the sanctity of international law. Should China and Japan eventually arrive at some solution of their difficulties, the whole position might be regularized. Mr. Stimson's declaration had not meant that Manchukuo would not be recognized under any circumstances whatever. Times changed and circumstances altered, and it might well be that the attitude of the United States to the whole question would require modification.*

One can see in this speech an astonishing toning down of the attitude revealed in Mr. Stimson's continual salvos of protest and in his letters to Mr. Senator Borah. In his comments on Japan's action, Mr. Castle shows greater understanding, and he states, officially, that Mr. Stimson did not lay down that Manchukuo must not be recognized under any circumstances whatever.

What is the meaning of the remark 'Times change and circumstances alter'? We may recall three points in America's China policy—territorial integrity, the open door, equality of opportunity. Does it amount to this, that if after all Japan does not annex Manchukuo, and if her actions conform to the doctrines of the Open Door and equality of opportunity, America will not complain?

Mr. Castle was not alone in adumbrating a possible recognition of Manchukuo. Professor John Bassett Moore, an authority on international law, contributed a long article to the American journal, *Foreign Affairs*, suggesting the same thing. He said that the proposals of the Lytton Report were too complicated, that the suggested co-operation of Japan with China would never materialize, that the whole tone of the finding of the Committee of the League that dealt with the report was hostile to Japan, and that its verdict was neither considerate nor fair. He maintained that armed interference in Manchuria would be plainly inconsistent

* The above is a brief précis of the Japanese version of Mr. Castle's speech, the original report of which has not been traced.—Translator.

with America's policy of granting independence to the Philippines, that it would assuredly fail and would invite serious trouble. He cited Samoa as showing that international control was the very worst form of administration, and ended by saying that Manchukuo would have to be recognized.

America's attitude to the Manchurian question is, then, negative, and we shall not be far wrong in concluding that the meeting of Roosevelt and Ishii confirms this statement. This being so, there can be no doubt that if the question is brought up at the next Pacific Conference and any attempt is made to enforce a cancellation of the declaration of independence, or even if the general feeling is in favour of cancellation, it will principally be due to the activities of England. But, as Uchida, Minister for Foreign Affairs, definitely informed the Diet, Japan would resist cancellation even if in so doing the country were reduced to ashes.

If, then, England should act as supposed, her relations with Japan would suddenly change to the very worst. This is one of the possible occasions of war. The question for Japan would be, how far would it be possible to detach America and to persuade her to withhold from England such support as she might otherwise incline to give.

England and the naval question.

Should England fail to coerce Japan over the Manchurian question, her next probable step would be to attempt, in conjunction with America, to whittle away her naval strength. In this matter England and America have much in common, and our people should note the fact.

The chief naval questions in dispute are those of the ratio and of submarines. Both England and America hope to keep Japanese progress and expansion in check by allotting to her as small a ratio as possible in both surface ships and submarines, if, indeed, they cannot abolish the latter altogether.

In this connexion it should be pointed out that we have hitherto thought of our Navy as designed primarily to meet America; the possibility of having to meet England has been a secondary consideration. But today, when our relations with England are somewhat strained, this attitude requires revision. For example, in a war with America we

should be able to make use of our Pacific Islands, but in one with England we should have no such advantage, as is explained later. Against her, therefore, we should require a larger tonnage ratio and our submarines would play a more important part. We should have to operate not only in the Indian Ocean, but as far south as the Cape of Good Hope. To enable us to do this we should have to bring up again, at the next Pacific Conference, the proposal which we put forward at the General Conference on Limitation of Armament at Geneva.

The following table shows the tonnage ratio in each type of ship that it is proposed to allot to Japan expressed as a percentage, England and America each having 100 per cent :

<i>Type</i>	<i>Treaty of London</i>	<i>American Proposal</i>	<i>British Proposal</i>	<i>Japanese Proposal</i>
Capital Ships	62	58	62	72.7
Aircraft Carriers ..	60	60	60	Abolition
'A' class Cruisers ..	60	58	60	83.3
'B' class Cruisers ..	70	70	70	?
Destroyers	70	70	70	?
Submarines	100	100	100	75,000 tons

NOTES :

(1) The latest advices indicate that America inclines to accept the British proposals *en bloc*. But as what she really wants appears to be the 'Hoover' proposal put forward at the Geneva Conference, I have given it here.

(2) The proportion of B class cruisers and destroyers that Japan demands is not known, but it is hardly likely to be less than 70 per cent.

(3) It is quite possible that Japan will demand equality with England and America.

Take note ! America proposes a smaller proportion of capital ships than that of the London Conference. Japan, on the other hand, wants a larger one. There is no doubt that America has reduced the Japanese proportion because of the affair in Manchuria. She may have proposed 70 per cent for Japan in B class cruisers and destroyers because

they do not take long to build and she has a very high capacity of output.

The figures given for England's proposal are those of the Treaty of London, but as it would be to her advantage to give Japan smaller ratios, she will undoubtedly hold up both hands to vote for the American proposal.

Japan, on her side, is dead against the principle of the British proposal and, as Satō, our representative, announced at Geneva, definitely declines to accept the Treaty of London as a basis of discussion.

As to submarines, England wants abolition, or, failing that, limitation in size to 250 tons. The limit imposed by the London Conference is 2000 tons; to reduce it to 250 would be to render this type of ship utterly valueless. Japan is the leading submarine country in the world, and to deprive her of the use of them would, from the point of view of national defence, amount to cutting off one of her arms. Further, the Treaty of London allotted to Japan a total submarine tonnage of 52,700, which she protested would not allow her to build a sufficient number of boats. She maintains that she requires 23,000 tons more, and the American proposal, which would reduce the allowance to 35,000 tons, amounts, again, from the point of view of national defence, to wrenching off one of her arms: it would not allow her to build half enough boats.

These questions of proportions and of submarines are of the first importance to Japan, who cannot accept either the British or the American proposals. Her difficulty will be far greater if she demands equality. A possible plan might be to endeavour to cause dissension between England and America by supporting the former's principle of a few big ships and opposing that of the latter of a large number of cruisers. Another excellent scheme would be to support the French and Italian demands for larger proportions and so to endanger the British two-European-Power standard. Yet again, to back up France whole-heartedly over the submarine question so as to send the Anglo-American idea of abolition up in smoke would be great fun.

However, to take a general view of the whole situation, it is highly probable that England and America will work together over the naval question, that they will, in the end, come into direct collision with Japan, and that the Dis-

armament Conference will end in a deadlock. If this is not a true forecast, it is not far out, and therein lies Japan's great problem.*

If the Disarmament Conference breaks down, the possibility has to be considered of England endeavouring to get at Japan by acting in concert with America and bringing up the question of Manchukuo, or by proposing that the mandate for the Pacific Islands be returned, or that the agreement to limit fortifications in the Pacific† be abrogated.

In our opinion there are good reasons why England should be the prime mover in attempts to put pressure on Japan. She is the country that would be affected most adversely should no solution to the armaments question be reached. Japan would in that case, naturally, build a navy equal to that of England or America, and the British Self-Governing Dominions would take alarm. For they and India are already in fierce competition with Japan commercially, and, if the attempt to solve the armaments question failed, England and Japan would be further estranged. But Japan is not the only country of whom England is apprehensive. If the Naval Conference broke down, both France and Italy would be able to build as they pleased, and England's traditional policy of maintaining in Europe a two-power standard would be upset, and she herself would seriously be threatened.

For reasons such as these it is probable that England will continue to support America, and by fair means or foul scheme to oppress Japan : a matter that on no account we should overlook.

If the agreement to limit fortifications in the Pacific is abrogated, Japan will be compelled to bring her naval strength to a level of equality with that of England and America. Her efforts before the Washington Conference show what she can do.

England and the Pacific Mandate.

It is not impossible that England may stir up the other

* For a detailed account of the question of armaments at the next Pacific Conference reference is requested to the author's *War Clouds Over the Pacific*.

† Article XIX of the Treaty of Washington.—Translator.

Powers, and America especially, to demand the return of Japan's mandate in the Pacific. The supreme authority in a 'C' mandated territory is variously held to be vested in : (i) the League of Nations ; (ii) the principal Allied and Associated Powers ; (iii) the holder of the mandate. Of these, (i) is the opinion of the League itself ; (ii) that of America, who claims the right to be consulted ; (iii) that of Japan, who certainly will not return her mandate without fighting. Germany, who, after all, is the party principally concerned, is continually pressing for the return of the territories to her, their original owner. In the end, this question can hardly be settled except by force. If the Powers insist on depriving Japan of the islands, which she regards as of great importance, she will fight. Of that there is no doubt whatever.

It is sometimes said that these islands are worth two battleships to Japan. But they have a deeper and a spiritual significance. They are, to us, symbolical of the days when we first spread our wings and went forth into the Pacific. They are not only essential to us strategically, they stand to us as an earnest of our national progress and development.*

There is another matter that must not be overlooked. Certain phrases in the Four Power Treaty which was signed at Rome on June 7, 1933, by England, France, Germany, and Italy, call for attention. The Treaty consists of a preamble and six Articles.

In the first Article, the four Powers agree to confer together over all questions arising between them, and, with a view to maintaining peace, to give effect to a policy calculated to invite the efficient co-operation of all countries in the League.

In the second, they agree carefully to examine all proposals to give effect to Articles 10, 16, and 19 of the League of Nations Covenant. In other words, they hold out to Germany and Italy a hope that the restrictions that have been placed upon them will be removed by a revision of the Treaties.

In the third, they agree to confer over any questions left unsettled at the Conference on Reduction of Armament. This refers, principally, to the German demand for an

* Reference to the author's *War Clouds Over the Pacific* is requested.

equal right of military preparation, and to the Italian demand for a naval strength equal to that of France.

It is the third Article that calls for the attention of Japan. It appears to imply that an attempt to give effect to the second Article will be made at the next Conference on Reduction of Armament. Should that Conference fail and the restrictions on German and Italian armaments not be removed, the four Powers will consult together and endeavour to find some suitable form of compensation. As things are at present, it would appear that nothing could be done for Germany except to hand over to her the Pacific Islands after taking them from Japan, and nothing for Italy except at the expense of Russia. For this very reason Russia has shown considerable resentment of the Rome agreement, in which she sees the four Powers arrayed against herself. The only country that has said nothing is Japan, as becomes a great nation.



To sum up, there is trouble in store for Japan over her Pacific Mandates. America wants them returned, and England will probably try to have them returned in order to pacify Germany. Here again is a reason why Japan should pay the closest attention to what England is doing.

War with England or with America?

As has already been pointed out, there are many cogent reasons for supposing that at the next Pacific Conference England will stir up the other Powers, and particularly America, to coerce Japan. It may be that England, with her habitual cunning, will let America appear as the ring-leader. But if for one reason or another America is backward in coming forward, England will throw off the mask and stand forth herself, just as she did when Japan left the League of Nations.

For reasons such as these, and because, in all probability, America would rather be friends with England than with Japan, one can imagine that a war arising out of the break-up of the next Pacific Conference would be either between Japan and America, with England intervening at a later date on the American side, or between Japan and England, with America intervening at a later date on the British side.

The English might come into an American-Japanese war



H.M.S. "FURIOUS"



if they thought that by the exercise of their cunning diplomacy, and by waiting until both belligerents were worn out, they could become Masters of the World without taking their hands out of their pockets.

America might come into an Anglo-Japanese war with a similar cunning design, or, possibly, if Japan succeeded in making friends with her and estranging her from England.

As Japan's wisest policy is to do everything she can to avoid war with America, war with England is not so utterly absurd as most people suppose ; in fact, one can see good reasons why it should occur. It would be all the more probable if England came to be regarded as the instigator of attempts to coerce Japan at the next Pacific Conference. This, on top of the economic pressure she has already exercised, would so infuriate the Japanese that they would endeavour to find some means of having their revenge. They might, for instance, join with Russia to stir up a revolt in India. England would have to fight then.

Second occasion of war with England.

We have discussed above the possibility of an Anglo-Japanese war arising out of the next Pacific Conference. Let us now consider the second occasion and imagine that, although a peaceful solution has been reached at the Conference by one means or another, economic competition, added to the questions of Japanese population and natural resources, has brought on a war.

The latest tendency since the breakdown of the London Economic Conference has been for countries to hasten to form economic blocks. The effect of this on Anglo-Japanese trade relations will not improve public feeling between the two countries. We can see each block engaged in strenuous activities to bring into itself those territories that remain unattached.

The countries that Japan is striving to bring into her block are China and India.

Since the affair with China, England has taken advantage of the anti-Japanese movement in that country to endeavour to form her own spheres of commercial interest. Aided by the efforts of Sir Miles Lampson, her minister, she has met with considerable success in Central, North, and South-west China. And, thanks to the policy of the Nankin Govern-

ment of ingratiating itself with her and with America, she is making further progress. In other words, England has extended her sphere of influence at Japan's expense. This being so, Japan will certainly and fiercely conduct a commercial campaign of retaliation. The matter is serious, for although American trade does not compete with that of Japan in China, being in different lines, that of England is in the same lines. Further, Japan will have to make one block with the whole of China and India if she is to strengthen her present block with Manchuria, and to establish an effective Monroe Doctrine in the Far East. But India is England's vital treasure-house, and to go as far as that opens up a prospect of a most violent collision.

The account already given of the relative positions of England and Germany refers to a state of affairs that existed some little while ago. At the present day there is this much difference, that as a potential cause of real war diplomatic strife over economic blocks has taken the place of economic strife between individual countries. For Japan, whose economic difficulties are bound up with those of population and natural resources, force provides the only final solution. This is the reason why, some time in the future, she will fight England.

This being so, how will the war be conducted? Before answering this question, let us consider briefly England's naval policy and the British Navy.

CHAPTER IV

THE KNELL OF THE BRITISH NAVY

(I) *The Sea-fight in which Germany asked England 'the Weight of the Pot'*

An unpalatable verdict.

BRITAIN boasts that the sun never sets on her Empire, but the Great War has proved the culminating point of its fortunes. She has prided herself on her Navy as the finest in the world, but the Great War has proved a turning point in its history and it has declined ever since. On the first page of the story of that decline will be written in large type the tale of the famous sea-fight against Germany.

A conclusion that may properly be drawn from a careful investigation of the facts is that although Germany lost the war to the Allies, in her encounter with England she won. The truth is that Germany was overwhelmed by the numbers that were brought against her by countries other than England. This is a verdict that will be far from palatable to the British Navy.

England's cry of distress over the submarine campaign.

What occurred will be understood when it is pointed out that at the outbreak of war the British Navy had a numerical superiority of more than 15 per cent over that of Germany, but by March 1917, some two and a half years later, she was at the point of defeat owing to the success of the German submarine campaign. Rear-Admiral Sims, Commander-in-Chief of the American naval forces dispatched to Europe, makes no secret of the fact in his book, *Victory at Sea*. He says :

Before arriving in England I myself had not known the gravity of the situation. I had followed the War from the beginning

with the greatest interest ; I had read practically everything printed about it in the American and foreign press, and I had had access to such official information as was available on our side of the Atlantic. The result was that, when I sailed for England in March, I felt little fear about the outcome. All the fundamental facts in the case made it appear impossible that the Germans could win the War. Sea-power apparently rested practically unchallenged in the hands of the Allies ; and that in itself, according to the unvarying lessons of history, was an absolute assurance of ultimate victory. The statistics of shipping losses had been regularly printed in the American press, and, while such wanton destruction of life and property seemed appalling, there was apparently nothing in these figures that was likely to make any material change in the result. Indeed, it appeared to be altogether probable that the War would end before the United States could exert any material influence on the outcome. My conclusions were shared by most American naval officers whom I knew, students of warfare, who, like myself, had the utmost respect for the British Fleet and believed that it had the naval situation well in hand.

Yet a few days spent in London clearly showed that all this confidence in the defeat of the Germans rested upon a misapprehension. The Germans, it now appeared, were not losing the war—they were winning it. The British Admiralty now placed before the American representative facts and figures which it had not given to the British press. These documents disclosed the astounding fact that, unless the appalling destruction of merchant tonnage which was then taking place could be materially checked, the unconditional surrender of the British Empire would inevitably take place within a few months.

On the day of my arrival in London I had my first interview with Admiral Jellicoe, who was, at that time, the First Sea Lord.

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After the usual greetings, Admiral Jellicoe took a paper out of his drawer and handed it to me. It was a record of the tonnage losses for the last few months. This showed that the total sinkings, British and neutral, had reached 536,000 tons in February, and 603,000 in March ; it further disclosed that sinkings were taking place in April which indicated the destruction of nearly 900,000 tons. These figures indicated that the losses were three and four times as large as those which were then being published in the press.

[NOTE.—The statements published were not false, but they were inconclusive and intentionally so. They gave the number of

British ships sunk, but not their tonnage, and not the total losses of British, Allied, and neutral tonnage.]

It is expressing it mildly to say that I was surprised by this disclosure. I was fairly astounded ; for I had never imagined anything so terrible. I expressed my consternation to Admiral Jellicoe.

"Yes," he said, as quietly as though he were discussing the weather and not the future of the British Empire, "it is impossible for us to go on with the War if losses like this continue."

"What are you doing about it?" I asked.

"Everything that we can. We are increasing our anti-submarine forces in every possible way. We are using every possible craft we can find with which to fight submarines. We are building destroyers, trawlers, and other light craft as fast as we can. But the situation is very serious and we shall need all the assistance we can get."

"It looks as though the Germans were winning the War," I remarked.

"They will win unless we can stop these losses—and stop them soon," the Admiral replied.

"Is there no solution for the problem?" I asked.

"Absolutely none that we can see now," Jellicoe announced. He described the work of destroyers and other anti-submarine craft, but he showed no confidence that they would be able to control the depredations of the U-boats.

The newspapers for several months had been publishing stories that submarines in large numbers were being sunk ; and these stories I now found to be untrue. The Admiralty records showed that only fifty-four German submarines were positively known to have been sunk since the beginning of the War ; the German shipyards, I was now informed, were turning out new submarines at the rate of three a week. The newspapers had also published accounts of the voluntary surrender of German U-boats ; but not one such surrender, Admiral Jellicoe said, had ever taken place ; the stories had been circulated merely for the purpose of depreciating enemy *moral*.

I even found that members of the Government, all of whom should have been better informed, and also British naval officers, believed that many captured German submarines had been carefully stowed away at the Portsmouth and Plymouth Navy Yards. Yet the disconcerting facts which faced the Allies were that the supplies and communications of the forces on all the fronts were threatened : that German submarines were constantly extending their operations farther and farther out into the Atlantic ; that German raiders were escaping into the open sea ; that three years' constant operations had seriously threatened

the strength of the British Navy, and that Great Britain's control of the sea was actually at stake.

Nor did Admiral Jellicoe indulge in any false expectations concerning the future. Bad as the situation then was, he had every expectation that it would grow worse. The season which was now approaching would make easier the German operations, for the submarines would soon have the long daylight of the British summer and the more favourable weather. The next few months, indeed, both in the estimation of the Germans and the British, would witness the great crisis of the War ; the basis of the ruthless campaign upon which the submarines had entered was that they could reach the decision before winter closed in. So far as I could learn there was a general belief in British naval circles that this plan would succeed. The losses were now approaching a million tons a month ; it was thus a matter of very simple arithmetic to determine the length of time the Allies could stand such a strain. According to the authorities the limit of endurance would be reached about November 1, 1917 ; in other words, unless some method of successfully fighting submarines could be discovered almost immediately, Great Britain would have to lay down her arms before a victorious Germany.

"What we are facing is the defeat of Great Britain," said Ambassador Walter H. Page, after the situation had been explained to him.*

That England was at the point of defeat is plain enough. The position was so critical that a special mission under Mr. Balfour was sent over to America to ask for assistance.

Battle of Jutland.

It was not only the German submarines that asked the British Navy 'the weight of the pot' ; Jutland, the one great sea-fight of the war, also taught it a lesson. This fight, in which the British had a marked superiority of force, showed that their ships and guns, which they had boasted to be the finest in the world, were no match for those of the Germans. Further, this fight showed clearly enough that the British personnel, universally admitted since the time of Nelson to be unsurpassed in resource and initiative, had been over-rated.

The battle began with an action between the British cruiser squadrons under the dashing and incomparable

* *The Victory at Sea.* Rear-Admiral W. S. Sims, U.S. Navy. John Murray. 1920. Pp. 4-8.

Beatty and the German scouting squadron under Vice-Admiral Hipper. The fighting was fierce enough to deserve special mention in the naval annals of the world. But Jellicoe, the Commander-in-Chief of the British Grand Fleet, was slow to take advantage of this good fight of Beatty's intrepid squadrons. Both officers proved inexpert, in that they engaged in separate and individual operations. If Jellicoe had succeeded in keeping his squadrons in touch and had made certain of bringing his whole fleet into action at the same time, he would have had such marked superiority of gun-power that he would have been able to inflict very serious damage on the German forces. For between the German battle fleet under Admiral Scheer, and Hipper's scouting squadron, was an empty space of fifty miles of sea, and it would have been quite possible to have destroyed them both in detail.

Next, the British have been criticized adversely for not hotly pursuing the German Fleet when it drew off. With their greatly superior destroyer forces they were in a position to prevent its escape. The irresolution of Admiral Jellicoe in not making use of this advantage, combined with the inexpert conduct of operations already mentioned, completely destroyed the reputation of the British Navy. Since then Admiral Jellicoe has been at pains to explain his action in his book, *The Grand Fleet, 1914-1916*, but we fear that no competent judge has been convinced.

British Navy obsessed by the defensive.

What, then, was radically wrong with the British Navy that it was brought to such a pass? Its traditional spirit had degenerated, and it was obsessed by the defensive instead of the offensive. We can see no other reason.

For the whole two years before Jutland, England had a superiority of naval force of 15 per cent. Yet no determined attempt was made to bring the German Fleet to action and destroy it. The world looked on in astonishment, and small wonder, for it believed that even at the time of the Great War the British were still deeply imbued with the doctrine in which Nelson so firmly believed, that attack is the best form of defence. An attack in force on Heligoland would have been a way of enticing the German Fleet to sea : it could not have remained inactive ; it would have

been compelled to come out and fight. Unfortunately, the British were too obsessed by the defensive. Naturally, they paid for it : the war was prolonged : numbers of lives were needlessly sacrificed : in the end, defeat was brought very near by the German submarine campaign. How could the British expect to maintain their reputation ?

One pace to the rear is the start of a hundred. The British Navy lost its renown and, at the Washington Conference, was forced to relinquish the supremacy it had held for a hundred years.

(2) *Supremacy at Sea Relinquished*

For many years England maintained her Navy at a two-power standard ; that is to say, at a strength equal to that of the next two strongest Powers combined. The overthrow of Germany gave her no respite, for she was confronted with a challenge from America, and her shouts of victory turned to cries of anxiety and distress. The challenge was the American naval programme of 1916, which provided for the construction of 10 battleships, 6 battle-cruisers, 10 cruisers, 117 destroyers, many submarines, and 13 special service vessels. As against this, England had left off building battleships in 1914, she had stopped the construction of three of the six battle-cruisers laid down in 1915 and 1916, and had only built a few light cruisers and smaller ships. Although she had the larger Navy, many of her ships had grown old during the War and would be no match for the new ones of America. The relative positions of the two countries were entirely altered. England had either to abandon the policy to which she had adhered for several hundred years, or to start building on a scale similar to that of America. That is what it amounted to.

Object of American naval expansion.

Clearly to understand the reason for America's vast naval programme, it is necessary to appreciate her attitude to the British Navy, which I will endeavour to explain.

The first consideration in framing the programme was Germany. In 1916, the year of its inception and the second year of the War, Germany was still the second naval Power, and it was feared that by the end of the

War she would be even stronger, for her dockyards had been working day and night. Further, at that time the result of the War was still uncertain. Should Germany succeed in crushing her European enemies, or in imposing her own terms upon them, it was highly probable that at the first opportunity she would turn on those countries that had been inimical to her ; America, to whom she had already openly shown herself hostile, among them. This consideration no longer obtained when the German Navy had been completely destroyed.

Japan was undoubtedly the second consideration. The Americans were not only apprehensive of Germany, they also feared increasing complications with Japan, who had at the time a far superior Navy and who appeared to be aiming at a mastery of the Pacific. It was desirable to keep her in check.

England becomes the object.

Germany and Japan, then, were the original considerations, but after a while another highly important factor entered into the question, namely, relations with England.

While America was still neutral, her overseas trade had suffered at the hands of the British Navy, and the ill-feeling that had arisen still continued after her entry into the War. The result was that she made up her mind to have a Navy as good, if not better, than that of Britain, to prevent a repetition of such losses and indignities. This was how the cry for 'A navy second to none !' arose.

The demand for a Navy the equal at least of that of Britain gained in insistence when President Wilson went over to Paris with his proposal to form a League of Nations. His naval adviser, Admiral Benson, minuted on March 14, 1919, to the effect that it would be very difficult to prevent the League from falling under the domination of its strongest member. It would be ineffective unless some member of it provided itself with a Navy equal to that of Britain, which then was superior to any other. America was the only country in a position to do this : the world knew it and relied upon her. If America failed to carry out her international duties, they would devolve on the armies of the League, supported by the British Navy.*

* *Woodrow Wilson and the World Settlement.* Vol. III.

The American Government concurred in this opinion.

What Wilson really had in mind.

It is difficult to see what Wilson had in mind when he supported the proposed naval expansion. He was at heart a man of peace and averse to acting against his principles. It is quite possible that he had some object ulterior to those put forward by his naval advisers. He might have approved the building of a large Navy against Japan or Germany on the ground that it would enable America to avoid war, but he would have vetoed it if directed against England. What, then, had he in mind? My own idea is that he intended to use the programme to force through his proposals at the Paris Peace Conference.

On May 28, 1924, Congressman Butler informed the House of Representatives that the expenditure of \$400,000,000 had been voted on the strength of a telegram from President Wilson at Versailles. But the President did not really want the programme to be carried out; it was sufficient for him for it to be passed, so that he could use the fact skilfully to manipulate the Peace Conference.

America's second naval programme.

This first programme, however, was not enough for the President's purposes; he had to have recourse to a second, which the Navy Department had put forward in the meantime, to try some more skilful manipulation. The second programme was presented to Congress in 1919, and provided for the construction of 10 battleships, 6 battle-cruisers, 30 cruisers, and sundry lighter craft in the next three years.

When the skilful manipulation at Paris failed, and when the very country whose President had proposed the League of Nations seemed likely to refuse to join it, Wilson used the naval programme again, telling his people that if they would not join the League they would find themselves compelled to build a bigger Navy. This statement that Wilson used the Navy Bill as a lever to get America into the League was confirmed by Secretary of the Navy Daniels, in a speech in Congress. He said that if America, in co-operation with other countries, formed a society to prevent war and to promote peace, the naval strength she already had would be sufficient for her national defence. If, on the other hand, she refused

to provide herself with a guarantee of peace by joining the League of Nations and elected to remain independent outside it, she would have to make suitable provision to protect her interests against any potential enemy or combination of enemies. He pointed out, in fact, that America had to choose between joining the League and naval expansion.

British anxiety.

What effect did these naval programmes have in England? We have already seen how, between 1917 and the summer of 1921, America commenced 16 capital ships, while England did not lay down one. This meant that in 1921 the number of American capital ships built and building exceeded those of England by 50 per cent. If the second programme introduced in 1919 were carried out, America would have, in 1921, 20 post-Jutland capital ships, 40 fast cruisers, and twice as many destroyers and submarines as England—in fact, a much bigger Navy altogether, a prospect which caused the British public the gravest anxiety.

Though British statesmen had never regarded America as a rival on the sea, they considered it necessary to do something to counter-balance her enormous post-War programme of construction. Winston Churchill and others strenuously opposed the idea of abandoning the policy of supremacy on the sea, but it was quite clear that if America, with her almost unlimited wealth, started a competition in ship-building, England was bound to lose. *The Times* and other papers published articles on the naval situation, and pointed out that America must be regarded as a rival. Distressing as this state of affairs was, England, suffering from the effects of the War, could do little else but 'cry herself to sleep over it'.

Anglo-American discussions.

However, something had to be done, and England attempted to negotiate during the Peace Conference. The negotiations were secret, but on January 30, 1927, the Hearst group of newspapers exposed the whole story by publishing Secretary of the Navy Daniels' conversations. It was stated that America had asked England to reduce her naval strength as above requirements after the German Navy had been destroyed. England replied by asking

President Wilson to stop the American programme of construction. In March 1919 Mr. Daniels, on instructions from the President, had an interview with Mr. Walter Long, the First Lord of the Admiralty. Mr. Long was most outspoken and said that America's enormous programme had been viewed with alarm in England, whose Navy it would reduce to that of second place. That was a state of affairs that could not be contemplated without grave concern. England could not accept such a position without protest. Not to beat about the bush, the Prime Minister, Mr. Lloyd George, had said that if America would not agree to cancel her programme, England would find herself unable to support the League of Nations. She could not allow any country to deprive her of her naval supremacy.

At this virtual ultimatum, Mr. Daniels abruptly terminated the interview and he has confessed that he spent a sleepless night. He felt that he could not tell his naval officers about it ; that would, beyond question, cause too much ill-feeling. He decided to report to the President direct and in person. After mature consideration, Mr. Wilson told him to drop all attempts to discuss the matter with British naval officers or with the British Admiralty, and to go to Mr. Lloyd George himself. This Mr. Daniels did, and was told in reply that if the affairs of the world were to be conducted by right and not by might, England and America must set the example by reducing their navies. England had already cancelled her programme of cruiser construction. If America was really in earnest about the League of Nations, she should stop building her dreadnoughts and cruisers.

Mr. Daniels replied that America would not hesitate to show the way in reducing armaments in response to a proposal from the League of Nations, but until that was put forward she could not enter into any naval agreement of the kind suggested. He went on to ask if he was to understand that the cancellation of the American naval programme was a condition of Britain's support of the League.

Mr. Lloyd George said, "Of course not," but added that if America continued to build dreadnoughts, the League of Nations would be as a house built upon the sand.

Mr. Daniels then started to compare British and American tonnage and programmes of construction. But Lloyd George cut him short, remarking that tonnage was not the decisive

factor. There was the question of guns, and if the 13 American dreadnoughts and 6 battle-cruisers carried 16-inch guns they would be the strongest in the world. That was what had brought the First Lord and several high officers over to Paris to urge him to get the American programme cancelled. At this Daniels declined further discussion, and after due consideration reported to the President. He was instructed to reply that the President was most anxious to find a means of rendering all the clauses of the Treaty of Peace effective. Until he could see how the Treaty would work out in practice he was not in a position to give a decision on the question of armaments.

This was on April 7, 1919, and that afternoon Mr. Daniels called on Mr. Long and told him what Wilson had said. What it all amounted to was that America would not consider cancelling her naval programme until the Treaty of Peace was not merely drafted but ratified. There was nothing more to be said, and the conversations were discontinued.

England, however, was not defeated, and tried to approach the President through Colonel House, his confidential adviser. Lloyd George, in the hope of modifying Wilson's attitude, informed this officer that if America went on with her plans to outstrip the British Navy, England would be unable to support the League of Nations. Possibly Lloyd George thought this the best weapon to use against Wilson.

Lord Robert Cecil, the British member of the Council of the League, also tried to approach Wilson through House, but he too met with no success. Eventually, Viscount Grey was brought into it, and, at the special request of Lloyd George, went over to America to confer with the President. But he did not get on and failed in his object. For one thing, the President was ill and unfit for serious conferences, and, for another, he was just then putting it to the Senate that America must either join the League or build the biggest Navy in the world. The occasion was not opportune.*

England gives way.

In the end, America refused to join the League of Nations. The Navy Bill that Wilson had hoped to use as a lever was used instead by the Big Navy men to further their ambition, which was to see their country the leading naval Power in

* Frederick Moore : *America's Naval Challenge*, pp. 22-33.

the world. The original demand for a Navy equal to that of England developed into one for absolute supremacy.

America then entered into competition with England, but by the end of 1920 the more thoughtful of her people began to question the wisdom of this naval policy. For they realized that all they were doing was competing with England. Public opinion tended to favour a reduction in the enormous expenditure that the programme entailed, and Congress discovered a similar tendency. The result was that little progress was made with the new construction.

England twice took opportunity to assure the Americans, as publicly as possible, that she intended in the future to be content with a one-power standard. The American Navy Department also conceded a point by abandoning its demand for absolute supremacy in favour of one for equality with England.

The matter was brought to a head by Senator Borah, who got up in the Senate and urged the Government to come to an arrangement with the leading naval Powers for a naval holiday. Public opinion responded to his suggestion, with the result that the Washington Conference was opened on November 12, 1921.

The British Navy dissatisfied.

It was with no little misgiving that England bowed to necessity at the Washington Conference and, abandoning her three-hundred-year-old policy of supremacy on the sea, accepted equality with America. The dissatisfaction felt in naval circles made itself heard from time to time. Admiral Wemyss, First Lord during the War, for instance, remarked that although it was questionable whether England, in her present financial circumstances, could maintain her supremacy, the day would come when the old contention that command of the sea was essential to the existence of the British Empire would be upheld again. Admiral Chatfield, regarded as the bright star among the British experts at the Conference, said to Admiral Katō Kwanji, in a most light-hearted way, "This sort of thing has happened before in our history. It will all be the same in a hundred years' time. Our descendants will soon get it back again."

This gives us a glimpse of the unwillingness of the British naval officers to accept defeat. They were delighted when,

owing to French opposition, the attempt to limit cruisers and lighter ships failed. And no wonder, for, if England accepted equality in capital ships and aircraft carriers only and retained her superiority in the lighter ships, she would, in effect, be able to maintain her supremacy on the sea.

The result was what was known as the Birkenhead five-year programme of construction of cruisers and lighter ships passed by the Baldwin Government in 1923, not long after the Conference.

England gives way again.

This started a competition in the construction of lighter ships, in which America joined, and in 1927 President Coolidge called a conference at Geneva between Japan, England, and America to stop it.

At this conference England made a clever attempt to regain her coveted position. She demanded small ships with light guns, as opposed to the American demand for big ships with heavy guns. This would have given her more ships, which, combined with her existing superiority in merchant ships, would make her supreme at sea. The issue was one of two inches—American 8-inch against British 6-inch—and, as neither side would give way, the conference broke up.

The Americans were very angry, and, by way of retaliation, brought in a Bill six months later to provide \$725,000,000 for the construction of 25 10,000-ton cruisers, 9 destroyers, 32 submarines, and 5 aircraft-carriers, 71 ships in all. The world gasped. If this programme were carried out, the American Navy would be far superior to the British. But England, suffering from the effects of the War, was unable to compete, and attempted to gain her object by giving way where resistance had failed. Just before the American Bill was laid before Congress, she cancelled part of the Birkenhead programme to indicate that she had no intention of competing. And she disseminated among Americans, by every possible means, the idea that their plans for naval expansion were unnecessary and a danger to the peace of the world. This policy was effective. Some of the more thoughtful Americans had already opposed the Bill, and Congress

reduced the appropriations by one-third. But in spite of this, if the revised programme only were carried out, the British Navy would still be inferior to the American. Then John Bull made one of his master-strokes : he cancelled a further part of the Birkenhead programme to show the Americans how little he cared ! And the fate of the amended Bill became an open question.

England shows her hand.

Up to this time John Bull's diplomacy had been very successful in concealing his real intentions, but very soon he began to show his hand. The Big Navy party in England had been highly indignant at the surrender of naval supremacy to America, and they had left no stone unturned to retain it in practice, though losing it in theory. In March 1928 a proposal to limit capital ships was introduced at the Geneva Conference, and in July of that year an attempt was made to reach a naval agreement with France. The limitation of capital ships was to be in respect of displacement and of calibre of guns. Also, the age limit was to be extended. As England had, at the time, the two latest dreadnoughts, the incomparable *Nelson* and *Rodney*, America would, if this move were successful, drop to second place in capital ship strength. And that was exactly what John Bull was after.

The object of the agreement with France was to secure her co-operation in resisting America's attempt to deprive England of her naval supremacy. The details of it gave England exactly what she had tried to get at the Three-Power Conference at Geneva, and which America had been at such pains to deny her.

Again the Americans got angry, and the Big Navy men thumped their tubs to the tune of 'We told you so !' Even President Coolidge rose in his wrath and made a violent speech in favour of naval expansion. The matter could not rest there ; an amended Navy Bill was passed by a majority of 68 to 12 and approved by the President. It provided for 15 10,000-ton cruisers with 8-in. guns, and one aircraft-carrier, to be built by July 1, 1931.

Anglo-American agreement.

England was startled. She abandoned the agreement

with France and dropped the proposal to limit capital ships. She was at last in direct opposition to America.

About that time, however, it so happened that there was a change of Government in England. The Conservatives, the great supporters of maritime supremacy, fell, and were succeeded by the Labour Party under MacDonald, who is, as is well known, an ardent pro-American and a strong advocate of disarmament. Just at the same time, Coolidge retired and was succeeded at the White House by Hoover. MacDonald seized the opportunity and, after sounding American opinion with encouraging results, went over to America and saw President Hoover at his country house at Ripidan. The two got out a draft of an Anglo-American Naval Agreement. By it they agreed to equality of naval strength as between themselves ; they allotted to Japan a proportion of from 60 per cent to 70 per cent, and they allotted to France and Italy about 50 per cent each, with a view to enabling England to maintain a two-power standard in Europe. This was to form the basis of an expected agreement at the coming London Conference.

(3) *The Last of the Two-power Standard*

I have already explained how England went from a two-power standard of naval strength to a one-power standard by accepting equality with America at the Washington Conference. And also how she tried to maintain a two-power standard in Europe only. What will happen in the end, none can say, but I will give a brief account of recent developments.

Abortive Franco-Italian agreement.

At the London Conference England endeavoured to secure for herself a naval strength equal to those of France and Italy combined, but failed to do so as those two countries could not agree between themselves.

France put the Navy she required at the astonishing figure of 724,000 tons, more than that demanded by Japan, being between 86 per cent and 88 per cent, as against 70 per cent, of the British or American tonnage. Further, she maintained that she could not reduce this figure by a single ton unless England and America guaranteed her safety. This

neither country would do. Then she demanded superiority over Italy, who, in her turn, demanded equality with France. As the two failed to reach agreement, the two-power standard did not materialize.

Agreement between England, France, and Italy.

England, however, continued her endeavours, and eventually, in March 1931, proposed a *tri-partite* agreement between herself, France, and Italy. She suggested that France should reduce her former demand to 670,000 tons, and that Italy should accept about 230,000 tons less than France. The combined naval strength of the two would then be about equal to that of England, who would thus be able to keep to her two-power standard.

'But in good things there is often a devil'. The negotiations, which had been progressing smoothly enough, unexpectedly came to a stop over the question of the replacement of ships that had passed the age limit. France wanted freedom to lay down replacement ships before 1936, but Italy would not agree at any price. The carefully arranged agreement failed to materialize, and England was again disappointed of her two-power standard.

The end of the two-power standard.

The two-power standard is an out-of-date British conception, the object of which is to dominate other countries. Britain, being no longer in a position to maintain it by increasing her own armaments, is endeavouring to do so by calling her opponents to conferences and getting them to reduce theirs. So long as she is successful in thus persuading others to surrender their right of independence of action, the more armaments are reduced, the better she is pleased.

In common fairness, the right to arm is possessed by every country in equal degree : there should be no discrimination. The best way to reduce armaments is to fix a maximum strength which no country may exceed, and for each country to confine its naval strength to one within that limit which will, in its own opinion, satisfy its political and economic requirements.

It is therefore morally wrong to allow England her two-power standard ; neither France nor Italy, let alone Japan, can do so without protest. It is our plain duty to

join with those two countries to stop it and to preserve the peace of the world. It might be worth while to raise this question at the next Pacific Conference to block England's anti-Japanese schemes.

There is another possibility, if Japan demands equality with England and America, France and Italy will do so too, with the result that there will be five Powers all with the same naval strength and, automatically, an end of the two-power standard. In any case, England will not be able to maintain it much longer.

To sum up, England was asked the weight of the pot in the sea-fight with Germany, has surrendered her maritime supremacy to America, and before long will have to abandon her idea of a two-power standard in Europe.

The British Navy must obey the law of Nature by which all living things flourish, decline, and ultimately perish. To the satisfaction of the whole world, decline has set in already.

What will follow? Will England fight Japan? Can she count on victory if she does?

These are most interesting questions, but we will leave them for the present and see if we can detect where the British shoe most pinches.

CHAPTER V

MEDITERRANEAN OR PACIFIC ?

(1) *British Naval Forces Moved Eastward*

Britain's weak points.

IF we fight England, our best plan will be to attack her weakest spots. Fortunately for us, but unfortunately for it, the Empire on which the sun never sets is vulnerable in many obvious places.

As everyone knows, England is not a self-supporting country. She cannot grow enough food for her people. Her existence is entirely dependent on her ability to import food and raw materials, and to export manufactured goods. She imports every week 6,000,000 tons of foodstuffs and 20,000,000 tons of raw materials. To do it, she has every day 1400 ships of over 3000 tons at sea and another 1400 loading or discharging cargo in ports all over the world. Her sea communications are of vital importance to her. Once they are cut, her people must either starve or surrender. It was to cut them that Germany decided on her illegal submarine campaign, in which she all but succeeded.

Four routes.

The routes followed by British merchant ships extend in all to some 80,000 miles. There are four arteries which lead to (1) North America, (2) South America, (3) Africa, (4) The Pacific. The last-named, after passing through the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal into the Indian Ocean, divides into two branches, of which one goes to the Far East and the other to Australia and New Zealand. The trade with India, the treasure house of the Empire, passes along it ; the trade with Australia and New Zealand is greater than that with

any other part of the world ; China, with her inexhaustible wealth and her millions of consumers, is the scene of fierce economic competition. This route, which leads to all these, is, then, regarded as the most important of the four.

According to an estimate prepared by the Trade Division of the British Admiralty, the annual value of British trade with India is £80,000,000, that with Australia £50,000,000, that with China £26,000,000. These figures include the value of ships and their cargoes at sea on a selected day of the year. Further, of the commodities imported by England, the following percentages come along these routes : Tea and jute, each 97 ; zinc, 96 ; rubber, 90 ; wool, 89 ; hemp, 77 ; nitrate of soda, 86 ; manganese ore, 76 ; tin, 71 ; rice, 63 ; cheese and butter, 50 ; a large proportion of the chilled meat, comestibles, and lubricating oils ; mineral oil, 25.*

BRITISH IMPORTS ACCORDING TO SOURCE

<i>Source</i>	1913	1925	1927
Asia	31.5	19.9	28.5
Oceania	53.4	46.0	43.2
North America	16.8	11.2	10.3
South America	27.9	21.2	18.6
Europe	8.4	8.7	7.9

BRITISH EXPORTS ACCORDING TO DESTINATION

<i>Destination</i>	1913	1925	1927
Asia	16.0	12.5	13.8
Oceania	52.1	52.4	44.2
North America	27.6	24.8	20.5
South America	23.7	20.0	19.5
Europe	12.8	13.9	13.9

(The figures are stated to be percentages.—Translator.)

* Bywater : *Navies and Nations*, p. 86.

Distribution of naval strength.

With the above in mind, a consideration of the following tables will show to what areas England attaches most importance, or, in other words, where she is most vulnerable.

DISTRIBUTION OF BRITISH NAVAL STRENGTH

<i>Station</i>	<i>Naval Strength</i>	<i>Bases</i>
Home Fleet .	Fleet Flagship (1) ; Battle Squadron (4) ; Battle-Cruiser Squadron (2) ; Cruiser Squadron (3) ; Destroyer Force, Cruiser (1), Destroyers (27) ; Submarine Force, Parent ship (1), Destroyers (1), Submarines (6) ; Aircraft-carriers (2) ; etc.	Gibraltar and various
Mediterranean Fleet	Fleet Flagship (1) ; Battle Squadron (4) ; Two Cruiser Squadrons (8) ; Destroyer Force, Cruiser (1), Parent Ship (1), Destroyers (27) ; Submarine Force, Parent ship (1), Destroyer (1), Submarines (6) ; Aircraft-carrier (1).	Gibraltar and Malta
China Fleet .	Cruiser Squadron (6) ; Destroyers (9) ; Submarine Force, Destroyer (1), Submarines (11), Parent ship (1) ; Aircraft-carrier (1).	Hongkong ✓
N. America and West Indies	Cruiser Squadron (4) ; Parent ship (1).	Bermuda
Africa . .	Cruiser Squadron (2) ; Parent ship (1).	Simonstown
East Indies .	Cruiser Squadron (3).	Colombo
Australian Navy	Cruisers (4) ; Destroyers (6) ; Parent ship (1).	Sydney
New Zealand Navy	Cruisers (2) ; Parent ship (1).	Auckland
Canadian Navy	Destroyers (4) ; Parent ship (2).	Esquimalt

Eastward concentration of naval force.

Before the Great War, when her relations with Germany were strained, England concentrated her more powerful ships in Home waters. Those that had been in the Far East were withdrawn, on the strength of the Anglo-Japanese

Alliance, and the Mediterranean was left to France, with whom agreement had been reached.

For some years after the War the distribution of the British Fleet remained undecided. England seemed unable to make up her mind whether to concentrate her naval forces in Home waters or to station them as requisite for the protection of her trade routes.

In general, the best way to protect sea-borne trade is to destroy the enemy's main fleet, but the experience of the German submarine campaign has shown it to be unreliable. That was why England, after careful consideration, eventually decided to station her fleets with a view to the protection of trade, rather than to concentrate them in Home waters. The strengthening of the Mediterranean Fleet was a natural result of this decision. The above table shows that the principal British Fleets are in Home waters and in the Mediterranean, the next in importance being in the Far East.

When peace was declared the Mediterranean Fleet consisted of six battleships, six cruisers and sixteen destroyers. But in 1922, just when the Admiralty was considering the desirability of strengthening it to afford more protection to the trade route to the East, there was a change in the political situation in the Near East and British relations with Turkey became somewhat strained. The Mediterranean Fleet was strengthened at once. This meant that the strategical centre had moved farther east.

There was, however, another important factor in this question which must not be overlooked. America had taken the place of Germany as the strongest potential enemy. So long as she was, in any sense, to be regarded as a rival, England could not afford to neglect the Atlantic. Fortunately, the Washington Conference put an end to the rivalry for the time being and England was able to transfer her principal Fleet from Home waters to the Mediterranean.

(2) *The Mediterranean and the British Empire*

England and the route to the East.

Why was the principal British Fleet stationed in the Mediterranean and the strategical centre moved to the eastward? This question has been answered in part in the

previous section, but to appreciate how and where England is vulnerable, closer consideration is required.

The importance of the trade route through the Mediterranean to India, Australia, and China has already been pointed out. To cut it east of India would cripple the British Empire : were it cut west of India, England would, in effect, be strangled and die.

India is vitally important because, although her people are very poor, they are also very numerous and they have their native industries. They provide most valuable markets, for which hundreds of British companies manufacture. The vast wealth of British business men is derived from them, and the prosperity and, indeed, the existence of thousands of British workmen depend on them. Naturally enough, England has taken alarm at our peaceful penetration and has done all she can to stop it.

The chain of naval bases that stretches from Gibraltar in the west to Hongkong and Weihaiwei in the east bears witness to the close and continual attention paid by British statesmen and their naval advisers to the control and protection of the trade route to the Far East. But the first condition of its safety is the command of the sea in the Mediterranean. For were it lost British ships would have to go all the way round by the Cape of Good Hope. That is why England always attaches so much importance to it. She lost it once, but the clear-sighted Nelson gave his life to recover it at Trafalgar. Since then the Union Jack [*sic*] has held undisputed sway over the Mediterranean.

To complete our understanding of this question of Britain and the Mediterranean, we must know something of the attitude of other countries to it.

France.

France and England, who fought together against Germany, have returned to their mutual antagonism now that the War is over. There is no need to explain why the loss of their common enemy has led to a serious conflict of interests. The saying, 'Things that can be joined can be parted', sufficiently expresses the position. The British, then, have to take into consideration the possibility of hostilities with France.

The principal French interests in the Mediterranean are

her trade routes and her colonies on the opposite coast of Africa. The former radiate like a fan from Marseilles as a centre to North Africa, the Near East, the Far East and elsewhere. The latter will have an added importance in the next war as a source of man-power, in which France is deficient. To enable her African troops to be called up, France has to have command of the sea in a triangular area with vertex at Marseilles, and with base stretching from Oran on the western boundary of French Morocco to Tunis and Biserta a long way farther east. This important triangle is dominated by the British Fleet based on Gibraltar and Malta to protect the British trade routes that pass through it. That the strength of this Fleet has to be sufficient to meet those of France and Italy combined has led England to adopt her two-European-Power standard. As has already been pointed out, the two-power standard is out of date and threatens the independence of action of other countries, but England has great difficulty in abandoning it. That is one of her many troubles.

French counter-moves.

France has been hard put to it to meet this British threat to her communications. The most desirable way would be to provide herself with a Capital Ship Navy, but the state of her finances does not permit of it. She has, therefore, concentrated on small fast, cruisers well-armed, sea-going torpedo boats, and submarines. She hopes that they, supported by her powerful air force, will ensure her communications with her African colonies. She is also building large cruisers and submarines for commerce-destroying operations outside the Mediterranean.

Further, she hopes to counterbalance the superior British Fleet with a superior air force. No reliable prophecy can be made as to whether the development of the air arm will cause any radical change in naval strategy, but it will certainly alter naval operations. For one thing, it is quite clear that a country, in spite of an inferior navy, can, with a superior air force, control a large area near her own coasts and can protect her lines of communication within the radius of action of her aircraft. An air force has especial importance for France and Italy, whose sources of supply are close, those of the former being in Africa and those of the

latter in Africa and the Near East. If, then, either of these two countries has an air force superior to that of England, it can use it to threaten British trade routes and also to bring in supplies.

The depth of the Mediterranean renders it especially suitable for submarine operations. It is so great that the English idea of laying mines is utterly futile. During the Great War a few Austrian and German submarines, not more than ten, operating hundreds of miles from their bases and completely ignoring the British, French, and Italian Fleets, were, by the end of 1917, destroying Allied shipping at the rate of 150,000 tons a month. In view of this, England cannot regard French activity in building submarines with equanimity ; it threatens her communications with India and the safety of the whole British Empire. As M. Kergesec said in the Chamber of Deputies : "Submarines are a godsend. . . . When France has from 250 to 300 of them she will be able to look forward to the future with confidence."* This explains why, at the London Conference, France demanded 99,600 tons of these vessels, and in the agreement with Italy and England would not accept less than 80,000 tons.

[*Note.*—The submarine tonnage allotted to each of Japan, England, and America at the London Conference was 52,700. At the general conference at Geneva, Japan is proposing to increase this to 75,000 tons].

Italy.

Relations between England and Italy are, to all appearances, friendly, but they are far from being so in connexion with the Mediterranean. The existence of a British naval base at Malta is regarded as a threat. A Fleet stationed there could cut Italy's communications with her valuable colony of Tripoli in Africa. And further, the Italian Nationalists stoutly maintain that the Maltese are Italian by race and language and that the island should be returned to them.

That this is how matters stand in the Mediterranean was endorsed in 1925 at the Williamstown International Political Conference by Visconte Antonio Cippico, the Italian representative and a member of the Fascist Senate. He said :

* *Annales de la Chambre des Députés*, No. 110.

Italy is different to other Mediterranean countries, she juts out, just like a pier, into the Mediterranean, which washes all her shores. Our liberty and our existence depend on the goodwill of the Power that holds the gates of Gibraltar and Suez and has seized Malta and Cyprus, not so much to satisfy the needs of her people, but to fulfil her Imperialistic ambition. If the Power that holds these gates closed them as a sudden act of hostility, 40,000,000 people would starve in a few weeks, deprived of their cereals, coal, oil, iron, and other commodities necessary to the life of a civilized race. The Mediterranean is of vital importance to Italy. The actions and aims of the Italian Government and people are not dictated by Imperialistic ambition or by national egotism like those of other countries greater in extent and strategically more secure than themselves. No, they are the outcome of the necessity of ensuring the political and economic life of our people, of guaranteeing to them liberty of action and of providing suitable outlets for their rapidly increasing numbers and for their manufactures. Possibly a peaceful solution to this question may be found by a careful study of it in the light of present political circumstances.

The exact wording of the last sentence may repay careful consideration ; the speaker did not say 'will', or 'should', or 'can', he said 'possibly may be'.

The Italian naval bases are a threat to the British Mediterranean routes. Those in Sardinia and Sicily, like that of France at Oran, flank the route to India ; submarines could be based on them. Another point at which the British are vulnerable is the passage between Sicily and the coast of Africa, through which ships trading with India pass : it is only 100 miles wide and, being the shallowest part of the Mediterranean, could be mined.

The historical fact that the Mediterranean was a Roman lake has led the Italians to think that they have an inherent right to control it, and they have come to speak of it as '*il mare nostro*'. This obsession is not unnatural in view of the paramount importance of the Mediterranean to them, but it is of equal importance to both France and England. The struggle for the mastery of it is, in fact, a three-cornered duel.

Suez Canal.

The Suez Canal is of more importance to England than anything else in the Mediterranean. It means more to

her than the Panama Canal to America. Should it pass into other hands, or should it be temporarily closed, the backbone of England would be completely crushed, and the Self-Governing Dominions in the Pacific, as well as India, would be imperilled. It must not be forgotten that the Canal is the weakest link in the long chain that connects England with India and is, therefore, essential to her. Gibraltar, if by any chance captured by an enemy, could in all probability be recaptured, and, in fact, unless the British Fleet were destroyed, the western entrance to the Straits is not a source of anxiety.

The loss of the naval base at Malta would not be a mortal blow ; the British Fleet could quite well operate in the Mediterranean without it.

Cyprus may one day be given up by England of her own accord.

The Suez Canal, however, is a very different question. A small raiding party could capture and hold it for a time and, with the help of aircraft, prevent ships from passing through it. A ship unexpectedly sunk in it would block it. As the defences of the Suez Canal zone are as different from those of that of Panama as 'mud from clouds', this operation would be comparatively simple.

That England holds Egypt, and has managed to secure the mandate for Palestine and Iraq, is undoubtedly part of a plan on a large scale to protect the Suez Canal. Before the Great War the Turkish Empire constituted a rampart for the defence of India by land and sea. For, though its strength was insufficient for it to take the offensive, it forbade interference.

But the old Turkey has disappeared as the result of the War and England has, henceforward, to defend India and the sea route to it by administering both sides of the Canal herself. She has to provide for attacks both by land and sea, such as those that in the past threatened from Russia and Germany. Although she has recognized Egypt as an independent country, she still stations troops there. During the Great War Palestine and Iraq were the first countries she occupied, and after it she secured the mandate for them both. All this was for one reason.

However, Egypt is to England as 'a chestnut in the fire', it may burst at any time. The Egyptians continue to agitate

for real independence. There is a religious question on both sides of the Canal. Mohammedans dislike government by Christians. The whole district is undoubtedly a most favourable one in which to foment unrest. That is another of England's troubles.

The Dardanelles.

And, finally, there is the question of the Dardanelles, the Bosphorus, and Constantinople.

The two straits are the one and only sea approach to the natural wealth of the countries bordering on the Black Sea, to the oil-lands between that sea and the Caspian, to all overland routes into Asia, where the motor-car and the aeroplane have taken the place of the old-time caravans. They have a further value as channels through which Russia can emerge into warm water. At the present time the Russian Fleet has disappeared ; it has died down like a plant, but there may come a time when, like a plant, it will shoot up again and with it the question of the straits.

Trotsky, when Army Commissary, asserted that the straits and Constantinople provided one of the rare instances in which Imperial Russia had pursued a reasonable policy. He said that the world must be given to understand that Red Russia regarded them as essential to her. He added a lot more to the effect that even though France and England went back on the secret agreement made with Russia during the War, he firmly believed that sooner or later the straits would be hers.

One day this declaration, which is almost one of war, will bear fruit. As a Russian Fleet could come out from the straits and attack the Suez Canal, England cannot ignore the scheme.

The Balkan countries have a similar interest in the straits. The regulation of 1923, by which their passage is free, will be very inconvenient to England if the Russian Navy is resuscitated or if there is a change in the relative strengths of the Powers. So much is this the case, that British statesmen have nervous breakdowns every time the Dardanelles question is mentioned.

Turkey.

Relations between England and Turkey are outwardly

friendly, but in reality dislike of the English is in the Turks' blood.

During the Great War, of the western European nations it was England, principally, who fought the Turks. It was she who sent expeditions to Mesopotamia and Palestine and fought the Turks there. It was she who made the attack on the Dardanelles and fought the Turks there. It was she who helped the Greeks when they landed at Smyrna, three years later, in 1919, and who backed them up to the last. In addition to all this, the Mosul affair, which had been in dispute for a long time, was settled in 1926 in favour of England. This annoyed the Turks and drove them nearer to Soviet Russia.

With this historical background, Anglo-Turkish relations are hardly likely to be friendly.

Rome and Carthage.

A consideration of the relations between the Mediterranean nations and between them and England, as briefly set forth above, shows how the age-old struggle between Rome and Carthage still silently goes on.

Each of these nations firmly believes its existence bound up with the sea that washes its shores. Each vies with the other to increase that influence. Their hostilities, now open, now latent, like the light and darkness of a revolving light, never cease. Each looks forward to the day when it will be strong enough to rule the sea that it regards as its own. All resent its domination by the British Navy.

During the War England was deprived of the command of the Mediterranean for a time by the activities of German submarines. If Italy had not joined the Allies, but had adhered to her allegiance to the Central Powers, the result would have been much more serious. Britain's naval supremacy may be threatened again; when it is, the resentment which today is suppressed may burst out.

Warning !

It is of primary importance that the Japanese people should understand this state of affairs. So long as there is a cloud hanging over Europe, England cannot send the greater portion of her Fleet to the Pacific. Further, in the event of war between us and her, there is more than one

Mediterranean country that is friendly to us and which might be disposed to take definite action against her. The Egyptians, the Turks, and the Arabians, too, might give vent to the resentment they have harboured for years and rise against her like a swarm of bees. The result would be that England would have to sue for peace, being no longer able to continue the fight.

In this connexion we are reminded of the clumsiness of our own diplomacy, which turned the whole world against us over the affair in Manchuria. If our military activities had been more restrained, if our public opinion had been more united, and if what our diplomatists said had been more consistent with what our soldiers did, our negotiations with America and at Geneva would not have been such a failure.

Cause and effect are like the spokes of a rotating wheel. When the Japanese people come to consider how the resentment of the Mediterranean peoples can be turned to their advantage in a war with England, it behoves them seriously and carefully to reflect on what has happened in the past and to remember how much a diplomatic failure may cost Japan. If they shut their eyes to these facts and in the conceit of ignorance delude themselves that it is the Pacific alone that counts, they will compass their own ruin.

Make friends with Turkey ! Curb that thoughtless and aggressive attitude to Russia, and make common cause with her against England ! Show sympathy with the Egyptian movement for independence ! Never forget that if a *rapprochement* with France is out of the question, this is the best policy for us to adopt !

(3) *British Naval Bases*

What of the naval bases from which the Fleet that guards the British Empire and its trade routes all over the world can operate ? In this chapter only those in Home waters—the Atlantic and the Mediterranean—will be mentioned : those in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific will be left to the next.

Home waters.

There is what appears to be an unnecessary number of naval ports and bases distributed 'like twinkling stars'

round the coasts of Great Britain. They are a provision against a sudden attack from the adjacent coasts of Europe, and are a standing example of the nervousness of the English ever since they were threatened with invasion by Napoleon.

Let us start with the Thames, the river that washes London. The two naval ports of Chatham and Sheerness at the mouth of this river guard that city. Next, going south to 'Dover Point' and into the English Channel and counting from the east, there are the four naval ports of Portsmouth, Portland, Plymouth, and Devonport, all along the Channel. Portsmouth is the centre of the Channel defences and is strongly fortified against attack by land or sea.

Following the coast of England from the Straits of Dover to the northward, we find Cromarty at the mouth of the Moray Firth and Rosyth near Edinburgh. These, with Scapa Flow in the Orkney Islands, which lie to the north-east of Scotland, are the principal bases for the defence of the North Sea. Crossing over to Ireland, we find on the south coast Queenstown, Haulbowline, and Berehaven, which together command the Irish Channel.

Danger from the air.

The bases mentioned above were primarily a provision against invasion.

The German Navy has been destroyed, but there are other Powers that might attempt an invasion of England. The development of aircraft has made this very difficult. England's powerful air force, acting in co-operation with her submarines, would render it nearly, if not absolutely, impossible. The Navy's share of responsibility for national defence is somewhat lightened in consequence.

It must not be overlooked, however, that the development of aircraft has, on the other hand, made it easier to attack England by air. During the Great War, when aircraft were, in respect of radius of action and offensive power, in their infancy, the British East Coast bases, like Chatham and Dover, were heavily bombed on several occasions. Had the Germans possessed at that time large numbers of aircraft as they are today, these places would have been rendered useless. The principal dockyards, Portsmouth and Devonport, are respectively 72 and 110 miles from the

French coast, that is, well within range of an attack by air. The future attack on England will be by air, and that is why she is so nervous about the growth of the French air force.

Malta.

Let us turn to the Mediterranean. At the western entrance lies Gibraltar, farther east and to the south of Sicily lies the island of Malta, where there is a naval base. Our flotillas dispatched to Europe during the Great War operated from it. It is 2000 miles from England and, until the new base at Singapore is finished, will remain the only place on the way to the Far East where a large capital ship can be docked. Since it was annexed by England in 1814, its possession has been an essential factor in her retention of the command of the Mediterranean. Its strategical value lies in the fact of its proximity to Asia, Africa, and Europe, and in the part it can play in the protection of the Suez Canal. England has attached great importance to it, but now that attack by air from the Continent of Europe has been so greatly facilitated by improvements in aircraft its value is considerably less. As a base, however, it is still of great importance to a British Fleet operating in the Mediterranean.

Gibraltar.

Gibraltar ranks next in importance in the Mediterranean to Malta. There is one small dock and three graving docks which cannot take a modern large ship that is bulged. It is heavily fortified, both on the landward and the seaward sides, but with modern developments in aircraft and submarines it does not completely command the straits. Its forts, however, acting in co-operation with aircraft and submarines, could make the passage of them highly dangerous by day or night. To that extent its possession helps to secure to England command of the Mediterranean and the control of the sea-route from the Western to the Eastern Ocean.

The place could be bombarded from Spain by indirect fire over the mountains. And its strategical value to England depends, in considerable degree, on the state of her relations with that country. That is why England wanted to build an

artificial harbour on its eastern side out of range of enemy guns. Owing, however, to the enormous expense involved, she did not proceed with it.

Because of these considerations, Gibraltar has been a subject of discussion when of recent years the question of Tangiers has come up. That place has been suggested as a substitute ; it is in Morocco, on the opposite coast, about thirty miles away, and like Suez, Singapore, and Panama, it is a trade route focus of considerable strategical importance. It has the disadvantage of being open to bombardment from the hinterland, but if long-range guns were mounted and submarines stationed there, it would prove a serious threat to shipping passing through the straits. It is, at present, under international administration, but England is keeping a sharp look-out for an opportunity to seize it.

Africa.

As explained above, the sea-route to the East through the Mediterranean is threatened in many places. Its shortness has, however, led the British Admiralty to regard it as of primary importance and to concentrate on its protection to the extent of neglecting that of other routes. The wisdom of this policy has been questioned, it being argued that with modern submarines and aircraft protection cannot be guaranteed, and that in a war with a strong European Power it is even doubtful whether British surface ships could operate in the Mediterranean at all. Further, a Fleet could hardly be sent out to the East via Suez unless the European Powers remained strictly neutral, and in a strategical discussion that assumption is not permissible. It is maintained that it would be far wiser to concentrate on protecting the Cape route, of which the greater safety more than outbalances the greater length.

The time factor is, however, all-important, and perhaps the Admiralty policy of regarding the Cape route as subsidiary may after all be the best. There is a defended harbour at Freetown in Sierra Leone, and farther south the naval base at Simonstown and the defended harbour of Cape Town not far away command the entrance to the Indian Ocean from the Atlantic. Farther on, up the east coast of Africa, is another defended harbour at Durban, the 'Little Paris of South Africa'.

With a few suitable improvements at these places the safety of the Cape route could be considerably increased. There is a new dock at Durban that can take the largest battleship, and it is the most important place on the route for repairs.

North America.

In North America there was a naval port at Halifax, but it has been reduced to a defended victualling yard by the policy of economy adopted by the Canadian Government.

Six hundred miles farther south lies Bermuda, the base of the North America and West Indies Station, with a dockyard for repairs and refits and a large floating dock. It is not suitable for modern battleships.

Some twenty odd years ago a British naval officer remarked that Bermuda would be of great importance in a war with America and might prove of some value in one with a European Power as a base for cruisers engaged in protecting trade. Its function in a British war against America would be that of an outpost, very much that of Guam in an American war against Japan. During the Great War it was used as a base by cruisers on the trade routes, as the officer quoted above anticipated.

Farther south again, in the Caribbean Sea, are Kingston in Jamaica and Port Castries in the Antilles, both defended harbours. The former has an anchorage and a fuel depot, but is not otherwise fitted for naval use.

Still farther south, and 550 miles to the eastward of the Straits of Magellan, lie the Falkland Islands, where there is a naval port. During the Great War the German Far Eastern Squadron was destroyed off these islands after it had been driven out of Tsing Tau.

(4) *Mediterranean or Pacific ?*

The main strength of the British Fleet is in Home waters and in the Mediterranean. All that there is in the Pacific, apart from the very weak forces of the Self-Governing Dominions, is a small squadron of five 10,000-ton cruisers and some smaller ships. The question naturally

suggests itself whether this is sufficient, in view of the tension between Japan and England, and whether it would not be wiser to detach part of the Fleet which is at present in Europe and station it in the Pacific. This question is one of the first importance to Japan, for the despatch of a Fleet to the Far East would be an early and definite indication that England had determined to fight her.

Admiral Jellicoe's views.

A natural preliminary to answering it is to form some idea of the importance that England attaches to the Pacific. In 1918, at the end of the Great War, the Admiralty realized that the probable scene of future naval operations had shifted from the North Sea to the Pacific. And they sent Admiral Jellicoe out there to investigate and to report on the strategical aspects of the matter. The Admiral advised that an 8-8 Fleet, to match the Japanese 8-8 Fleet, should be stationed in the southern part of the area, and that a suitable base for it should be constructed at Singapore.*

The Admiralty concurred, but the Government of the day held that to station a powerful Fleet in the Pacific would only irritate Japan and America and serve to breed ill-feeling. For that, as well as for reasons of economy, it turned down that part of the proposal and compromised by approving the construction of a base at Singapore capable of taking the latest heavy ships, which could then be despatched to the Far East should occasion arise.

The idea at the time was that although Singapore was 8000 miles from England, it would be possible to send out there a fast and powerful squadron consisting of the high-speed battleships *Nelson* and *Rodney*, who were then nearing completion, and *Hood*, *Repulse*, and *Renown*. Further, it was expected that future capital ships would be even faster and would be capable of reaching the area under consideration in ten days. In fact, British naval opinion did not consider it necessary to station a powerful Fleet in the Pacific.

Note, reader ! The plan to construct these fast capital ships, to which the British naval officers pointed with so

*NOTE.—The Japanese programmes of construction of about this date provided for a main Fleet of eight battleships and eight battle cruisers. It was described in the Press as the 8-8 Fleet.

much pride, never materialized ; part was abandoned and part miscarried at the Washington Conference.

Difficulties with a one-power standard.

The reasons given for not stationing a large Fleet in the Pacific—impolitic, too expensive, etc.—are of little interest today when relations between Japan and England are somewhat strained. The important question is, will England defer sending a Fleet to the Far East until the very last moment ?

There can be little doubt that she would send out a Fleet capable of competing with that of Japan as soon as she saw that relations were seriously strained, if she could do so and still leave in Europe sufficient strength to meet France and Italy. But with a superiority over Japan limited to a ratio of ten to six by the Washington Treaty, she is not in a position to do this. What, then, would she do ?

As everyone knows, peace in Europe today is an enforced peace, and there are several magazines ready to explode. There are two contending schools, one of which, that of the 'contents', wants to maintain the *status quo*, the other, that of the 'malcontents', wants to upset it. They come into collision principally over the Franco-German, Franco-Italian, and Anglo-French questions. England, France, Belgium, Poland, Yugoslavia, Roumania, Czecho-Slovakia are of the first school, while Germany, Austria, Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria, and also Russia belong to the second. The malcontents want to recover lost territory, to restore national prosperity and to regain national rights. They want to expand and to express themselves racially. They are kept in check and peace is preserved because England has thrown her weight into the scales against them. Were this check removed, the storm would break and another European War could hardly be avoided. The check is, in fact, the British Navy, which cannot, therefore, easily be sent away from European waters.

Vice-Admiral Colomb, looked up to by British naval officers as a great strategist, said that the Channel was the strategical key to the British Empire. There the enemy's attack must be expected and thence, as a base, naval operations all over the world must be conducted.

These 'golden words' applied in the past, apply today,

and will apply in the future. All else is but a secondary consideration when compared with the defence of this highly important area. To leave it unprotected by sending the Fleet away, for whatever reason, would be a serious mistake. Though in the past England has had a Navy large enough to contain an enemy fleet in Europe and to fight in another part of the world at the same time, she cannot do so today. With the relative strengths of five naval Powers as they are today, she cannot conduct major operations in the Pacific without losing the command of her Home waters. In other words, with a one-power standard Navy, it is impossible to carry on a two-power standard war.

To station part of her Fleet in the Far East to oppose Japan while leaving the rest in Europe may, at first sight, appear a suitable proceeding, but the experience of the Russo-Japanese War shows it to be the idea of some mere amateur, the dangerous suggestion of a raw recruit.

In actual fact, the Russian Asiatic and European Fleets combined were superior to the Japanese Fleet, but being sent out one after the other were defeated and destroyed by it in detail. Ships of war of that date had too small a radius of action to permit of operations against the Baltic Fleet as far off as the Indian Ocean. But modern submarines are capable of operating from Japan not only in the Indian Ocean, but even as far away as the Mediterranean. To send, then, to the Far East, a force inferior to that of Japan would be very risky ; it would, in fact, be to court destruction. If, in spite of this, England did send out an inferior force, Japan might well conclude that she was relying on some secret agreement with another Power. Such action would, in fact, imply a secret understanding with America.

The moral of all this is that with a one-power standard Navy England can hardly fight in the Pacific, and she will be in a still worse predicament if, in the future, she has to abandon the two-European-power standard that she at present maintains. As her loss is Japan's gain, we should do well to support any attempts by France and Italy to make her do so.

Anglo-American co-operation.

The English should bear in mind that if America would be at a disadvantage in fighting Japan, they would be still

more so. England cannot carry on a distant war while she is insecure at home. Should she be rash enough to attempt to do so, her forces would be destroyed in detail, that is perfectly clear. She is far more likely to inveigle America into doing the fighting while she stands by to collect the 'fisherman's spoils'. That is why, at the next Pacific Conference, she will let America lead the opposition against Japan. If she fails to bring this off, she will do her utmost so to involve America in the quarrel that she will not have to fight alone.

Japan will hardly succeed in keeping the two countries apart, and it will probably be wiser for her to devote her diplomatic energies to those European Powers that are awaiting their opportunity to deprive Britain of her supremacy.

CHAPTER VI

BRITISH STRATEGY IN THE PACIFIC (A)

(1) *A Curious System of Defence*

The Mother Country and the defence of the Self-Governing Dominions.

BEFORE we go on to glance at British strategy in the Pacific, let us consider how the Mother Country and the Self-Governing Dominions stand in relation to national defence. This question has always been something of a mystery and has become more so since the Imperial Conference in October 1926, when it was decided that the Self-Governing Dominions were no longer to be subordinate to England, but were to hold a position equal to hers in the confederacy of nations that forms the British Empire. Australia announced that she relied on the Mother Country for defence, but in this she was alone, the other Dominions held different views.

For purposes of defence, the British Empire must be considered in its entirety, its constituent parts cannot be treated separately. The Navy, for instance, must be regarded as maintained for the defence of the whole Empire, not for that of England only. Further, this Imperial Navy, though composed of units severally contributed by the Self-Governing Dominions should, in theory, be controlled as one whole by the Central Government. This, however, is not what has happened in practice.

An Admiralty memo.

What follows is an extract from an Admiralty memorandum circulated to all the representatives at the Imperial Conference of 1909.

The question of the naval forces of the Empire cannot be dealt with on considerations of strategy alone. The various

circumstances of the different Dominions must be taken into account. All have great possibilities, but population, wealth and strength have not developed to the same extent in each. It may be that they will find a financial or material contribution the most convenient way in which to assist in Imperial Naval Defence.

It may be that they hope to found navies of their own by having their own ships, which they intend to place under the orders of the Imperial Government in the event of war. They may consider that the interests of the Empire are better served by contributing to its finance than by maintaining separate navies."

The wording is very guarded, but it is enough to show how widely the views of the Dominions differ, and with what difficulties England has to contend in endeavouring to organize an Imperial Navy as a single unit.

Dominion indifference.

Let us compare this with what has actually happened. Australia established an Australian Navy in 1907, holding that to be better than a subsidized fleet, i.e. a fleet sent out from England in return for a subsidy.

In 1905 Canada proposed to build docks at Halifax and Esquimalt, and commenced them. In 1910 she purchased two old cruisers for the defence of her own coasts. Later, a proposal to build several dreadnoughts was made, but raised such a political storm that it had to be dropped.

New Zealand has taken a keen interest in naval defence. In 1909 she built a battle-cruiser at her own expense, intending her to be one of an eventual Pacific Fleet, and when relations between England and Germany became strained, placed her at the disposal of the Mother Country.

On the other hand, neither South Africa nor India have wished to build ships or to maintain a fleet : they have preferred to make financial contributions.

During the Great War all the Dominions co-operated in the defence of the Mother Country, by sending ships or men. The Australian ships operated in many different areas : *New Zealand* fought the Germans in British Home waters : the Canadian ships went on patrol duty in the Atlantic and Pacific : the very small Indian Navy joined in the defence of the Suez Canal.

The Dominions, then, co-operated very closely with England during the War, but it is human nature to forget. The enthusiasm for national defence evaporated with the coming of peace, and was replaced by a desire to evade further financial burdens.

(2) *Present State of the Dominion Navies*

The nominal Canadian Navy.

The strategical question in the Pacific that Admiral Jellicoe went out to study in 1919 included that of the establishment of a Canadian Navy. He suggested for consideration two alternatives :

- (i) That Canada should contribute to a proposed Pacific Grand Fleet her own Fleet of one battle-cruiser, two cruisers, six destroyers, and four submarines.
- (ii) That Canada should provide for the defence of her own coasts only, in which case a force of three cruisers, thirteen destroyers, and eight submarines would be sufficient.

These suggestions were laid before the Dominion Parliament at Ottawa on March 10, 1920, but neither was adopted. Twelve days later, on the 22nd, the Minister of the Navy announced that it had been decided to make reductions in the existing service. The numbers at the training schools would be reduced to 500. The defences at Halifax and Esquimalt would be dismantled and the establishments at those two places abolished. The two cruisers would be sold. He explained this decision as follows :

The Canadian Government has carefully considered Admiral Jellicoe's suggestions. It is a time of great financial stringency. Imperial Naval Policy is still under consideration and will be discussed at the Imperial Conference. Pending the result of this discussion, the Canadian Government has decided to suspend action and, reverting to its pre-War policy, to accept the one cruiser and two destroyers offered by the Mother Country. The present two old cruisers will be paid off. The general organization of the Canadian Navy will be altered and, in order to economize, the total personnel will be readjusted and the

naval establishments at Halifax and Esquimalt will be reduced or abolished.

Canada, in fact, did away with the two old cruisers and accepted the one cruiser and two destroyers from the Mother Country as sufficient. Shortly afterwards, however, she proposed to do away with even these.

This policy of reduction was attacked by the Conservatives, whose leader, Mr. Meighen, said that the Government was renouncing the duty of national defence. It was endeavouring to evade as inconvenient a moral responsibility which was beyond its power to accept or refuse. The Government's policy amounted, in fact, to a renunciation of membership of the British Empire. If effect were given to it they, though members of the Empire, would be of their own accord putting themselves in the position of foreigners. If the people of Canada really intended to do nothing of any value, they had better make a clean cut and leave the Empire altogether.

This attack was effective, the Government eventually dropped its proposal to do away with the one cruiser and two destroyers and put the latter into commission. In November 1922 a Ministry of Defence was established to administer the naval and air forces. Under it, an officer known as Director of Naval Affairs was put in charge of the Navy.

The upshot of all this is that Canada has not a single soldier on her frontiers, and at sea but four (two were added afterwards) destroyers, of which two are in the Atlantic and two in the Pacific. She is, in effect, without defence against enemy attack. But the Canadians are quite unconcerned. Why? It must not be forgotten that they have behind them a great champion in the shape of the United States of America, on whom, rather than on England, they rely.

If, in a war with England, we attacked Canada by air or made a descent on her Pacific coasts, we should, in all probability, bring the United States in against us, to our great disadvantage.

Australia's weak points.

Australia is regrettably vulnerable. She has not, like Canada, a powerful neighbour to defend her against enemy

attack. The nearest British naval base is at Singapore, 1900 miles away, and it is by no means certain that a Fleet would be there. Failing that, she would have to go 10,000 miles to England to obtain assistance.

Geographically, Australia is one continent, but strategically it may be regarded as a collection of islands. The population is concentrated in towns on the coast. There is no fully developed system of railways, and supplies are distributed by sea rather than by land. A blockade could be made effective by interrupting the coastal traffic at certain suitable points. Diversion of shipping to other ports would be of little avail.

The Henderson Navy Bill.

The life of the country is dependent on sea communications, and the squadron in Australian waters was one of the first to be strengthened during the Russian scare of the 'seventies and 'eighties of the last century,* which led to demands for a larger Navy. The Governments of Australia and New Zealand shared the expense.

In later years, when Germany's acquisition of colonies in the Pacific brought her within striking distance, the Australians felt the need of a Fleet of their own, and, in 1910, got Admiral Sir Reginald Henderson out to advise on naval policy. He proposed the building of fifty-two ships by 1933 to form an independent Fleet. This Fleet was to be organized into an Eastern and a Western Squadron, with bases at Sydney and Fremantle respectively. The dividing line between their stations was to be that from Cape York to Melbourne. There were to be secondary bases at Hobart, Albany, Port Darwin, Thursday Island, Townsville, and other places. Special importance was attached to Port Darwin. The total estimate of expenditure amounted to 38,000,000 sterling, and the proposal was accepted in principle by the Australian Government. But for the Great War it would probably have been carried out, with, perhaps, a few alterations.

Present Australian Navy.

The Henderson plan did not materialize. At the end of

* The Japanese text says, 'in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries'.—Translator.

the Great War the Australian Fleet, which had been reinforced when the German Far Eastern Fleet was at large in the Pacific, comprised one battle-cruiser, five cruisers, twelve destroyers and six submarines, and amounted to thirty-three vessels in all. Financial considerations did not however, admit of the maintenance of so large a Fleet in time of peace, and the Australian Government decided to reduce its own Navy and to leave the responsibility for the defence of Australia to England. That was why it so keenly supported, in conjunction with that of New Zealand, the proposal to construct a main Pacific base at Singapore. When a Conservative Government in England passed this proposal, the battle-cruiser *Australia* (afterwards broken up in accordance with the terms of the Treaty of Washington) and about twenty other ships were paid off.

Later, however, a Labour Government in England stopped all work on the Singapore base, and Australian opinion veered round in favour of building their own ships and resuscitating their own Navy. A Bill to this effect was introduced in June 1924, and passed by the Dominion Parliament. It provided for the construction of two cruisers and two submarines as well as for the establishment of a fuelling station at Port Darwin and a seaplane base at Sydney. Effect has been given to it, and two 10,000-ton cruisers have been added. All these ships are now in commission.

New Zealand Navy.

New Zealand is vulnerable in much the same way as Australia. For this, as well as for financial reasons, she has thought it better to rely on a British Fleet based on Singapore than to have her own Dominion Navy. This may sound unfair, but the people of New Zealand argue that the English gain more by it than they do.

At present New Zealand has two cruisers. A programme passed in 1923 provided for three cruisers, some submarines, and a fuelling station at Auckland. Two of the cruisers and the fuelling station have been completed.

The following memorandum shows the importance attached to the Singapore base by the New Zealand Government :

The people of New Zealand regard a base at Singapore as a pressing necessity for strategical reasons. They agree that its construction is a defensive measure, for as long as the British Fleet is unable to operate in the Pacific the Empire is in danger. It is premature to rely on the League of Nations as a means of ensuring peace.

In other words, New Zealand relied for defence on a British Fleet based on Singapore. The British have, however, some reason to be dissatisfied with the incidence of the cost, which works out at £1 6s. 10d. per head in England, and to 8s. per head in New Zealand.

The Indian Navy.

Before 1926 the so-called Indian Marine consisted of a few armed merchantmen and patrol vessels. But on this purely nominal Navy India spent £350,000 a year, in addition to £100,000 for the base of the East Indies Squadron at Colombo, to which the Indians very naturally objected.

In February 1926 this nominal force was abolished and a new Indian Navy established, to consist of four sloops and two patrol vessels. Its scope is gradually being extended and entry into it has been made open to Indians, but only during certain seasons of the year.

The majority of Indians are opposed to the establishment of this Navy. They say, "We have no enmity against any country : we have no potential enemy. What, then, is the use of a Navy? It is intended to be used against us, there is no one else, and we will have nothing to do with it."

The sole object of the Navy is to keep the Indians down, and that is why they object to it. India is not like it was : anti-British feeling is rife all over it. The Indians have our deepest sympathy : they have to maintain a Navy for their own oppression, and the very money for it is squeezed out of their own empty pockets.

But India is the vital treasure house of England. The safety of the trade routes across the Indian Ocean is, beyond all doubt, absolutely essential to her existence. The responsibility for it rests, at present, on the East Indies Squadron, but there is no mistaking the intention to let it fall on the

CHAPTER VII

BRITISH STRATEGY IN THE PACIFIC (B)

(1) *Singapore Base Directed Against Japan*

Decision to construct the base.

AFTER the Washington Conference, the clouds that had been hanging over the Pacific dispersed, but just as we, as well as others, were expecting that all would be peace, the world was astonished by a British proposal to establish a naval base at Singapore.

At the British Imperial Conference, opened in the autumn of 1921, it was decided that a base at Singapore was essential to the safety of British Imperial trade in the East, that every protection should be afforded to the trade route through the Mediterranean and Red Sea, and that the Dominions should maintain larger air forces.

The British Government introduced a Bill accordingly. It was opposed by the Liberal and Labour Parties, who made common cause, objecting that the presumptive enemy was evidently Japan and that the measure would uselessly imperil British relations with her.

When a Labour Cabinet took office in 1924 it put a stop to the whole proceeding, much to the disappointment of Australia and New Zealand, who strongly protested. The interchange of views that took place between the Home Government and those of the Self-Governing Dominions shows that Australia and New Zealand were strongly in favour of the construction of the base : South Africa was opposed to it on the grounds that it was not conducive to the peace of the world : neither Canada nor the Irish Free State expressed any opinion : India was undecided. However, the Conservatives came back to power in 1925, and in March of that year work was commenced.



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Motive behind the base.

What, then, was England's real object? Who was the enemy?

It is very difficult to come at the truth from reading the Parliamentary debates and the discussions that went on elsewhere, they are both confusing and conflicting.

It may occasionally be possible to obtain some inkling of what was, in fact, behind it all, but more often the truth is concealed under flattery and courteous phrases, which ring false. The mystery, however, can be solved by collating, in the light of a knowledge of England's traditional policy, the few scraps of genuine information that have transpired. I wish the British Government would tell us what it really had in mind in establishing this base.

Well, Singapore at the southern extremity of the Malay Peninsula, with India the treasure house of Britain on the west, with Australia, New Zealand, and the Netherlands East Indies on the east, and with Indo-China on the north, is the meeting-place of the ways that lead to China. Indirectly it is one of the defences of South Africa. It is the natural strategic centre of the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

Since the Great War :

(i) The markets of the Far East, and those of China in particular, have become the scene of the keenest competition between Japan, England, and America.

(ii) The Pacific has replaced the North Sea as the probable theatre of war. The United States and Japan, countries that suffered but little from the War, are now important naval Powers. There is a clash of interests and of sentiment between them, and both persist in maintaining large and efficient navies. War is not out of the question, especially as a large part of the American Fleet has come through the Panama Canal into the Pacific. The day may come when England will have to keep a large Fleet in the Pacific to protect her rights and interests.

(iii) The English have recognized that the powerful navies of the United States and Japan constitute a threat to the safety of Australia and New Zealand, and, in view of their experiences during the Great War, have felt very strongly that the bond between them and their Dominions should be strengthened and made more secure.

(iv) A suitable naval base has been considered necessary

directly and indirectly to suppress the spirit of liberty and independence and the political consciousness of the Indian people, both of which have grown rapidly since the War.

(v) It has been considered desirable to provide a large base for naval operations in the Indian and Pacific Oceans in addition to that at Hongkong, which has been deprived of much of its value by the Washington Treaty.

British traditional policy.

It has always been part of the policy of Britain to possess herself of a naval base near the centre of any area in which she may encounter competition, and to back her diplomacy with a display of naval force. This was explained by Lord Salisbury in a never-to-be-forgotten speech at Manchester in 1879. He said :

In occupying Cyprus we are simply adhering to our traditional policy. When, for example, Spain was the storm-centre of Europe, we occupied Gibraltar. When Italy was the chief problem of Europe, we occupied Malta. And today, when all eyes are turned to Egypt and Asia Minor, we have occupied Cyprus. There is nothing new in the policy we have adopted, the Government does not pretend to have done anything original. It has done no more than adhere to the policy adopted by previous Governments and handed down to it by them.

The decision to establish a base at Singapore is but a further example of this traditional policy.

The scope of a naval base and the scale on which it is designed naturally depend on the country against whom it is intended to be used. The first question to be answered, then, is, 'Who is the supposed enemy ?'

Japan the principal enemy.

We saw in Chapter V, section 4, that Admiral Jellicoe advised that a Fleet comparable with the 8-8 Fleet of Japan should be based on Singapore. This is a plain statement that Japan is the enemy, and makes it quite clear that the base is being constructed as a precaution against her expansion.

Japan, at the time, was regarded in Europe and America as an aggressive militarist country which would absorb, not only China, but also Australia, New Zealand, and India.

The remarkable spread of her trade, too, was causing alarm to both English and Americans, who thought that it would threaten their very existence if not checked. In other words, Japan was a country, like Germany, that wanted watching: not to take precautions against her was asking for trouble. This was what was behind the Singapore base. No wonder Admiral Jellicoe, with this scheme in his pocket, refused the invitation of our Navy to visit us on his way home. For all our incomparable loyalty to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, he preferred to visit America, a mere 'Associate' in the War. He could hardly have come to Japan cherishing a plan for a Fleet to match her 8-8 Fleet.

In this connexion I am reminded of a remark made to me by one of our Admirals who had been at the Washington Conference. He gave it as his opinion that the Singapore base was directed against America rather than against us. He had seen how the British naval officers resented the dropping of the two-power standard and the forced acceptance of equality with America. But he had not realized that, for all this resentment on the part of naval officers, the politicians had already made a lightning change to co-operation with America. It would not occur to one of our naval officers that some of the British statesmen had foreseen the possibility of a serious clash with Japan in the future. They are much too honest not to be taken in by the cunning of British diplomacy.

Trade protection a blind.

However, any excuse will serve.

The British Government has explained the Singapore base somewhat as follows :

"The experience of the Great War has emphasized the necessity of effectively protecting our trade routes. Of these, that through the Suez Canal to the Far East is of the first importance. It is protected as far as Suez by the Mediterranean Fleet, but from there eastwards we have no powerful Fleet ; the protection afforded is insufficient and cannot be made so without a base at Singapore."

If this is so, if the Singapore base is solely for the protection of trade routes, it need not be designed to accommodate anything larger than light cruisers. The Admiralty, however, are providing two dry docks and one floating dock,

so that three of the largest capital ships can be docked at the same time. Judging by the proportion of British docks to ships during the Great War, this figure indicates an intention to base most of the present British Fleet on Singapore. That being so, the British Government's statement that the base is required solely for the protection of trade routes is an empty excuse.

Debate in Parliament.

Anyone who reads the debates in Parliament with the above in mind will see that I am correct.

Commander Eyres-Monsell, Civil Lord of the Admiralty, said that the functions of the Navy were not confined to guarding the coasts of England. Indeed, that was not its function at all. Its real function was to ensure the safety of British overseas trade and to protect British Possessions in the Seven Seas. They now maintained a one-power standard Navy only, and the Fleet could no longer be divided as it was before the War. It must be kept in readiness to proceed to any part of the world where it might be required. The trade route to the Far East was, for example, of very great importance, and until adequate provision had been made for its protection, the safety of the Empire could not be guaranteed and British interests could not be afforded the protection they required. . . . The Government asked for money to enlarge the base at Singapore and to make it capable of accommodating the latest and largest capital ships. It was in vain to concentrate the Fleet without a suitable base.

Defences of a kind had existed at Singapore since 1882, and the Government now proposed to bring them and the whole base up to date. The proposal had been accepted by the Conference on Imperial Defence in 1921, whose members had given it their warm support. The last and the present Cabinets, as well as the Overseas Dominions, had approved it. It was all the more necessary since it had been agreed at the Washington Conference not to develop Hongkong. The total expenditure of £9,500,000 would be spread over a period of ten years, and it was hoped that the Overseas Dominions, who were deeply concerned, would contribute of their own accord.

Mr. Amery, the First Lord, said that the real object

of the proposal was to increase the mobility of the much-reduced British Fleet. They were not embarking on any new strategical policy. The strategy on which the Empire relied was fixed and unchangeable. The fate of the whole Empire might be decided in very distant waters. It had taken them a long four years to defeat Germany, but if they lost command of the sea they would have to give in in a few weeks. An honourable Member had said that England had command of the sea all over the world. That was not the fact. For several years to come they would not be able to station a Fleet of battleships in the Pacific, nor even at Singapore. Their helplessness in that area left them entirely dependent on the goodwill of other countries. No country could remain in that position for long and retain its self-respect. To carry out its traditional functions, the Fleet must be able to operate freely in any part of the world. It was for reasons such as these that the Admiralty regarded the extension of the Singapore base as urgent and essential. Without it, the Fleet could not operate in those waters.

This is very obscure and purposely avoids the issue. But, reading between the lines, it is not difficult to see what the real object was. A perusal of the speeches of well-known statesmen like Asquith and Grey against the proposal will, however, clear away all obscurity. They insisted that war with Japan in the near future was entirely out of the question. Viscount Grey said that he wanted to make it quite clear that the war for which the base was being constructed was very unlikely to occur. It was unthinkable that there would be war with Japan. Knowing the history of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, he could not believe such a war possible. Both countries were members of the League of Nations. War would be a breach of the Covenant.

Mr. Lambert, the Member for South Molton, asked whether the Government had discussed this question with Japan. He said that the horrors and terrors of the recent War made him deeply regret this new rivalry in armaments and naval bases. How were communications with this base, which he understood was 7000 miles away, to be maintained? He did not want to talk about war, but he had to refer to this matter again on account of the size of the estimates. Did the Government believe that with a one-power standard Navy it would be able to despatch a Fleet

to Singapore in time of war or other calamity? With whom did they imagine they were going to fight near Singapore? Who could say that when in ten years' time the £9,500,000 had been spent and the base had been finished, the docks and the capital ships they had at present would not be entirely out of date? The Admiralty said that the base was of the greatest importance to the Overseas Dominions. Had Australia been consulted? Did she propose to bear any part of the expense? He did not believe any case had been made out for committing the House to the base and to the enormous expenditure. The taxpayers objected to it. He wanted action suspended until the matter itself as well as the staffing of the establishment had been carefully considered by a strong and competent committee.

A naval officer speaking in support of the proposal was much more outspoken. Commander Bellairs, a Conservative Member, said that the Pacific was increasing in commercial importance, and a base at Singapore was a necessity. Another reason was the growth of Japan. Who could say that the peoples of the Far East would not combine in the future? Singapore was now much more the centre of the Empire than Portsmouth.*

Singapore and an Anglo-American war against Japan.

Another curious idea expressed by certain English writers was that Singapore could be used by the Americans if they went to war with Japan, and would enable England and America to co-operate. As Commander Bellairs openly stated in the House of Commons, Singapore might be required for the defence of the Philippine Islands.

The *Morning Post* published a series of articles on 'The Far Eastern Question', the first of which appeared on June 12, 1923. They attracted considerable attention. Their anonymous author claimed recently to have studied the problem on the spot. He said that America might expect trouble from Japan over the immigration question, but, in spite of her very considerable interests in the Far East, the only naval bases she had in that part of the world were in the Philippine Islands and at Guam. The last named was hardly worth mentioning, and Japan would probably

* The above reports of speeches have been translated after reference to Hansard.—Translator.

capture the first before the American Fleet could be reinforced. Hongkong was only twenty hours from the southern end of Formosa. If Japan elected to take that place and the Philippines at the same time, neither England nor America would have any naval base in the Far East and both would be powerless. There were economic reasons why Japan should hesitate to fight America. It was in the United States that she had to find the market for her silks, and it was there that she had to buy her raw cotton. This was a deterrent which would cease to act as soon as Japan succeeded in satisfying her industrial and commercial needs in China, a potential market and source of supply. America could do nothing to prevent or check the spread of Japanese influence in that country. Without a backing of armed force diplomacy was but an expression of opinion. The distance across the Pacific precluded the use of it in the same way as it prevented Japan from imposing her will on America. If England developed Singapore, it would be an excellent base for the Americans and very convenient for suppressing Japan.

The American, Nicholas Roosevelt, wrote in much the same strain. He said :

The fears of possible Japanese expansion are not unconnected with the problem of Singapore. As the western gate of the Pacific, Singapore is an ideal place for a naval station on which to base the defence of British interests in China and the Pacific. To describe it as a 'menace' to Japan and hence as 'aggressive' is to ignore its location and the true character of the interest which it serves. Great Britain, it cannot be sufficiently emphasized, is the great conservator, bent only on holding what she has. Hence the fortifications and naval docks and the oil reserves at Singapore are to be used only if the balance of power in the Pacific is disturbed.

If a line be drawn from the north-western tip of Sumatra to Hongkong and thence to New Zealand, the peninsula and islands that lie east and south of it (with the exception of Timor) will be found to belong to three Powers—Great Britain, the United States, and Holland. Within this area the preservation of the *status quo* is the chief aim of all three nations. In the defence of this area Singapore plays the prime, Manila the second, rôle. Hence it is as much to the interest of the United States to see a strong British Fleet based on Singapore as it is to those of

England and Holland to see a powerful American Fleet based in the Philippines. Were the United States to withdraw from the Philippines, the balance of power in this region—and in all of Eastern Asia—would be so upset as to endanger the peace of the world. England and Holland alike could only view the occupation of the Philippines by Japan with the gravest alarm, for it would mean almost inevitably that the Dutch East Indies and probably Australia would, in time, fall under Japanese influence.*

The fact that Singapore would be very useful to America in a war with Japan is an inducement to her to combine with England, and is therefore greatly to Japan's disadvantage.

What is England's object?

It would appear that we shall not be far wrong in taking as the object of the Singapore base any of the following :

- (i) For use against Japan by England alone.
- (ii) For use against Japan by England and America acting in co-operation.
- (iii) To serve as a 'casting vote' should Japan and America be on the verge of war.
- (iv) For the political oppression of India.
- (v) For use in an Anglo-Japanese war against America.

What has been said above leaves no room for doubt that the first of these is the principal object. We can but admire the foresight of the British Government, especially in view of the growing estrangement of the two countries.

(2) *Details of the Singapore Base*

Designed on a large scale.

The Singapore base turns out to be on a much larger scale than most people imagined. They expected, when the scheme was first mooted, little more than some reconstruction of the base in Keppel Harbour that has been there since 1882, an enlargement, perhaps, of the King's Dock to enable

* Nicholas Roosevelt : *The Restless Pacific*, pp. 143-144.

it to take a battleship fitted with bulges, or a floating dock to be sent out for the same purpose. But the facts have turned out to be very different. An entirely new base is to be constructed some considerable distance away from Keppel Harbour, on a scale, it is understood, comparable with that of the Japanese naval dockyard at Kure.

Position of the base.

The base is to be in the Johore Strait, which separates the peninsula of that name from the Island of Singapore, and to extend for about six miles across the mouth of the Zembawan River. The strait is about 200 miles long and some twenty-five miles wide, with plenty of water for a big ship. The position is said to be easily defensible and to be topographically ideal.

Lay-out of the base.

It is reported that there will be an air base covering about 600 acres of land and water on the right bank of the Sentah River (? Seletar River), some four miles to the eastwards of the mouth of the Zembawan. There is to be a fort at Changi Point, at the eastern entrance to the Johore Strait, mounting 18-inch guns. There will be two dry docks and one 50,000-ton floating dock. It was at first intended to use for the latter the floating dock surrendered by the Germans, but now, it is understood, a new one is to be built. There is to be a large oil-fuel station with pipe-lines to the base, and sheds for 300,000 tons of coal are to be erected.

The original estimate was for £11,000,000, but the House of Commons cut it down to £9,500,000. The cost of constructing a floating dock to replace the German one, and of building and garrisoning the forts, was, however, overlooked. With this added, the total cost amounts to £27,000,000. This may be increased in the future but will not be reduced. The work is expected to be completed by 1937.

Military opinion.

Military opinion was to the effect that as the base was far nearer to Japan than to any British base whence a Fleet could be sent to relieve it, both it and the port of Singapore

would have to be fortified and garrisoned to withstand a protracted siege. It would be necessary to deny to the enemy the use of the wharves and cranes of the port for landing siege trains and heavy artillery. The use made of Dalny by the Japanese during the second siege of Port Arthur was cited as a case in point.

(3) *Effect on Japan*

How will the establishment of a base at Singapore affect Japan economically, politically, and from the point of view of national defence ?

Effect on national defence.

The first thing that comes to mind is the danger of attack. Singapore is 1430 miles from Hongkong, 1625 miles from the southern end of Formosa, and 2520 from Sasebo. A British Fleet would have little difficulty in operating from there against Japan. Further, the existing base at Hongkong is isolated, and is limited by the Washington Treaty to one for minor refits and for drawing stores, but with a fully equipped base at Singapore it would serve as a valuable advanced base for operations against Japan. As the Americans could conduct offensive operations against Japan from their base at Hawaii, 3500 miles away, the danger to be apprehended from Singapore is obvious enough. When Japan accepted at Washington a naval strength of 60 per cent, she was relying on the agreement to limit fortifications and bases in the Pacific. Our naval officers were, at the time, so much concerned about America that the possibility of a British base at Singapore never occurred to them. The few to whom it did occur, remembering the twenty years of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, regarded war with England as inconceivable, and could not see in a base at Singapore a threat to Japan. Our representatives included Hongkong in the agreement, but entirely overlooked Singapore, which is not half as far away as Hawaii.

It must be understood that our naval outlook is completely altered when it has to envisage operations conducted by a British Fleet based on Singapore and using Hongkong as an advanced base. The situation is much the same as

that which would arise were the Americans able to establish a first-class base in the Philippines and to operate from it with a Fleet as superior to ours as that of Britain. As it is, an American Fleet would be denied the use of the Philippines or of Guam, and would have to come into the western Pacific 3500 miles from Hawaii, harassed on its way by our light forces from our Pacific islands. With but 60 per cent or 70 per cent of American naval strength, we have little to fear. Our islands, however, could play no part in operations to the north of Singapore, and to compete on an equal footing with a British Fleet based on that place we should have to have a strength equal to that of England. Further, Japan is completely defenceless against air attack, and, with Singapore but 1600 miles away, the danger of one is far greater than it would be in a war with America.

Threat to communications.

The second point to be considered is the threat to our communications. Japan is dependent on supplies from abroad. Whence and by what routes do they come? In what do they consist?

They come as follows :

- (i) About 19 per cent from China, Manchuria, and Siberia, crossing the Sea of Japan, the Yellow Sea, and the East China Sea.
- (ii) About 18 per cent from Hongkong, Indo-China, the Straits Settlements, and British India, crossing the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean.
- (iii) About 11.5 per cent from the Philippines, the Netherlands East Indies, Australia, and New Zealand, crossing the Pacific south of the P.I.
- (iv) About 33 per cent from the two American continents, coming along both coasts and across the North Pacific.
- (v) About 18.5 per cent from Europe and Egypt, crossing the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, the Mediterranean, part of the Atlantic, and the North Sea.

Supposing the base at Singapore to have been established, (ii), (iii) and (v), amounting to some 48 per cent of the whole, would be cut off in the event of war with England.

Exports to the same places would also be stopped and Japan's overseas trade would be reduced to that with China, Manchuria, and Siberia, and possibly, but by no means certainly, that with North and South America. In fact, Japan's commercial activities would be confined to the Far East and she would be placed in a pitiable situation.

This is a state of affairs very different from that which would obtain in a war with the United States, when, although we should lose our trade with the American continents, we should be able to carry on with that across the South China Sea and Indian Ocean. This shows to what extent the Singapore base threatens our sea communications.

Political effect.

The third point is that the establishment of the Singapore base will have a very considerable effect on our policy in China.

We have certain great advantages in our dealings with that country. None can deprive us of them, of our geographical position, or of the military strength on which the success of our diplomacy depends. These were sufficient to prevent armed interference by Europe and America in Manchuria. But if England completes the Singapore base and is in a position to dispatch a powerful Fleet to the Far East in a few days, the hands of her diplomatists in China will be greatly strengthened, China herself will become uppish and begin to treat us with scant respect. The spiritual bond between the peoples of Asia, who look to us as their leader, will be broken. The new base, then, is a very serious threat in this respect.

The truth from an Englishman.

Some Englishmen have been quite straightforward about this question, among them Mr. Bywater, a writer on naval matters, who says :

It is patent to all who have studied the Singapore project that the issues involved are weighty and far-reaching, affecting not only the strategy of the British Navy but our future relations with Japan, and therefore the political situation throughout the East. It is, in fact, a question of high policy rather than one of naval strategy alone. The sponsors of the scheme do not admit

that Japan has any cause to regard the new base with apprehension. They point to its remoteness from Japan (2890 miles) as proof that it could never be used as a base for offensive operations against that country, though this argument is somewhat weakened by the fact that the distance from Singapore to Formosa, an integral part of the Japanese Empire, is only 1625 miles. It is in any case futile to pretend that naval preparations at the gateway of the Pacific have no direct reference to Japan. Though Singapore may be too far away to serve as a base of attack [Japanese translator's remark : 'For modern ships it is not too far'], it is ideally situated as a strategic centre from which to dominate Japan's sea communications—other than with the Asiatic Continent [The Japanese says : 'Sea communications of Japan rather than those of countries on the mainland of Asia.'—Tr.] and subject her to distant blockade. This is the point upon which Japanese critics constantly dwell, nor is it possible to rebut their argument.

That our manifold interests in the Pacific require adequate defence is not to be disputed. Since our present naval squadrons in the East would not be capable of holding their own in the event of war with Japan, no one can justly complain if we provide the requisite facilities for reinforcing them with capital ships in case of need. . . . Docking facilities for the largest battleships must therefore be provided in the Pacific area if British interests in that region are not to be left unguarded.

It does not follow, however, that the construction of a new base of such magnitude as the one projected at Singapore is either necessary or prudent. Since the scheme was first mooted in 1921 the naval situation in the Pacific has undergone a complete change. Japan at that time was building an immense Fleet, avowedly designed to maintain the balance of power against the United States, whose own naval preparations were on an equally lavish scale. These two nations were, in fact, more or less openly building against each other, and since the prize at stake was the control of the Pacific, where British interests are extensive and vital, it was not possible for this country to look on with indifference. An armed clash between America and Japan seemed by no means improbable, and in view of this contingency it was the part of wisdom to take measures for safeguarding our neutrality. Hence the decision to provide a base in or near the Pacific where a British Battle Fleet could find supplies and dock accommodation.

But with the negotiation of the Washington Treaties in 1922 the situation was entirely altered. So far as dreadnoughts were concerned, competitive building ceased ; the American and Japanese Battle Fleets were reduced to eighteen and ten ships

respectively, the insular naval bases they were preparing in the Western Pacific were not proceeded with.

. . . Having regard to the altered circumstances, it was widely assumed that the Singapore scheme would either be given up or drastically modified, since the necessity of maintaining a great British Battle Fleet in those waters had passed, and with it the need of an elaborate base at Singapore or elsewhere within the Pacific zone. This expectation was not fulfilled. So far as public knowledge goes, the original plan has been adhered to in every respect. Apparently, therefore, the intention of stationing a large Battle Fleet in the Pacific still persists, for if it did not the provision of the new base would be superfluous.

Yet the peril against which this Battle Fleet is to shield the Empire is not readily discerned. The corresponding Japanese force now numbers only ten ships, half of which are semi-obsolete. After the year 1934 the operation of the Washington Treaty will automatically reduce it to nine ships, nor can that total be exceeded while the Treaty remains valid. It is true that the Japanese Navy is strong in cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, but battleships are not required to fight such craft, and Singapore is, it would seem, to be primarily a battleship base. The Treaty is to remain in force until the end of 1936, and it will continue to be valid for an indefinite period after that date unless denounced by one of the signatory Powers. The decision to complete the Singapore base would be justified if there were reason to anticipate an early denunciation of the Treaty and the resumption of battleship construction by Japan, among other Powers. So far, however, there is no indication of such development.

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Since Japan is the only naval Power in the Western Pacific, she assumes, logically enough, that the Singapore base has a direct reference to herself. It is the implication that she is now regarded as a possible enemy by Great Britain, her former ally, with whom she has always been on terms of friendship, that has angered Japan and moved her to protest. It is quite true, as her newspapers declare, that Japan has done nothing to warrant a suspicion that she harbours designs against the British Empire. She has made no demonstration against British interests in Asia, nor does the trend of her naval or military policy accord with the theory that she meditates an invasion of British territory.

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If it could be proved that the new base was absolutely essential to the safety of the Empire, Japanese ill-will would have

to be risked, serious as the consequences may be to our interests in the East. As yet, however, the necessity of the base has not been demonstrated. That docks for battleships must be provided somewhere within the Pacific area is clear enough, since without them the Fleet would be permanently barred from that ocean, and the knowledge that British naval power could not be brought to bear at any point east of the Red Sea would hardly make for the preservation of peace. Because Singapore is a position of capital importance in relation to Pacific strategy, it should certainly be provided with at least one dock capable of taking the largest men-of-war. The simplest plan would have been to send out a floating dock. If, in addition, the existing dry dock had been enlarged to take bulged battleships the work would have excited no comment.

The main objection to the present scheme, apart from its questionable expediency, is that it has focused world-wide attention on our naval preparations in the East and given them, in Japanese eyes at least, an aggressive significance. . . . All urgent naval requirements in the Pacific would be met if the present establishment at Singapore were equipped with a new battleship dock and additional oil-tanks and magazines. If, at the same time, new docks were constructed at the principal Australian ports, the strategic mobility of the British Fleet would be proportionately increased. All these things might be done without the slightest disturbance of the political situation, and while the total cost might be less than that of the new base at Singapore, the gain in security would be immeasurably greater. As it is, the new base seems calculated to intensify the very danger it was designed to avert.*

Need for further discussions.

That the Singapore base is a menace to Japan is an incontrovertible fact, 'ten eyes behold it, ten hands point to it'.†

Still thinking as they did when the dead Alliance was alive, our representatives overlooked it. Now we must wake up. With this base in existence, a ratio of 70 per cent or of 80 per cent is of no use against England. And we must not be misled into thinking that a ratio of equality, like that which America has, would be enough. Dispassionate strategical reasoning demands more. It is Japan's un-

* Hector C. Bywater : *Navies and Nations*, pp. 87-102.

† *Commentary on the Great Learning of Confucius*, Chap. VI, 3. Legge's translation.

questionable right to claim it. So long as the agreement to refrain from developing bases* remains in force, we must, in our military and naval preparations, distinguish between England and America.

Our proposals as to limitation of armament must be amended accordingly. We must have fresh safeguards in the Southern Seas. The least carelessness on our part will endanger our national safety.

(4) *British Bases in the Pacific and Indian Oceans*

Hongkong.

Far nearer to us than Singapore, that principal star in the constellation of British bases, and of far greater military importance to us, is Hongkong. It lies near the mouth of the river about ninety miles to the southward of Canton. It is an island running from east to west for about eleven miles, with a breadth of from two to five miles and an area of about twenty-two square miles. It is separated from the Kowloon peninsula by a strait about half a mile wide. The island is hilly, with steep declivities and no rivers or streams. There are many places where an armed landing party could be put ashore, but the disembarkation of a large force would be difficult. The harbour is large enough to take our whole Fleet. It is not strongly fortified, for it was agreed at Washington that no extensions or improvements should be made.

Kowloon was leased by the British in order to make the place more defensible. The leased territory comprises some 356 square miles, most of which area is under cultivation.

Australia and New Zealand.

To turn to Australia, there are naval ports on the east coast at Sydney and Melbourne, which are the principal bases of the Australian Navy. Both are well equipped and have well constructed, strong forts.

Apart from these, there are defended harbours at Thursday Island in the Torres Strait on the north, at Brisbane and Newcastle on the east coast, at Adelaide on the south coast, at Albany, Port Darwin, and Fremantle on

* Article XIX of the Washington Treaty.

the west coast. Farther south, in Tasmania, is the defended harbour of Hobart. Of all these, the greatest strategical importance attaches to Port Darwin, as has already been pointed out.

Away to the eastward, in New Zealand, there are four defended harbours, viz : Auckland and Wellington in the North Island, and Littleton and Dunedin in the South Island. Of these, the first is the principal base of the New Zealand Fleet.

Indian Ocean.

There is a chain of bases across the Indian Ocean linking the Mediterranean with the Pacific. Going from west to east, we find Aden at the entrance to the Red Sea, Karachi and Bombay on the west coast of India, with Colombo and Trincomalee in Ceylon to the south of them. Colombo is the base of the East Indies Squadron. In the Bay of Bengal are Madras and Calcutta on the Indian coast and Rangoon in Burma. None of these ports is strongly defended, though there are guns at them all.

(5) *England's Pacific Strategy*

It is not difficult to estimate England's strategical plans in the Pacific and Indian Oceans from the foregoing. I will try to indicate the strategical value of the Singapore base.

In an Anglo-Japanese war.

As has already been mentioned, we accepted a ratio of 60 per cent of naval strength in comparison with those of England and of America because we overlooked the base at Singapore. There, England had us ! If our plenipotentiaries had had more foresight, or if they had not been so full of the glorious past of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, we should certainly have stood out, like America, for equality. With the present ratio, a war with England must be expected to end in a victory for her. In other words, we start at a disadvantage unless our naval strength is at least equal to hers.

It is commonly said that Japan could take Hongkong at once and has no need to be pessimistic. But as Singapore is only 1430 miles off, and a powerful British Fleet could come up from there in a matter of a few days, taking Hongkong is not so easy as it looks. Further, the more difficult Hongkong is of capture, the greater its potential value as an advanced base, and, consequently, the more difficult our plan of operations and the poorer our chances of winning. A matter worth mentioning in this connexion is the giving up of Weihaiwei. There has been a tendency to point to it with pride as an example of England's philanthropic and humanitarian principles, as a gesture made in the spirit of the Washington Conference. But from a strategical point of view it was a sound, wise move. The place had some value to England simply as a base for the Fleet, but in the event of war with us it would, without a shadow of doubt, have been taken as easily as a fish already in the net. It would, in fact, have been in a plight more piteous than the American Guam. It was much wiser to give it up cheerfully and with a good grace than to suffer the dishonour of losing it to the enemy. People who talk about England's humanitarian principles do not understand how thoroughly business-like she is.

Defence of Australia and New Zealand.

Now let us consider the Singapore base in relation to the defence of Australia and New Zealand.

The security of the Self-Governing Dominions is a determining factor in British strategy in the Pacific. Naval bases are established round Singapore as a centre, and Fleets are stationed in those waters to that end.

Japan at war with England could hardly hope successfully to carry out any plan she might have to invade Australia and New Zealand, unless she had first got command of the sea by destroying any British Fleet there might be at Singapore. Such an invasion would entail transporting 30,000 or 40,000 troops for 3000 miles, a journey that would take at least a fortnight—Australia sent 417,000 men to Europe during the Great War. The destruction of the enemy fleet would be a prior condition of success ; without it the attempt would be suicidal. So long as the British have a powerful Fleet at Singapore, Australia and New Zealand

are safe from invasion and their inhabitants can sleep in peace.

The same considerations would apply, even more forcibly, were America the enemy. Her nearest base is at a much greater distance than Japan, unless we include Tutuila, which is unsuitable for a large Fleet.

Dependencies and Mandated Territories.

The above-mentioned dispositions also ensure the safety of British Possessions and Mandated Territories in the Pacific. Borneo, for instance, within hailing distance of Singapore, New Guinea off the west coast of Australia, the Fiji and Solomon Groups, and the various mandated islands south of the equator are within the radius of action of a Fleet at Singapore and of the Australian and New Zealand Fleets, but out of reach of a Japanese or an American Fleet. Neither Japan nor America could do anything to these islands while there is a powerful British Fleet at Singapore.

Command of the sea in the Indian Ocean.

A base and a Fleet at Singapore give England the initial command of the sea in the Indian Ocean. Without first destroying the Fleet, no nation could deprive her of it. Nor could any nation interrupt her vitally important trade routes across it, except temporarily with surface or submarine raiders. Permanent interruption of traffic demands the prior destruction of the Fleet.

Strategical key to the Pacific.

Two conditions are essential to the successful development of British strategy in the Pacific. One is the completion of the base at Singapore, the other the presence there of a Fleet at the critical moment. The base will shortly be finished, but without a Fleet there at the right time and in a condition to operate, the Japanese Fleet would have a free hand, and Australia, New Zealand, India, and the other possessions, together with the command of the sea in the Indian Ocean, would fall into the hands of the enemy.

But England is not in a position to station a Fleet at Singapore in time of peace, on account of conditions in Europe, and there can be no doubt that the problem of

getting one there at the appropriate time is extremely difficult. Should the Fleet fail to arrive in time, England would lose Hongkong, Singapore, her Self-Governing Dominions and her other possessions. That is one of England's troubles of which her enemy can take advantage.

Before discussing how Japan could best exploit this weak point, let us look at the strengths of the Japanese and British Navies, Armies, and Air Forces.

CHAPTER VIII

JAPANESE AND BRITISH FIGHTING FORCES IN 1936

(1) *Navies*

ENGLAND has inevitably been drawn into the maelstrom of the naval competition between Japan and America that has arisen over the Manchurian affair. Therefore, at the end of 1936, when the Washington and London agreements expire, she may be expected to have, like Japan and America, the naval strength allotted to her by the London Treaty.

Table I has been compiled on that basis.

TABLE I

NAVAL STRENGTHS ACCORDING TO THE TREATY OF LONDON
(UNIT 1000 TONS)

	Capital Ships	Aircraft Carriers	'A' Class Cruisers	'B' Class Cruisers	Destroy- ers	Sub- marines	Total
Japan ..	264.0 (nine)	81.0	108.4 (twelve)	100.45	105.5	52.7	712.05
America..	435.1 (fifteen)	135.0	180.0 (eighteen)	143.5	150.0	52.7	1096.3
England..	422.9 (fifteen)	135.0	146.8 (fifteen)	191.2	150.0	52.7	1099.6
Jap./Amer. per cent	60	60	60	70	70	100	65
Jap./Eng. per cent	62	60	74	53	70	100	65

In Tables II and III, Japanese and British ships have been arranged in classes for convenience of comparison.

TABLE II
BRITISH NAVAL STRENGTH

	Tonnage	Speed, knots	Guns, in.	Torpedo Tubes
(i) BATTLESHIPS :				
<i>Queen Elizabeth</i> class, five	30,000 31,000	25.0	15 (8)	2-4
<i>Royal Sovereign</i> class, five	27,150	23.0	15 (8)	2-4
<i>Nelson</i> class, two ..	33,500 33,900	23.0	16 (9)	2
(ii) BATTLE-CRUISERS :				
<i>Repulse</i> class, two ..	32,000	31.5	15 (6)	2-10
<i>Hood</i>	42,100	31.0	15 (8)	6
(iii) AIRCRAFT-CARRIERS :			'Planes	
<i>Furious</i>	22,450	31.0	54	
<i>Argus</i>	14,450	20.2	27	
<i>Eagle</i>	22,600	24.0	27	
<i>Hermes</i>	10,850	25.0	18	
<i>Courageous</i>	22,500	31.0	81	
<i>Glorious</i>	22,500	31.0	63	
(iv) 'A' CLASS CRUISERS :			Guns	
<i>Kent</i> class, five ..	9800 9900	31.5	8 (8)	8
* <i>Australia</i> class, two ..	9870	31.5	8 (8)	8
<i>London</i> class, six ..	9750	32.25	8 (8)	8
<i>York</i> class, two ..	8300	32.25	8 (6)	6
(v) 'B' CLASS CRUISERS :				
<i>Cambrian</i> class, five ..	3920 4120	29.0	6 (4)	6
<i>Caledon</i> class, thirteen	4180 4290	29.0	6 (5)	8

* Denotes Australian or New Zealand Navy.

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	Tonnage	Speed, knots	Guns, in.	Torpedo Tubes
(v) 'B' CLASS CRUISERS (continued)				
<i>Despatch</i> class, six ..	4850	29.0	6 (6)	12
<i>Emerald</i> class, two ..	7560	33.0	6 (7)	16
* <i>Adelaide</i>	5100	25.3	6 (9)	2
* <i>Dunedin</i> class, two ..	4850	29.0	6 (6)	12
<i>Leander</i> class, eight	7000	32.5	6 (8)	?
<i>Arethusa</i> class, two ..	5500	?	6 (6)	6
(vi) DESTROYERS :				
<i>Tasmania</i> class, twenty-nine ..	905	36.0	4 (3) 4.7 (5)	4
<i>Venomous</i> class, four- teen	1120	34.0	4.7 (4)	6
<i>Wallace</i> class, three	1480	36.0	4.7 (5)	6
<i>Mackay</i> class, two ..	1530	36.5	4.7 (5)	6
<i>Amazon</i> class, four- teen	1350	37.0	4.7 (4)	6
<i>Crusader</i> class, twelve	1375	35.5	4.7 (4)	6
<i>Echo</i> class, eight ..	?	?	?	?
<i>Fearless</i> class, eight..	?	?	?	?
<i>Keith</i> class (Leaders), nine	1390	35.0	4.7 (4)	8
(vii) SUBMARINES :				
'L' class, six ..	760 845	17.5	4 (1)	6
K 26	1710	23.5	4 (3)	10
X 1	2425	22.0	?	?
'O' class, nine ..	1383 1540	15.0	4 (1)	?
'P' class, six ..	1570	15.0	4 (1)	?
'R' class, six ..	1570	15.0	4 (1)	?
<i>Thames</i> class, six ..	1805	22.5	4.7 (1)	6
<i>Swordfish</i> class, nine..	640	14.0	3 (1)	6
			H.A.	
<i>Porpoise</i> class, six ..	2060	15.0	4.7 (1)	?

NOTE.—To keep up to the limit allowed by the London Treaty England has on the whole been building three cruisers, nine destroyers, and three submarines each year. By the end of 1936 she may have more than is shown in the table.

* Denotes Australian or New Zealand Navy.

TABLE III
JAPANESE NAVAL STRENGTH

	Tonnage	Speed, knots	Guns, in.	Torpedo Tubes
(i) BATTLESHIPS :				
<i>Mutsu</i> class, two ..	32,720	23.0	16 (8)	8
<i>Hyūga</i> class, four ..	29,330	22.5	14 (12)	6
	29,990	23.0		
(ii) BATTLE-CRUISERS :				
<i>Kongō</i> class, three ..	26,330	27.5	14 (8)	4
(iii) AIRCRAFT-CARRIERS :				
<i>Akagi</i> class, two ..	26,900	28.5	8 (10)	
		23.0		
? class, two ..	10,000	?	?	
<i>Rūjō</i>	7600	25.0	5 (12) H.A.	
(iv) 'A' CLASS CRUISERS :				
<i>Nachi</i> class, eight ..	10,000	33.0	8 (10)	8-12
<i>Kako</i> class, four ..	7100	33.0	8 (6)	12
(v) 'B' CLASS CRUISERS :				
<i>Mogami</i> class, six ..	8500	33.0	6 (15)	?
<i>Kuma</i> class, fourteen	5100	33.0	5.5 (7)	8
	5195			
<i>Yūbari</i>	2890	33.0	5.5 (6)	4
(vi) DESTROYERS :				
<i>Fubuki</i> class, twenty- four	1700	34.0	5 (6)	8
? class, fourteen	1400	?	?	?
<i>Hatsuhara</i> class, twelve	1378	?	?	?
<i>Mutsuki</i> class, twelve	1315	34.0	4.7 (4)	6
<i>Kamikaze</i> class, nine	1270	34.0	4.7 (4)	6
(vii) SUBMARINES :				
*I, No. 1 class, six ..	1970	17.5	4.7 (2)	6
I, No. 53 class, fifteen	1650	21.0	4.7 (1)	8
I, No. 68 class, six ..	1400	?	?	?
? class, three ..	1600	?	?	?

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	Tonnage	Speed, knots	Guns, in.	Torpedo Tubes
(vii) SUBMARINES (continued)				
I, No. 21 class, four	1150	16.5	4.7 (1)	4
*Ro, No. 65 class, four	998	16.0	3 (1)	6
Ro, No. 69 class, two	900	?	?	?
? class, three ..	900	?	?	?

* I and Ro are the first two of a series of Japanese phonetic symbols which are commonly used for classification in the same way as we use the letters of our alphabet.—Translator.

Capital ships and large cruisers.

An inspection of the last two tables shows that England is far superior to Japan in capital ships. *Nelson* and *Rodney* are the latest and finest battleships in the world. The battle cruisers *Hood*—with eight 15-inch guns—*Repulse*, and *Renown* are far beyond anything that Japan has. In 'A' class cruisers, the Japanese of 10,000 tons with 8-inch guns are, ship for ship, superior to the British of the same displacement and armament, but England has thirteen of them and Japan eight only. Further, England has two 8300-ton cruisers carrying six 8-inch as against the four *Kakos* of 7100 tons with six 8-inch. Of these British cruisers, five of those with eight 8-inch are stationed in China and two in Australia : six more are in Home waters and also the two with six 8-inch. Japan has nothing to fear from them if she can succeed in destroying the squadrons separately. The question is, how is she to do it ?

Japanese advantage in smaller cruisers.

England's strength in the smaller cruisers was reduced from seventy to fifty by the London Treaty. Most of those she has are past the age limit, having been built in 1914. For financial reasons their rate of replacement has not exceeded three a year, and the force is always out of date. To judge by the present state of affairs, there will be only thirty-five under the age limit at the end of 1936, a number insufficient for Fleet work and the protection of trade routes.

Japan is at an advantage here, for she pressed on with

her programme of construction after the London Conference, and her small cruisers are comparatively new. This, added to the fact that England will have to detach many of her cruisers from the main Fleet for the protection of trade, compensates Japan for her inferiority in numbers.

Destroyers and submarines.

A similar state of affairs obtains in regard to destroyers. England has the larger number, but the Japanese ships are better and most of them are of more recent date—a majority of the British ships having been built before 1919. Further, many of the British destroyers will have to be used for the protection of trade routes and bases all over the world, and, like the smaller cruisers, will not be available in the main theatre of operations. In fact, Japan need have no misgivings on account of destroyers.

As to submarines, the total tonnage allotted by the London Treaty to Japan, England, and America alike was 52,700, whereby Japan was the gainer. And, taking into account the fact that her boats individually are far better than the British, she has a definite superiority.

To sum up, although England has more tonnage in the heavier ships, Japan would have nothing to fear if her strategy was successful. Nor need she be apprehensive on account of the smaller cruisers and lighter craft, for many of the more numerous British vessels would have to be detached from Fleet work for the protection of trade routes.

(2) *British Army*

Organization and strength.

The British Army is recruited by voluntary enlistment and consists of a Regular and a Territorial Army.

The Regular, or Standing Army, is to form the nucleus of the army in the field in time of war : it is used mainly for foreign service. Its strength on a peace footing is about 221,600 men.

The primary duty of the Territorial Army is Home defence, but it would be used overseas should occasion arise. Its strength on a peace footing is 171,000 men approximately.

The strength may greatly be increased in war time. Before the Great War it was only 120,000, but by January 1915, five months after the outbreak of War, it had grown to 347,000 : at the end of that year it was 601,000, and at the time of the Armistice it had reached 5,000,000.

Regular Army.

The Regular Army includes men serving with the Colours, Reserve, Supplementary Reserve, and Militia.

Troops serving with the Colours are, in time of peace, stationed as follows :

(i) BRITISH ISLES : Total 135,000.

Five Divisions. (A division consists of 3 brigades of infantry with divisional artillery, engineers and signal corps.)

Cavalry, 1 brigade and 12 regiments.

Horse Artillery, 10 batteries.

Field Artillery, 7 brigades.

Special Artillery, 1 brigade and 27 batteries.

Tank Corps, 4 brigades.

Armoured Cars, 10 companies.

Anti-Aircraft Corps, 2 brigades.

(ii) OVERSEAS (excluding India) : Total 26,737.

Stationed in Jamaica, Aden, Mauritius, Ceylon, Straits Settlements, Hongkong.

(iii) INDIA : Total 59,915.

The units in India are changed from time to time at the expense of the Government of India.

The Reserve consists of men who have finished their service with the Colours, but are still liable to be called up. The Supplementary Reserve, which would be mobilized in time of war, includes the Reserve of Officers and technicians.

The native regiments of Malta, India, and the Straits Settlements form part of the Regular Army.

Territorial Army.

The Territorial Army is divided into active and reserve. The actual strength varies from year to year with the Budget and with the numbers of applicants, service being

voluntary. The nominal strength is 8,415 officers and 163,037 men. The numbers volunteering have decreased since the Great War, and the War Office is much concerned about it.

The peace organization is into fourteen divisions and one division of cavalry. These are called up for drills and manœuvres from time to time.

Indian Army.

India, the treasure house of England, displayed great loyalty to the Mother Country during the Great War. She mobilized 1,500,000 men and sent 1,000,000 for service in Europe and elsewhere. She expended 2,000,000,000 rupees and pays interest on a war loan of £100,000,000. She was of the greatest assistance to England. But the public promises of independence and pledges given during the War have since completely been forgotten or ignored. This has changed the feelings of the people and has been the cause of the unrest.

The Indian Army, maintained partly to enable England to keep the people of India in subjection and partly to keep out invaders, had a strength of 280,223 in 1929. The cost of it is said to be 550,000,000 rupees. It is organized into Regular Army (British), Native Indian Army, Volunteers (British), Territorial Indian Army, and Air Force. Of these, the first is composed of British troops sent out from England and changed from time to time. Its strength is about 60,000 men. The volunteers are British residents, a nucleus only serving in peace time : the strength is 31,600 men.

The native regiments are enlisted from among the fighting races of India—Mahommedans, Sikhs, Rajputs, and Nepalese. The last-named are a courageous race and make fine soldiers. The strength is about 172,000 men.

Native and British battalions are brigaded together, usually two of the former with one of the latter, both cavalry and infantry.

The Native Territorials are voluntarily enlisted. In peace time they form a nucleus of about 19,000 men and are periodically called up for training.

Indianization.

In addition to the cry of 'India for the Indians' and the movement for independence, there is a demand for the

further Indianization of the Army. Hitherto there have been native Indian officers in six infantry battalions and two cavalry regiments only. The Indians want this altered ; they want a military college established and, by 1952, half the commissions in the Indian Army given to them. The Government of India does not agree, and has put all sorts of obstacles in the way. This question, combined with the independence movement, is likely to cause trouble in the future.

Australian Army.

As has already been explained, Australia is dependent on sea-power for defence, but instead of providing it herself, prefers to rely on the British Navy. As, however, some time must elapse before that Navy could come to her assistance, and as many outlying parts of the country are at considerable distances from the naval bases, some military provision has been thought necessary and an Army has been formed under the Commonwealth Government. Since 1921 males have to undergo compulsory training on reaching a certain age, and the force has been organized under the separate Governments into fifteen infantry brigades of sixty battalions. On February 1, 1929, the number of trained men on the active list was 47,931. There is a military college at Duntroon.

(3) *British Air Force*

The British Air Force, unlike those of Japan and America, is under a separate Ministry. It co-operates with the Navy and Army as requisite. There is a Minister for Air, and an Air General Staff and Council.

The present strength is a personnel of 35,000 and 1800 machines. The Force is in process of expansion and should have a greater strength at the end of 1936. It comprises the Regular Air Force and the Territorial Air Force. The latter is regarded in peace time as a nucleus, a practice similar to that which obtains in the Army.

Of the Regular Air Force, 46 squadrons are in the British Isles, 12 are attached to the Navy, and 22 are in India or elsewhere overseas. The eight squadrons in India are mostly on the N.W. Frontier, and provision has been made for them to be reinforced at short notice from Iraq or Egypt. There are

some thousand machines engaged in civil aviation, which receives official encouragement.

Encouragement of civil aviation.

England suffered considerably from German aircraft during the Great War, and in view of the powerful Air Force maintained by France, she is devoting her energies to expanding her own. As it is uneconomical to build large numbers of fighting aircraft, she encourages civil aviation.

Imperial Airways has been granted a subsidy of £1,000,000 over a period of ten years. An Imperial Aviation Company has been formed and is subsidized to establish a service with India. In peace time it trains officers and men, and it would be taken over by the Government in time of war. It built two airships, one of which, R101, was lost in the air over France on its way to India. Lord Thomson, Minister for Air, and several others lost their lives, as everyone knows.

CHAPTER IX

HOW WILL JAPAN AND ENGLAND FIGHT ? (A)

(1) *The Diplomatic Contest*

Essentials of victory.

Of the many means a country may use to overcome its enemy, the diplomatic, the political, and the military are the most important.

It may use diplomacy to draw to its own side neutral countries and to thwart the corresponding attempts of its enemy. And it may, by getting those countries to act together, put economic pressure on its enemy.

By the political means is meant the stirring up of strife in the enemy country to weaken its fighting power.

All these help the country, embarrass its enemy, and open the road to victory. All must be employed finally to win the war. A country which, after due preparation in all these respects, makes war at its own good time may be confident of victory.

In the present chapter the diplomatic and the political means will be considered.

Attitude of America.

If, as supposed in Case I of Chapter III, section 4, war between Japan and England should result from a break-up of the Pacific Conference to be held in 1935 or 1936, the principal countries whose support each of the two belligerents would endeavour to gain by diplomacy would be America, Russia, and Holland. As the first two are Great Powers outside the League of Nations and the third has highly important island possessions in the Pacific, their support would have a considerable effect on the course of the war.

To take America first. Unless England succeeded in bringing her in to fight on her side, she could hardly win. Japan would, in all probability, be able to take advantage of England's inability to keep her Fleet concentrated in the Pacific, to destroy it in detail, and in a short time to deprive her of the command of the sea east of Suez. The loss of India, Australia, New Zealand, and the British Pacific Islands would follow. The only means that England has of preventing this calamity is to get America to come in with her and so tie Japan's hands. Her most strenuous diplomatic efforts would be devoted to this end, America being, in fact, her potential saviour.

It is hardly to be expected that Japan, on her side, would succeed in gaining the support of the Americans, much as she would like to have it. The most she could expect would be to keep them out of the war and induce them to maintain a strict neutrality. We might, perhaps, explain to them that if, with their aid, England defeated Japan, they would have to fight her afterwards to decide who should be master, and that it would be far wiser for them to remain neutral. But what success might attend this sermon is somewhat difficult to foresee.

Three cases.


We may, perhaps, classify the possible results of Japanese and British advances to America under three heads. America might

- (i) Co-operate with England from the start seriously to interfere with Japan.
- (ii) Not declare herself till war had broken out and then immediately join in with England.
- (iii) Enter the war on the British side at some later date.

In the first case, it would be for our diplomats to find out whether America really intended to back her interference by force, or whether her co-operation with England was merely a convenient means of making protests.

If it was thought that she really meant business, Japan would be best advised to try some means other than war with England to gain her ends.

In the second case, America might think it wise to adopt



Above : JAPANESE BATTLE-CRUISER "HARUNA"

Below : JAPANESE BATTLE-CRUISER "KIRISHIMA"

the attitude of England when the Great War was imminent and deliberately to wait so as to induce a declaration of war. Japan cannot afford to ignore such a possibility.

The third case would be a repetition of what America did in the Great War. She would make all she could as a neutral and, when both sides had been sucked dry and were exhausted beyond recovery, she would come in on England's side, quietly to put out her hand and to step up on to the throne of the world.

Beyond all doubt, the third policy is the one for America to adopt in her own interest. But it is far more probable that the English, rather than fight Japan themselves, will let America fight her and then assume the mastery of the world without having had to take their hands out of their pockets. The first case, then, must be regarded as that most likely to occur.

This being so, the task before our diplomats is to keep America out of the war. If they fail in that, they should devote themselves to delaying her entry into it as long as possible. They will have disgraced themselves utterly should the second case occur and we are let in as Germany was by Grey's cunning diplomacy.

What of Russia?

The attitude of Soviet Russia would greatly influence the result of an Anglo-Japanese war. She might prove a most useful tool wherewith to break into Britain's treasure house of India.

From the British point of view, she is an indispensable barrier cutting off Japan from the continent of Asia.

Her favours will, then, be another diplomatic bone of contention.

Russia is still striving after an outlet into warm water. Of the three attempts she has made in past Imperial times, two, those in the Mediterranean and in the Near East, have been obstructed principally by England, the third, in the Far East, was blocked completely by Japan. The matter is of importance in the present connexion, because a war between Japan and England might give her an opportunity to crown this traditional policy with success.

It is possible that England might win over Russia by offering her Manchuria and an outlet to the Yellow Sea.

Japan, on the other hand, might offer her a port in the Middle East. Which of these has the better chance of success?

In the event of Russia adopting an anti-Japanese and pro-British attitude, Japan might tie her hands by occupying Eastern Siberia and then advancing into her protectorates of Outer Mongolia and Hsin Chiang to destroy her influence there. England has no such means of putting pressure on her. Further, international interests in the Far East are so involved that Russia might foresee too many complications to accept an offer of Manchuria. On the other hand, conditions in the Middle East are comparatively simple; England alone has interests there. It would, therefore, be more to Russia's advantage to join in with Japan, and her level-headed statesmen would probably not hesitate to do so.

The possibility of Russia remaining neutral must also be considered. What has she to gain by it? The answer is quite simple: nothing, apart from profiteering in munitions. There is no need to explain what would happen to her if she adopted such a negative attitude and abandoned the positive policy of expansion that she has always followed in the past.

Russia, then, is a country either party would like to have on its side. But we must not forget that her aid would be particularly valuable to Japan in connexion with China and Canada. She would serve to keep China under control and to render that country unable effectively to resist Japan. On the other hand, by making common cause with China, she could cut off Japan from the continent of Asia and seriously embarrass her. China 'made eyes' at Russia more than once during the Manchurian affair for this very reason.

Canada, in the event of war between Japan and England, might well attempt an air attack on Hokkaidō,* or even Honshū,* by way of Alaska and the peninsula of Kamtchatka. Russia could prevent this and at the same time facilitate a Japanese air attack on Canada.

The support of Russia is, then, absolutely essential: failure to secure it would place Japan at a very serious disadvantage in the war. In brief, we must have Russia as an ally, whether we fight England or America. We are rendered powerless if we make her hostile. Why, then, do

* The northern and the main islands of Japan.—Translator.

certain of our soldiers talk so much of war with her? No country can fight the whole world. One would have thought it obvious that Japan, driven as she is into hostilities with those two champion wrestlers* England and America, would not hesitate to grasp the hand of her neighbour and to get from her any and every assistance in cutting her way out from a desperate position in which she is beset on all sides.

It is, of course, essential to be on one's guard against Communism. We Japanese, however, need see nothing in it, as a principle, to fear. What we really have to guard against is not Communism, to think of that obscures the issue, but heedless provocation of Russia. To kill the small insect and to leave the big one alive is to commit the folly of ultimately destroying oneself.

Holland.

On account of the strategical and economic importance of her East Indian possessions, the attitude of Holland would have a very considerable influence on the result of a war between Japan and England.

Strung out in a chain, like twinkling stars, across the South China Sea and the Pacific to the south of the Philippines, the Netherlands East Indies leap to the eye on opening the map of the world. The approaches to Singapore from the Indian Ocean are screened by Sumatra, Java, and the Lesser Sunda Isles. The route north to Hongkong is flanked by the Natuna Islands and Borneo. That to Australia passes between Java and the Celebes.

The Netherlands East Indies stand to a naval base at Singapore much as our Pacific Islands stand to Manila. Their possession by either England or Japan would determine the fate of Singapore and the command of the South China Sea, the South Pacific, and, perhaps, the Indian Ocean. It is no exaggeration to say that they constitute the strategical key to Australia, New Zealand, and India, not to mention Singapore. Their importance in an Anglo-Japanese war is not, however, solely strategical: it has its economic side. The islands are noted for their production of sugar, coffee, rubber, tobacco, tin, and oil. Of the last named in

* The professional wrestlers of Japan compete in two leagues of the East and the West, in each of which one man is champion.—Translator.

particular, their output in 1927 was 20,400,000 barrels, and they stand seventh in the list of the oil-producing countries of the world. They have, therefore, a special importance to the Singapore base, to which they are quite close.

England has long been alive to the military and economic importance of these islands. She has come to an understanding with Holland, and, from the military point of view, may be regarded as their protector. She is also a partner in their commercial development and has thus succeeded in killing two birds with one stone.

The reason why the Dutch consider their very small Fleet of three cruisers, eight destroyers, and twelve submarines sufficient for the protection of their East Indies is because they rely on a British Fleet based at Singapore. The 'Dutch Shell', a joint concern, is an example of the commercial partnership.

Holland on the British side.

Enough has been said to indicate that in an Anglo-Japanese war Holland would be on the side of the British, though on account of her insignificant Navy she would hardly allow herself to be drawn into the maelstrom. She would observe a neutrality friendly to England, but strict and even obstructive in both its military and economic aspects to Japan. We must, if at war with England, be prepared for continual disputes with Holland. We might, for instance, require to improvise bases in the islands for our submarines, armed merchantmen, or aircraft to enable them to lie in wait for a British Fleet attempting to get into Singapore from the Indian Ocean through the Straits of Sumatra, of Sunda, of Lombok, or of Bali. The Dutch Government would regard such action as a breach of neutrality and a dispute would ensue. Oil, or rubber, for example, might be declared contraband of war and its supply to us prohibited. That would give rise to a controversy in international law. A neutrality friendly to England would make all this inevitable.

Holland's weak points.

However, Japan has nothing to fear on that account. If Holland were to adopt a one-sided attitude of neutrality, we are in a position to retaliate. We could, for one thing, stir up the natives of the islands into revolt.

The Dutch colonial methods have from the first been blindly based on those of the British in India : they have aimed at keeping the natives in a state of dependence by denying them education.

The policy of the Government General has been to amass wealth for the Mother Country by forced labour and capitulation taxes, and by similar means to squeeze the people. On the social side, it has been held that to educate the natives or to give them any instruction in political matters would open their eyes and jeopardize Dutch rule. It has been thought better to keep them in ignorance and so to make them more amenable. They have, however, been affected by the spread of ideas of liberty and of self-determination. From 1903 limitations have been imposed on the power of the Government General. In 1918 a National Assembly was established and legislative power was given to it. Some advance was made towards a representative and liberal system of government. But native rights, just as in India, are strictly limited, the Assembly had no voice in the important questions of national defence, foreign relations, and international law, which are the prerogative of the Government General. Under these circumstances, the natives are in a continual state of unrest and are ready to seize every opportunity to obtain a greater measure of self-government. Here again is a 'chestnut in the fire'* of which Japan can avail herself.

Attitude of France.

Our diplomacy could indeed be counted successful if, in the event of war with England, it could persuade France to maintain a neutrality friendly to ourselves. But I fear that would be well-nigh impossible.

France's attitude, though friendly to England and hostile to Japan is, in general, negative. As likely as not it would depend on that of America.

France has one cruiser and two submarines in Indo-China. About all she could do, if she joined England against Japan, would be to assist in establishing a blockade. It is hardly likely that she would send out her Fleet from Europe, but she might come to some understanding whereby it took over the protection of British interests in the Mediterranean.

Of the other members of the League of Nations, some

* The reference is to the liability of the chestnut to burst.—Translator.

might co-operate with England in establishing an economic blockade, but the possibility of their sending forces to join in the fighting is out of the question.

Second case.

We have considered above an Anglo-Japanese war which might arise should the next Pacific Conference break up and leave unsettled Japan's position in regard to the League of Nations. We have also discussed the diplomatic and economic contest between the two countries and the attitude of the others.

In the second case, which will now be considered, it is supposed that although a peaceful solution has been found to the questions of Manchuria and of the limitation of armament, Japan's economic and demographic difficulties cause a war with England in the more distant future.

The international situation is continually changing, and it is very difficult to foresee what may happen, but it is not likely that the attitudes of America and Holland will alter much from those described above, even in the course of time. The presence of Japan is sufficient to prevent any sudden breach between England and America, and there is nothing to cause a change in the attitude of Holland. The attitude of other countries cannot be foreseen, but what we Japanese must not forget is that our relations with France will have a very considerable effect on the result of any war with England. We must endeavour to establish good relations with her and so to behave towards her as to secure her goodwill in time of war.

As has already been pointed out, England has to think of Europe, and is not in a position to station a powerful Fleet in the Pacific. This is one of her weak points and one for Japan to make the most of in the event of war. The principal reason for it is the presence in the Mediterranean of the French and Italian Fleets. As these two countries are potential enemies, it may be that England would have nothing to fear from France, even though she despatched her Mediterranean Fleet to the Far East. But should France be hostile, or even unfriendly, the route through the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal might be interrupted at its start. The result would be that England would have to fall back on the long route round the Cape. The loss and inconvenience that this

would occasion her in a war with Japan can well be imagined. If, then, by hook or by crook a peaceful solution is reached at the next Pacific Conference, we must spare no endeavour to improve our relations with France.

(2) *Timing the First Act of War*

The importance of choosing the right moment.

Even though one have the superior force, it may be destroyed in detail if the moment for commencing the war be not well chosen. Russia made this mistake in the war of 1904-5. She had at the start, a Fleet in the Far East comparable with that of Japan, and another powerful Fleet in Europe. If she had sent out part of this second Fleet in time, it is doubtful whether Japan would have decided on war. This, however, she neglected to do, although she was attempting to bully Japan. A squadron under Viren started from Russia, but it was too late ; the war had already begun. It had to go back, having accomplished nothing. Russia had herself to thank for what she got in the end. This is a good example of how the time at which the first blow is struck may affect the result of a war.

What, then, will Japan and England do in this matter ?

Three cases.

I will imagine three possibilities and discuss how each would effect the conduct of the war.

First case. We will suppose that most of the British Fleet has been sent out to the Far East from Europe and based on Singapore : that it has left that place in company for Hongkong, and that war breaks out just before its arrival there.

Under these conditions, the ships of the China Squadron would be able safely to join the Fleet from Europe and England would start the war in superior force. The safety of Singapore and Hongkong would be assured, and the latter place could be used as an advanced base for operations against Japan.

What of Japan ? She would have had no opportunity to destroy any part of the British Fleet on its way out, or to reduce its superiority. Her own Fleet would be constrained

to remain north of the Formosa Channel. She would have been unable to take either Hongkong or Singapore, and her chances of ultimate victory would be very doubtful.

Second case. Let us suppose that the British Fleet from Europe has reached Singapore and is there at the outbreak of war. It would probably go north towards Hongkong and the Formosa Channel in the hope of bringing the Japanese Fleet to action. The distance to Hongkong is 1430 miles, so that, taking the speed of the Fleet as fifteen knots, it should be off that place on the fourth day. This interval of four days would be of the utmost importance to Japan. In it she would probably attempt to take Hongkong, and should she by any chance fail to do so, she would leave no stone unturned to render it useless as an advanced base by destroying the dockyard. The ultimate fate of Hongkong would depend on the result of the decisive action between the two main Fleets. Although England with the superior Fleet would have the advantage of being able to force an action, she would be at a disadvantage in regard to subsequent operations should Hongkong be occupied, even temporarily, by the Japanese, or should the dockyard have been destroyed. In other words, a superior British Fleet based on Singapore could expect to beat the Japanese Fleet, but if Hongkong had been dealt with as already suggested, its subsequent operations would be hampered and, also, Japan would be able to put whatever pressure she liked on China.

Third case. We will suppose that the outbreak of war finds the British Fleet at its peace stations, i.e. the major part in Europe and a squadron with a principal strength of five 10,000-ton cruisers in China. The first thing to note is that even if conditions in Europe permitted England to send the greater part of her Fleet to the Far East, several days must elapse before it could arrive. It would, for instance, take at least twenty days for a Fleet to get from Malta, via Suez, to Singapore, even at fifteen knots. If the Suez Canal had been blocked by Japan, or if, for any reason, the Fleet could not pass through it, the only other way is round the Cape. At least thirty-seven days would be required to come out that way from England, without allowing anything for fuelling and taking in stores. The time required is so long, that before the Fleet could arrive Hongkong would certainly have been taken and Singapore, if not actually taken,

would be invested by a Japanese Army and the base would have been partially destroyed. In any case, the Fleet would not be able to go into the place. It would, in fact, arrive at the end of a very long passage to find the one base on which it relied for rest and refit closed to it. Further operations would be out of the question.

But that is not all. There is a variety of schemes we could devise for blocking the Suez Canal. Our submarines could go into the Indian Ocean and even into the Atlantic to attack the British Fleet on its way East. The Straits of Malacca, Sunda, Bali, and Lombok, between the Dutch islands, offer especially good opportunity for surprise attacks, which our destroyers and submarines would push home regardless of cost, in much the same way as our Southern Island flotillas would attack an American Fleet coming from Hawaii. In fact, there are many opportunities for carrying on a war of attrition. With Singapore denied to it, there is little the British Fleet could do to make good any damage it might suffer. There is no suitable defended harbour in the N.E.I. : Port Darwin is fully 1800 miles off, and on the way there the Japanese Fleet could attack when and where it chose. The British Fleet would, in fact, find itself in a hopeless position. I do not want to be over-confident, but the problem with which the British would be faced is very difficult and would make their chances of victory less than those of the Americans.

The first stroke.

The above shows that the most favourable time for us to strike the first blow would be when the British Fleet is at its normal peace-time stations, i.e. with the major portion in Europe and one squadron of large cruisers in the Far East. If we chose such a time, we should be able to reduce the British superiority by attrition and should very probably succeed in capturing Hongkong and Singapore. We should be able to make it very difficult, if not impossible, for the enemy to carry on the war.

If, on the other hand, the British had assembled a large Fleet at Singapore before the outbreak of war, a war of attrition would be out of the question : we should have to meet a superior Fleet and the result would be far less of a foregone conclusion than we generally suppose. We should

have even less chance if the British Fleet had got as far as Hongkong by the time war broke out.

From the British point of view, the longer actual hostilities are deferred, the better. It would suit them best to have the Fleet at Hongkong beforehand, and least to have it in Europe. In any case, it is essential for them to wait until they have a superior Fleet at Singapore.

Japan, then, must strike as soon as she learns that the British Fleet has left European waters on its way East. The conditions are much the same as those which would obtain in a war with America, when the last moment for commencing hostilities is that when the enemy Fleet leaves Hawaii for the westward.*

The No-War Pact.

In thus choosing the moment most favourable to herself for the first act of war, Japan might find herself in difficulties in connexion with the No-War Pact and other Treaties. We attempted to justify our military action in Manchuria as being within the limits of that which may be taken in self-defence—the limits are somewhat indefinite—and by saying that we were not at war. We took advantage of the confused state of international law and of the vague wording of the Treaties. As China was hardly a normal country, these excuses met with some measure of acceptance, but in the event of a war with England, conditions would be entirely different. If we attacked Hongkong or Singapore, or the British squadron in China without a previous declaration of war, we could not pretend that it was not war. Other countries would not take a lenient view of our action and describe it, in the words of the Lytton Report, as 'War in Disguise'. We should be held guilty of violating the No-War Pact.

America and 'The Aggressor'.

If we broke the No-War Pact and appealed to force of arms by attacking British territories or ships, we should be deemed the aggressor. More than one proposal has been put forward to stop the loopholes in the No-War Pact to

* In making this and other references to what might happen in a war with America, the author appears to assume his readers to be familiar with his book on that subject.—Translator.

which our military action in Manchuria drew attention. Some of them are under discussion between the Powers, others are before the General Committee on Limitation of Armament at Geneva. For instance, on May 16, 1933, President Roosevelt, after his meetings with Mr. MacDonald and with M. Heriot, former Prime Minister of France, addressed a telegram in the sense of that below to the heads of States.

All nations of the world should enter into a solemn and definite pact of non-aggression.

They should solemnly reaffirm the obligations that they have assumed to limit and reduce their armaments and, provided these obligations are faithfully executed by all signatory Powers, individually agree that they will send no armed forces of whatsoever nature across their frontiers.

Later on, when enlarging on this telegram before the General Council on Limitation of Armament at Geneva, Mr. Norman Davis, the American representative, said that the United States was willing to consult with other States in case of a threat to peace, with a view to averting conflict. Further, the United States would refrain from any action tending to defeat collective action against a country that the States in conference had found to be an aggressor, provided they concurred in that finding.

Faithfully to carry out the obligations of the No-War Pact, disputes should be settled at the conference table instead of on the battlefield. In proposing an agreement to refrain from sending armed forces across a frontier, the President had had this in mind.

An aggressor might be very simply and clearly defined as a country whose armed forces had invaded the territory of another, in violation of the Treaties.

In President Roosevelt's opinion, a country that, contrary to the No-War Pact, sent an armed expedition into another was the aggressor. Against such, America would decide independently whether she would take restrictive measures or not, but she would do nothing to obstruct them.

British proposals for Conference.

Mr. MacDonald, when introducing the British proposals

for Limiting Arms, wished to insert, as a safeguard, a clause defining the aggressor. On May 24 Mr. Davis, after discussing the matter with President Roosevelt and taking the opinion of other countries, introduced amended proposals. They included the following agreement to confer :

- (i) If the No-War Pact was violated or threatened with violation, the Council, or Plenary Session, or one of the countries concerned, though not a member of the League, could propose an immediate conference.
- (ii) The objects of the conference should be :
 - (a) If violation threatened, to preserve peace and avoid strife by an interchange of views.
 - (b) If violence had occurred, to mediate with a view to restoring peace.
 - (c) To apportion the blame, (b) having failed.

What this amounts to is that should a country break, or threaten to break, the No-War Pact, the Council or General Assembly of the League of Nations will immediately call a conference of the two countries between whom the dispute has arisen, with a view to restoring peace. Should this prove impossible, it will decide which of the two is responsible. The aggressor having thus been determined, restrictive action will be taken accordingly.

In view of her painful experience over the Manchurian affair, Japan will probably attach reservations to President Roosevelt's 'Aggressor proposal' and to MacDonald's 'Consultative Clauses'. This, though an entirely proper procedure, would hardly be dignified or straightforward. It would be far better for Japan to frame a definition of the aggressor and to draft consultative clauses in such a way that she can agree to them. This would, however, be very difficult so long as she has not the right to parity of naval strength with England and America.

CHAPTER X

HOW WILL JAPAN AND ENGLAND FIGHT? (B)

(1) *British War Plans*

WE have discussed the diplomatic aspects of a war between Japan and England and the parts other nations might play in it. Let us now turn to the strategical side.

Pre-war preparations.

Of the many things which the British strategists would have to consider before the outbreak of war, we will refer to the following :

- (i) Defence of bases in the Pacific and Indian Oceans : their garrisons and the Air Force units to be stationed at them.
- (ii) Defence of the Suez Canal.
- (iii) Provision of temporary submarine and air bases in the N.E.I. and British Borneo.
- (iv) Ditto on the coasts of China.
- (v) Early concentration of a superior Fleet at Singapore.
- (vi) Instructions to C.-in-C., China.

The first would include assembling at Hongkong the detachments of the Army already in China, transporting to Singapore troops from India, strengthening the fortifications, and increasing the Air Force as much as possible at both these places.

As to the second, it would be of the first importance to ensure that the Suez Canal was free for the passage of the British Fleet. Were it blocked, even temporarily, so that the route round the Cape had to be used, at least seventeen days

would be wasted and British operations in the Far East would be seriously hampered. It would be necessary to station troops in the Canal zone and to win over the Egyptians.

The third is necessary for obtaining information of the movements of the Japanese Fleet and for delivering attacks upon it. The use of the N.E.I. would constitute a breach of neutrality, but we may suppose that in her friendship for England, Holland would connive at it. This is a matter of which we Japanese could take advantage.

In connexion with the fourth, England might enlist the aid of China and get her aircraft to attack Japan. If she did so, considerable damage would be inflicted on the Japanese Islands up as far as Ōsaka, especially if China had provided herself with increased numbers of aircraft after her painful experiences in Manchuria. We cannot afford to ignore the possibility of air attacks by Chinese under British direction and control.

Submarine bases would be valuable for attacks on the Japanese Fleet, and especially for interrupting our highly important communications across the Korean Strait, the Sea of Japan, and the Yellow Sea.

The fifth is, however, the crux of the whole matter. The success or failure of British operations against us depends on whether a superior Fleet can be assembled at Singapore or not. England would, in this connexion, have to devise means, censorship of, or an embargo on, communications, to prevent news of the movements of her Fleet, its sailings, its ports of call, its passage through the Canal, from leaking out to us.

The discussion of the sixth I will leave till later, and I do not propose to go into the many other points that would require consideration.

Three cases.

The British problem is to assemble a superior Fleet at Singapore. On that, the whole conduct of subsequent operations depends. If the attempt were successful, the Fleet could at once proceed to seek out the Japanese Fleet and bring it to action. If it failed, subsequent operations would be hampered by the necessity of finding a base elsewhere.

I will discuss the lines on which it may be supposed that England would conduct her operations under three heads.

- (i) When war does not break out until after the British Fleet has been concentrated at Singapore.
- (ii) When war breaks out while the British Fleet is in the Indian Ocean on its way East, Singapore not having fallen.
- (iii) When Japan begins the war while the British Fleet is at its normal peace stations—the main Fleet in Europe and five large cruisers in China.

Case (i) :

In the first case, the British Fleet would have an initial superiority of between 36 per cent and 38 per cent in capital ships and aircraft carriers, of 26 per cent in 'A' class cruisers, and of 25 per cent in 'B' class cruisers and destroyers. (*See Chap. VIII, section 1, Table 1.*) She would definitely take the offensive and endeavour to reduce Japan to submission. Her strategical objects—that is the expression used—would be :

- (i) To annihilate the Japanese Fleet.
- (ii) To cut Japan's communications by sea.
- (iii) To attack from the air the chief cities, the principal industrial centres, and the naval dockyards of Japan.

The first of these may be described as cutting Japan's throat, the second and third as amputating her hands and feet. The latter operation is not necessarily attended with the fatal results that are the usual consequence of the former.

The destruction of the Fleet would leave England free to cut our communications and to attack us from the air when and where she pleased.

Numbers (ii) and (iii) are subsidiary means of reducing an enemy ; their effect is not decisive, like that of number (i). England would so regard them and act accordingly.

The next question that arises is, How could England accomplish these strategical objects ? In other words, How could she force the Japanese Fleet into a decisive action ?

She has the choice of two strategical objectives—that is the expression used.

The first, operating from the main base at Singapore and from temporary bases in the Dutch Natuna Islands or British Borneo, to send her Fleet up the Formosa Channel, there to bring the Japanese Fleet to action. Should it refuse to come out, to force it out by attacking from the air the principal cities, industrial centres, naval harbours, dockyards, and bases in Formosa and Kyūshū, and by interrupting with submarines communications with Korea, Manchuria, and Siberia.

The second, to retake Hongkong as a preliminary, and from there to lure the Japanese Fleet to its destruction. Hongkong is 1430 miles from Singapore and only 200 miles from the southern end of Formosa. Its retention or loss by the British would closely affect the possibility of destroying the Japanese Fleet and the ultimate fate of Japan. A British Fleet from Singapore could get there in three days, and if, as she would have to do, Japan attacked the place on the outbreak of war, might arrive while the fighting was still going on. It may appear, therefore, that the best thing the British could attempt would be to retake Hongkong first and engage the Japanese Fleet afterwards. This view is, however, somewhat superficial, for by destroying the Japanese main Fleet, the British would automatically recover Hongkong: whereas, to recapture the place would mean escorting thither a fleet of transports, which would offer a good target to our light forces, would require protection, and would hamper the operations of the Battle Fleet. It might, after all, be wiser to make the first objective the destruction of the Japanese Fleet and to let Hongkong wait on the result.

If that plan were adopted, an advanced base would have to be found elsewhere until Hongkong could be retaken. French Kuang-chou-wan, Honkoe Bay in Indo-China, Manila in the Philippines, though very suitable are not likely to be available. There are several good harbours on the coast of China, San-tuao for example, but they are all too far north. There is nothing, in fact, apart from a port in British Borneo or in the Dutch Natuna Islands, one of which would have to be used in spite of the inconvenience. This is an additional reason why England should want to keep in with France and America.

Case (ii) :

In the second case, the British Fleet seems to have a choice of two alternatives :

- (i) To proceed at once to the neighbourhood of Singapore by the shortest route, in the hope of bringing the Japanese Fleet to an early and decisive action.
- (ii) To go to Australia first, to Port Darwin, say, there to rest and refit, and then to go north to engage the Japanese Fleet.

We will suppose the British Fleet to be crossing the Indian Ocean ; Singapore to be invested ; the Japanese Battle Fleet to have taken up a position at sea between Singapore and Borneo and their light forces to be awaiting opportunity to deliver surprise attacks in the Straits of Malacca, Sunda, Bali, and Lombok. The British Commander-in-Chief will anticipate some such disposition of our forces and will realize that he cannot expect to bring our Battle Fleet to action without previously sustaining certain losses. He may, therefore, decide to play for safety, and, abandoning any attempt to get to the neighbourhood of Singapore, proceed as in (ii) above.

This, however, would leave Singapore to its fate, and, if it fell, further prosecution of the war would be very difficult. In the first place, we should gain command of the South China Sea, and Borneo and the N.E.I. would be at our mercy. In the second, the fall of Singapore would stimulate the independence agitation in India, where the whole country would buzz like a beehive. In the third, the East Indian chain of twinkling stars would become available to us for advanced bases whence to harass the British Fleet in its Australian bases. In the light of all this, playing for safety in the manner described above does not appear so very safe. After all, even if the British Fleet did sustain losses in the straits leading to the South China Sea, enough of it might get through to engage the Japanese Battle Fleet at once, and it might be the wisest policy to make the attempt. If the fight were lost, or if the losses in the straits made fighting out of the question, it would not necessarily be too late to withdraw to Australia.

Daring has always paid in war : swift action appeals to

the fighting man more than a clever and cautious plan. And, above all, the destruction of the enemy Fleet is the surest path to victory. The British would be quite right and would be acting in accordance with the fundamental principles of the art of war to discard all thoughts of playing for safety and, braving ten thousand dangers, to seek a decisive action.

Assuming that this would be done, through which of the many straits would be British Fleet endeavour to enter the South China Sea? That is the next question. We will suppose that it expects to meet the Japanese Fleet somewhere to the north of Banka Island, off the east coast of Sumatra. Coming from the Indian Ocean, it would have to come down the Straits of Malacca, between Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula, or through one of the many straits, Sunda, Bali, Lombok, in the chain of islands, or to go right round Timor at the eastern end of that chain and into the Banda Sea. The more easterly the passage selected, the longer the time to reach Banka Island, and time would be of importance. The passage round Timor, though the safest, may therefore be ruled out. That down the Straits of Malacca is the most direct, but the straits themselves are long, full of navigational dangers and of possible lurking places for submarines. No Fleet, let alone one in the presence of the enemy, would be likely to attempt it. The Straits of Bali and Lombok being too far east, only that of Sunda remains. This would probably be attempted, with due precautions.

Case (iii) :

British Battle Fleet in Europe, five large cruisers in China.

To reach Banka Island from Europe would take twenty days via Suez and thirty-seven days via The Cape. In either case, we may suppose Hongkong to have been taken and Singapore to be in a precarious position. The movements of the British Fleet will depend on whether Singapore can hold out or not. If it can, the state of affairs may be regarded as much the same as that of Case (ii) above. If it cannot, the whole situation is completely changed, the command of the China Sea would pass into Japanese hands, the N.E.I. would be at her mercy, India would be in a state of

ferment. England would have to fall back on statecraft and abandon the idea of seeking an immediate and decisive action at all costs. Her Fleet would withdraw to safety in an Australian port for rest and refit, while her statesmen used every endeavour to drag America into the maelstrom of war.

There are many ways in which this might be done. It could be made out that our attack on Hongkong and Singapore was a violation of the No-War Pact, that our use of Dutch territory for purposes of war was a breach of neutrality. It could be represented that we had unlawfully interfered with American shipping on its way to and from Asia and the Philippines. Yet another most effective inducement would be for Canada to attack Japan by air. Japan would then have to retaliate, and it could be made out that numbers of innocent Canadian women and children were being butchered. American sympathy with them would hasten her entry into the war.

The next question is, 'Where would the Fleet go in Australia ?

The safest place would appear to be Sydney. It is Australia's premier naval base and has been fitted out accordingly, but it is too far to the eastward of the principal theatre of war.

A base on the north or west coasts would be more suitable, and the only one available appears to be Port Darwin. This harbour is in the north-west of North Australia, it can take a considerable number of ships and is easily defended. It is conveniently near New Guinea for the exercise of some measure of control over the N.E.I., and is not too far from the probable scene of the expected decisive action. Its disadvantage is the absence of overland communications, those with the great Australian cities of Sydney and Melbourne being by sea, and therefore open to enemy attack.

When the British Fleet has refitted, it may be expected to reassume the offensive and to proceed in the direction of the South China Sea to seek out the Japanese Fleet and to bring it to action.

The many islands which stretch from New Guinea to the N.E.I. would have to be recaptured from us to clear them of our flotillas, which would be lurking among them

determined to do or die. The next step would be to establish an advanced base in British Borneo, and then the situation would have returned to that described in Case (i).

Function of the China Squadron.

It remains to discuss the British China Squadron. It consists of five 10,000-ton cruisers, one smaller cruiser, one aircraft carrier of 22,000 tons, ten destroyers, and twelve submarines. It could carry out various subsidiary, but important, operations depending on the ability and the plans of the Admiral. The command of this squadron would be one of the most dangerous and, at the same time, most desirable appointments. Dangerous, because a single mistake would spell annihilation : desirable, because of the wide scope it would offer for independent action and for raids in unexpected places, which would put fear into the Japanese people. During the Great War the German cruiser *Emden*, as a single unit, carried out a series of raids in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The British China Squadron would be able to do the same sort of thing on a bigger scale and to contain part of the Japanese Fleet.

In fact, the Admiral would be most usefully instructed to watch and report on the movements of the Japanese Fleet, to hamper its operations against Hongkong and Singapore by diverting part of it, and to knock away the shores from under Japan's fighting strength by attacking her sea communications. His submarines and aircraft might, for instance, be used for scouting, for attacking communications and for the defence of Hongkong and Singapore : the large cruisers for diverting part of the Japanese Fleet and for attacking communications : the destroyers for the defence of bases. Some of the submarines might go into the Korean Strait, the Yellow Sea, and the Sea of Japan to sink our shipping, others might go farther north to cut off our oil supplies from Saghalien, others might attempt to enter our naval ports to see if they could torpedo any of our important ships of war. Japan would have to be prepared for all this sort of thing.

But a most important, and at the same time most interesting, question is the best use to be made of the five 10,000-ton cruisers. I will endeavour to forecast what they might do in each of my three cases.

In the first case, they might be used to hamper the attack on Singapore and to entice part of the Japanese Fleet to the southward to give the British Fleet an opportunity of destroying it.

In the second case, they might suitably be employed in obstructing our operations against Hongkong and Singapore and in clearing out our light forces lurking among the Dutch Islands. They might eventually slip through the Straits of Sunda or Bali and *rendezvous* with the Battle Fleet from Europe somewhere to the north-west of Sumatra.

The third case presents many opportunities for independent action and calls for audacity. Apart from hampering our attacks on Hongkong and Singapore and making air-raids on Formosa, the Pescadores, and Kyūshū, the squadron could raid our communications in the East China Sea, appear off the Pacific coasts of Japan and send up aircraft to drop bombs on Tōkyō, Nagoya, or Ōsaka. Continual raids, a game of suddenly appearing and disappearing, of 'God come out devil go in', would be most disconcerting to our plans.

A point not to be overlooked is that these operations would be conditioned by the necessity of interfering with ours in Australian waters, and the position of the squadron's *rendezvous* with its Battle Fleet would depend entirely on the movements of our Fleet.

(2) *Japanese Plan of Operations*

To turn to the Japanese side : at sea we should have to face a superior force, which we should probably try to reduce to a level of equality before any decisive action could be fought by the Battle Fleets. Our Great General Staff* might possibly regard the following as the principal objects of our naval operations :

- (i) To destroy the enemy's forces in detail.
- (ii) To reduce the enemy's force by attrition.
- (iii) To capture immediately on the outbreak of war the enemy bases in the South China Sea.
- (iv) To interrupt enemy communications.

* Dai-hon-ei, combined naval and military staff constituted in war time only.—Translator.

Of these (i) and (ii) are a prelude to a decisive action at sea. The destruction of the British China Squadron is an example of (i). The use of the convenient geographical configuration of the islands that mask Singapore to establish a line of defence and to await the enemy's onset is an example of (ii). A lightning descent on Hongkong and Singapore, blocking the Suez Canal, threatening the enemy's communications in the Indian Ocean are examples of (iii) and (iv).

The above are the operations on which our success principally depends; if they fail we cannot expect to win.

Destruction of the China Squadron.

As has already been remarked, the duties of the China Squadron are at the same time dangerous and enviable. Its destruction before it can be reinforced from Europe is of the first importance to us, and would have a far-reaching effect on the subsequent course of the war. This can readily be understood from a glance at the relative strengths of Japan and England in the 10,000-ton cruisers of which it is composed. With their 8-inch guns they are the flower of modern ship construction. Britain has thirteen of them and two of the slightly less powerful *York* class (8300 tons) in addition. Five are on the China station; two—*Australia* and *Canberra*—belong to the Australian Navy and are not likely to be released from those waters for service elsewhere. If, then, we can destroy the China Squadron, the number of cruisers of this type that could accompany the Battle Fleet would be reduced to eight, about one half of the original total.

On the other hand, Japan has eight 10,000-ton and four 7100-ton cruisers all with 8-inch guns.

In an engagement with the China Squadron we should lose something, but judging by previous experience of cruiser actions, not so much as it would, for we should be in superior force. Even if we lost four to England's five, we should improve our position, as we should be left with eight against eight, instead of thirteen against ten [*sic*]. With only eight large cruisers, some of which might have to be detached, the British Fleet would be at a strategical and tactical disadvantage in a fight in the dangerous China Sea. All this would make things easier for Japan, but the difficulty would be to bring the five British cruisers to action.

It is highly probable that as soon as war was imminent, the Admiral in command would take his squadron to sea to avoid being trapped.

In this connexion, the time we select for commencing hostilities has added importance. If we waited until after the arrival of the British Fleet at Singapore, our chances of destroying the squadron would be considerably diminished. Nevertheless, destroyed it would have to be, and we should have to adapt our plans accordingly. Further, the time for commencing hostilities would affect our plans for capturing enemy bases and for reducing the enemy's strength by attrition. I will try to forecast these plans in each of my three cases.

Case (i).

Here, the fact that a superior Fleet had already reached Singapore would complicate the problem of attacking Hongkong. That place is three days from Singapore and seventeen hours—allowing Army transports a speed of 12 knots—from Formosa, and to attack it would appear very rash. But if the British Fleet is to bring our Fleet to action, it will have to operate from a base not so far away as Singapore: it will have, in fact, to use Hongkong as an advanced base. The capture of that place is, therefore, of the first importance, and would have to be undertaken even at heavy cost. We should have to be very quick and to use a very large force, and to save time the whole expedition would have completely to be prepared beforehand.

With the British Fleet at Singapore, we should have but little opportunity to pursue a war of attrition and little chance of reducing the difference in strength between our own and the enemy's Fleet. Submarines, it is true, might be posted in the Anamba or Natuna Islands near Singapore, in the Paracels, Amphitrite, and Ligan Islands to the south-east of Hainan, or at the Pratas Shoal between Hongkong and Luzon. They would have little chance of success, except perhaps in the first position, and that is too close to Singapore.

Having done all we could to reduce the enemy's superiority, we should be ready for a decisive action. The only place in which we could elect to fight would be at the southern entrance to the Formosa Channel, to the north of the Pratas Shoal. That is, unfortunately, too near our

own territory, but if the British Fleet had succeeded in reaching Singapore, we should have to make the best of it.

Case (ii) :

Here, with the British Fleet in the Indian Ocean, we should, as in Case (i), have to attack Hongkong at once.

As to Singapore, let us suppose that the British Fleet is at the eastern end of the Gulf of Aden and that it will put in to Colombo for stores. That would allow ten days before it could reach Singapore. It would take three days to transport a Japanese expeditionary force from Formosa, a difference of seven days, which appears insufficient. But Singapore, like Hongkong, even more than Hongkong, is a base essential to British operations. Were it invested, the danger of attempting to enter it would be so great that the British Fleet would have to find a base elsewhere, and there is none that is secure nearer than Australia. Therefore it would be to our advantage to attack it, whatever the risk. Further, if we took it we should strike England in one of her weakest spots, her so-called treasure house of India, where the natives, who are burning with righteous indignation at being kept in dependence, would rise in swarms.

The fact that the British Fleet from Europe is well to the westward, as it is in this case, improves our prospects of reducing its strength by attrition. Our submarines would be able to attack it in the Red Sea and in the Gulf of Aden, as well as off Colombo, where we may suppose it would put in to draw stores and to prepare for action. But the best place of all for operations of this type is round the Dutch Islands. A glance at the map shows how a British Fleet from Europe hastening to bring our Fleet to a decisive action somewhere to the north of Banka Island, would come through the Straits of Sunda into the Java Sea and pass one side or the other of Billiton Island. The British might call these Straits 'Hell's Gate', for there we should have our third chance of delivering torpedo attacks, the first being in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, and the second off Colombo. The passages on either side of Billiton Island—between it and Banka Island and between it and Cape Sambar at the north-west extremity of Dutch Borneo—would give us a fourth. These passages afford us much the same opportunity for attacking the British Fleet as our Pacific Islands for attacks

across the northern end of the Malay Peninsula, as a glance at the map will show, and with its backing our operations against Singapore would obviously be facilitated. Its alliance with us would bring the people of India out in open revolt and leave Singapore in a precarious position.

Fortunately, we gained the goodwill of Siam over the last 42-to-1 vote in the League of Nations. But the Japanese people, though conscious that they have her goodwill, do not realize how valuable it might be to them in connexion with operations against Singapore and in the South China Seas in the coming war with England.

We must bear in mind that our relations with her have their strategical as well as their commercial side.

in much the same way as in Case (ii), so I will confine myself to discussing what we could do should the second alternative be adopted.

We should have little or no opportunity for sporadic attacks while the British Fleet was on its way across the Indian Ocean to the southward of the Sunda Isles, to, say, Port Darwin. None would be likely to arise until it left that place and proceeded north to bring our Fleet to action. To reach the South China Sea from Port Darwin, the British would have to pass on one side or the other of the Tenimbar Group, enter the Banda Sea and proceed thence through the Celebes Sea, or through the Straits of Macassar between the Celebes and British North Borneo. There is an abundance of places along this route where our light forces could lie in wait to deliver unexpected torpedo attacks. To obviate heavy loss before reaching the China Sea, the British would have to sweep all the various islands clear of our ships, and that would take them a long time. Even if we suppose them to have succeeded in reaching the South China Sea without serious loss, they would still have to find an advanced base, presumably in North Borneo, for Hongkong certainly, and Singapore probably, would have fallen.

Hence, in this third case, England would have little chance of success until she had built many more ships and considerably increased her naval strength in comparison with that of Japan. In other words, both sides would have to prepare for a long-drawn-out war.

Friendly relations with France.

In the above discussion, nothing has been said of France, who has been regarded as strictly neutral. Should, however, she take sides, or even be benevolently neutral to one side, the situation would be altered completely. Her friendship would facilitate our attack on Singapore and enable us to undertake operations in the N.E.I. without misgivings. Her enmity would increase our difficulties. In fact, in the struggle in the South China Sea France holds the scales, her aid might well decide the issue, and the diplomatic competition to gain it would be very keen.

Relations with Siam.

One more point—the attitude of Siam. This country lies

across the northern end of the Malay Peninsula, as a glance at the map will show, and with its backing our operations against Singapore would obviously be facilitated. Its alliance with us would bring the people of India out in open revolt and leave Singapore in a precarious position.

Fortunately, we gained the goodwill of Siam over the last 42-to-1 vote in the League of Nations. But the Japanese people, though conscious that they have her goodwill, do not realize how valuable it might be to them in connexion with operations against Singapore and in the South China Seas in the coming war with England.

We must bear in mind that our relations with her have their strategical as well as their commercial side.

CHAPTER XI

ATTACK ON ENGLAND'S WEAK POINTS

(1) *Insurrection in Egypt*

THE most effective way of upsetting England's war plans in the Far East, or even of compelling her to abandon them altogether, is to 'explode a chestnut in the fire' for her. That is, to strike her in her most vulnerable spots, Egypt and India.

A double object.

To fan the agitation for independence and to raise the standard of revolt in Egypt would serve two objects.

In the first place, the Suez Canal may well be called the key to British communications with the Indian Ocean, the Far East, and Australasia. Were it blocked, British naval operations farther east would very seriously be hampered and a highly vital trade route would be interrupted. In the second, the supply of Egyptian cotton, on which the operatives of Manchester are dependent for their livelihood, would be cut off.

Among the agricultural products of Egypt cotton comes first, the annual value of the amount exported has reached 400,000,000 yen* and appears to be rising rapidly. There is a promising output of mineral oil, 1,864,000 barrels in 1929, which is also on the increase.

Blocking the Suez Canal.

But the importance to Britain of the Suez Canal overshadows everything else. It was opened in 1869 and cost 254,000,000 yen to cut. It has no locks like the Panama

* The par value of the yen is about two shillings, though its value today, July 1935, is well below that amount.—Translator.

Canal. It is 104.5 miles long—88 miles excluding the Bitter Lakes—has a width of 150 feet, enabling ships of 121 feet beam to pass through, and a depth of 36 feet. The time taken to go through is about fourteen hours. The four most important places on it are, counting from the north, Port Said at the Mediterranean entrance, Kantara, Ismailia and Suez, at the southern entrance. The first and last of these can meet the requirements of ships passing through. Kantara is of strategical importance : it is in a narrow defile at the southern end of Lake Mensala, through which armies have passed in days gone by between Egypt and Syria. Ismailia is at the northern end of Lake Timsah and is the junction for Cairo on the Port Said-Suez railway.

The Canal could be blocked by sinking a ship in it, or temporarily obstructed by blowing it up at its highest point—60 feet—between Kantara and Ismailia.

One of the difficulties with which troops guarding the Canal have to contend is that there is no local fresh water. This has to be obtained from the Nile, and one method of attack would be to cut off that supply.

A British trick.

But the best way of all of definitely blocking the Canal would be to stir up an insurrection in Egypt. During the Great War the Turks advanced to the Canal and made determined efforts to cut it, but they had omitted to win over the Egyptians. The English, however, were wiser, and, by declaring Turkish suzerainty at an end and by saying that Egypt would be taken under British protection and granted independence, were able successfully to protect the Canal. The Egyptians, trusting to these promises, made many sacrifices during the War. Some volunteered for service on the Palestine, Syrian, and Mesopotamian fronts, others served behind the line. After the War they expected to be granted the independence they so earnestly desired. They had been deluded, and have our sincere sympathy.

Two days after the Armistice, Zaghul Pasha, the leader of the Egyptian Nationalist Party, called at the Residency, and, on the strength of the promises given during the War, demanded the abolition of the protectorate and a recognition of complete independence. The Sirdar, Sir Reginald Wingate, received him with courtesy, but gave him an evasive

answer. A few days later the impatient Zaghul went to see Sir Reginald again and asked for a permit to proceed to England to appeal to London direct. His request was forwarded, but the reply was somewhat unexpected, the Home Government saying that it was too fully occupied at the moment to deal with the question. Zaghul and his friends were infuriated and threw themselves into the independence movement.

England played this same old trick on others besides the Egyptians—on the Indians, for instance. She won over Hussein, King of the Hejaz, with a deliberately false document, which turned out to be so much waste-paper after the War. The Egyptians should be on their guard against this sort of thing.

Egyptian demands.

I have discussed the Egyptian nationalist movement at some length in my earlier book, *Japan Fights the World*, and have explained how it arose because the independence granted was nominal only.

Egyptian demands may be classified under the following three heads :

- (i) The withdrawal of all British troops from Egypt.
- (ii) The removal of the British legal and financial advisers.
- (iii) The cessation of British supervision, especially in connexion with foreign affairs.
- (iv) The abolition of the protection England claims to exercise in Egypt over foreigners and natives of small nations.
- (v) The abolition of British guardianship of the Suez Canal.

England appears to be inclined to give way over (i) to the extent of limiting the troops she has a right to station in Egypt to those required for guarding the Canal, and also over (iv). But in return she is demanding a twenty-five years' Treaty of Alliance and an agreement to abstain from entering into any Treaty with a third party disadvantageous to her. But it is doubtful if the Egyptians will agree to this unless she also gives way over the remaining demands.

Egypt still a dependency.

Egypt is in name an independent country, but in fact she is not. She is a British dependency, which, of course, is exactly what England intends her to be.

Chapter I, Article 1 of the Egyptian constitution says : 'Egypt is a self-governing, independent country. Her sovereign rights are indivisible and inalienable. She has representative government under an hereditary sovereign.'

This constitution was not, however, drafted to meet the wishes of the Egyptian people, it was designed to suit England. If the country was really independent, all the power would not be in the hands of the Higher Council, the members of which are nominated by England. The King is a puppet set up by the British Government, not a sovereign chosen by the people. And last, but not least, British troops are stationed in Egypt to overawe the people should occasion arise.

Egypt has representative government and a Parliament of two Houses. But the wishes of the people as expressed by the Diet are not carried out. England does not allow them to be reflected in the actions of the Government.

The party of the Wafd, for instance, led by Zaghul Pasha, has an absolute majority in the Diet, but England takes no notice of it and turns out any Cabinet formed by it.

In June 1930 the election law was revised and the will of the people was made still more ineffective. Sixty members of the Upper House are in the appointment of the King, who can summon or close the Diet as he pleases. As this King is nothing more than a British puppet, the meaning of the electoral law is obvious enough.

The Egyptians are a fighting race.

Shortly after the end of the Great War I spent about a month in Port Said. It was just at the time when the independence movement had begun in earnest. I had many opportunities of talking to Egyptians and Arabs and of hearing their views. I was much astonished to find how eager they were for independence and how well disposed to us Japanese as fellow Asiatics.

The Egyptians are fighters, like the Arabs : they look bold and fearless. If well led, they would make fine troops. The present standing Army has a strength of 12,500, apart

from the Royal Guard of 1100. The Egyptian Navy consists of four coast-defence vessels. There are 11,400 British troops in Egypt, which, added to those of the Royal Guard, make a number about equal to that of the native troops. It is pretty evident what England is after.

Aeroplanes are the most useful arm for operations in the Canal zone. They could be used for blowing up the Canal, and the native Egyptian and Arab troops are afraid of them. England, with her powerful Air Force, has an indisputable advantage there.

The possibility of an Egyptian rising would very seriously embarrass England if she took the plunge and endeavoured to fight a war in the Far East. The Egyptians are not likely to allow themselves to be tricked again, and they may remember that an Anglo-Japanese war would provide them with an unlooked-for opportunity to realize their long-cherished desire for independence.

(2) *Insurrection in India*

British tricks.

India is another of the unfortunate countries that have been tricked and exploited by the British.

British Indians have continued to demand self-government ever since the cry for it was raised at the Indian Nationalist Congress in 1906. During the Great War the British inveigled them with fair promises into assisting the Mother Country. They rendered faithful service on many fronts and bore their share of the expense, little realizing that, like the Egyptians, they were being deceived. In 1917 the Lloyd George Cabinet, possibly in return for this service, announced that responsible government would gradually be introduced, as provided for in the so-called Montague manifesto. In fact, the British had promised India self-government a full sixteen years earlier. But no sooner was the War over than the promise was broken. The self-government granted was so in name only, and the Indians found that they had been deluded. By the present law, which was promulgated in 1919, Indians have control in one department only of local affairs, to wit, that of education, the Governor-General has power to interfere

in all others. Should they prove successful in this, it is intended to hand other departments over to them.

The Simon Committee was set up to study the results of this form of partial self-government, but owing to Conservative opposition no Indian was appointed on it. As the report of this Committee went very little further than the Montague manifesto, the Indians were very dissatisfied, and the result has been that the movement for self-government has developed into one for independence.

In view of the alarming state of affairs, Lord Irwin, the Viceroy, reaffirmed in October 1929 that self-government would be granted, and it was announced that a round-table conference would shortly be held in London to discuss the details of an Indian constitution. If this affirmation had meant what it said, the anti-British atmosphere that surrounds the nationalist movement would have been dispersed. But England went back on it, and the whole of the Viceroy's intentions were upset by the violent opposition of a certain section of the Conservatives. Gandhi and his followers made a progress* to Cambay, there to make salt. He was imprisoned in consequence.

At the round-table conference, opened in London September 10, 1930, not a single representative of the Indian Nationalist Congress was present. The conference passed certain resolutions, but the British Government kept control of such important matters as foreign relations, defence, and part of Indian finance in its own hands. Indians were not allowed to have any say in them. Thanks to the efforts of Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, leader of the Moderate Party, Gandhi and other political offenders were released. Gandhi himself appeared at the second round-table conference in September 1931, as representative of the National Congress. There, again, the British Government refused to give up its right to control foreign relations and defence, and as, also, the Mohammedans started a religious agitation, the conference accomplished nothing. In January 1932 Gandhi returned from London and started his Disobedience Movement, and was put in prison again. Then the British began a far-reaching policy of repression.

As the state of affairs in India was steadily getting worse, a further round-table conference, on a smaller scale, was

* The Japanese word used has a religious signification.—Translator.

opened in November 1932, and the draft of a revised Indian Constitution was taken in hand. The result was published in a White Book on March 17, 1933.

*The Revised Indian Constitution.**

What is the Revised Indian Constitution? Will it satisfy the people of India? I can only see in it their further betrayal.

In the first place, very extensive safeguards are proposed : safeguards, that is, of British public and private interests. The real authority remains in the hands of the Viceroy and the British officials. The control of defence, foreign relations, and of religious matters, all of which the Indians earnestly desire to manage for themselves, remain the prerogative of the Viceroy. The ministers responsible to the Confederate or other Assembly are not allowed to interfere in them in any way. The Viceroy is responsible to the British Government and Parliament only. He has power to act without reference to the Confederate Assembly, as indicated below. He can act to :

- (i) Control a situation which threatens the peace of India or any part of it.
- (ii) Uphold the finances and credit of the Indian Confederacy.
- (iii) Support the authority of the constitutional officials and protect their lawful interests.
- (iv) Protect the interests of the Native States.
- (v) Check commercial discrimination.
- (vi) Enforce all reservations.

This seems to take the backbone out of Indian self-government. It is evident that England is again deluding the Indians with fair words. And, to bring the whole system into line with that which obtains in Egypt, she has the Native Princes in her pocket to control the nationalist movement. Instead of appointing a king of her own choice, as she has done in Egypt, she has won over the Princes.

* *Note* : I have described the Indian Nationalist Movement at some length in my *Will Japan and America Ultimately Fight?* and my *Japan Fights the World*. What follows is an account of developments since they were written.

Another astonishing thing is that the Viceroy is given power to issue temporary emergency orders to maintain peace.

Real self-government has not been granted at all, but merely an emasculated form of it.

In the second place, the revised constitution establishes a Confederation. This was passed at the first round-table conference, and Sir T. Saprú and his friends hoped by means of it to cement together British India and the Native States into a United India. England, however, proposed to use it to produce the opposite effect.

There is at present in India, apart from the districts under British rule, a number of Native States governed by their own Princes. The relations of these States with others are dealt with by the Viceroy, in the name of the King-Emperor, but otherwise each Prince is an independent sovereign. The Nationalist Party agreed to a Confederation as a necessary step towards the consolidation of the whole country into a United India. But the British saw in it a means of getting the Native Princes to surrender their sovereign rights to the Viceroy. As it was to the advantage of England to have the Princes in her pocket, she cunningly threw them a sop in the form of certain privileges and approved the formation of a Confederation on condition that the ruling Native Princes, by a majority of their representatives in the Upper House, agreed to join it. While on the one hand a bribe was offered to the Native Princes, on the other, the consolidation of a United India for the Indians was obstructed by indefinitely postponing the formation of the Confederation.

Further, the number of seats in Upper and Lower Houses to which the Princes nominate representatives is out of all proportion. The census of 1921 returned the population of British India as 318,940,000, and that of the Native States as 70,940,000, less than one-fifth of the total. But two-fifths of the members of the Upper House and one-third of those of the Lower House are nominated by the Princes. As these Princes are but British puppets, it is no exaggeration to say that this enables the Viceroy easily to manipulate the Confederate Assembly. Still more is this so, as the franchise is very limited, only some 2 per cent or 3 per cent of the population having votes.

Still further, the administration of the provinces is on similar lines to that of the Confederation. The Provincial Governors are appointed by the Viceroy and have power to over-ride the Provincial Assemblies, should occasion arise, and act independently of them.

These are the main points of the Confederation Bill. From them it is clear enough that the self-government it is proposed to grant to India is nominal only. Sir T. Saprú, the well-known leader of the Moderate Party, has declared that the Revised Constitution fails not only to make India a self-governing Dominion, but even to give any guarantee that it ever will be. The Indian Lower House has maintained that, without drastic amendment of the Bill, there is little hope of peace and progress.

Anti-British feeling in India.

Anti-British feeling has run so high that the Viceroy has seen no alternative to issuing orders severely repressing all agitation. The police have dispersed prohibited demonstrations and assemblies with their batons. The use of these was, however, too brutal, and was denounced by the Christians of the whole world : the Viceroy gave way and bamboo sticks were to be used instead. Was anything ever so ridiculous ? But, naturally enough, the more severe the repression the higher ran the anti-British feeling. In the end it developed into a terrorist movement and British residents went in fear of their lives. To give one or two examples :

In the spring of 1932, at the Degree Ceremony at Calcutta University, a woman student tried to assassinate the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal by firing a pistol at him while he was delivering a congratulatory address. She missed, and the Lieutenant-Governor was not injured. Later on, when brought before the Court, she was quite calm and said that she had no animus against the Lieutenant-Governor himself, but that the women of India needed rousing in the cause of political freedom. If her pistol-shot had done something to that end, she was satisfied. She was glad that the Lieutenant-Governor had not been injured. She asked to be condemned to death, as she had no desire to languish in prison. How pitiable !

There was another girl of 17 or 18 who assassinated a political officer.

In 1932 Sir Alfred Watson, the editor of India's greatest newspaper, *The Statesman*, was twice attacked by terrorists. Later on, he was in such danger that he secretly returned to England. All this was because of his articles against Indian Nationalism. The assailants were arrested in each case, but all of them took poison on their way to the police-station and died before they got there.

The state of affairs was so bad that British residents were greatly relieved if a week passed without a terrorist outrage : they got into the habit of taking pistols with them when they went to play tennis. Repressive measures were carried to such lengths that anyone suspected of being in the terrorist or disobedience movement was forbidden the use of train, ship, tramcar, post, or telegraph, and not allowed to change his place of residence : India was practically under martial law. It is a remarkable fact that from January 1932, when Gandhi was first imprisoned, no fewer than 60,000 persons, of whom 2700 were women, were put in gaol.

Boycott of British goods.

A boycott of British goods was started in connexion with the anti-British movement.

An Indian went into a shop to buy something, but as soon as he found that what was offered him was of British manufacture he refused to have it and asked for an article made elsewhere. A police-constable standing by asked him his reasons. He replied that though he, personally, had no objection to buying British goods, his wife would refuse to have them as soon as she found out what they were.

Another Indian asked a Japanese who was smoking a British-made cigarette whether they could not make cigarettes in Japan, and on being told that they could, said that the Japanese ought to be ashamed of himself for not using them. It occurred to this Japanese that if the Indians were as determined as all that not to buy British goods, it might be worth while importing Japanese cigarettes. He advised some of his business friends to try, and in a few months Japanese 'Cherry' cigarettes had been sold to the value of half a million yen.

Japanese cotton goods are very popular with the Indians, partly on account of their low price, but also very largely as the result of the boycott.

Indian admiration of Japan.

The Indians look on Japan as the leader of Asia : they are not so much pro-Japanese as admirers of the Japanese people. Among other things, the result of the Russo-Japanese war stimulated the growth of the Indian Nationalist Movement. Japan defeated the mighty Russia and gave the whites a 'flick on the nose'. The Indians look on Japan as a country very strong in war, though small in size. They believe that all the men are warriors.

India was for a long time unaware of our industrial progress, but its attitude to our goods entirely changed after a visit to Japan by Sir Hari Singh Gawa. This gentleman was an influential member of the Nationalist Party, and was at one time head of Delhi University. He went to Japan in the spring of 1932 and saw how she had developed industrially, and what a thorough system of education existed throughout the country. The Indians began to realize that the Japanese were worthy of respect not only as fighters, but also as industrialists. Their attitude to Japan improved still further when they learned, what they had not known before, what a large quantity of Indian products she bought. In the last thirty years Japan has imported from India three or four times as much as she has exported to her. As soon as it was realized what a good customer she was, her export to India went up by leaps and bounds.

The Indians are naturally and deeply religious. They are ready to listen to one who is above the common herd and to believe in him as in one inspired. That is why a man of the type of Gandhi is revered like a god. Hence, if Japan were to make war on Britain and it were understood that she had done so to free Asiatics from the hands of the white man, there is no room for doubt that the Indians, who have all along looked up to her, would raise the standard of revolt against the British.

But, as Gandhi remarked, the Indians are an emasculated people, forcibly deprived of weapons. There are at present 60,000 men of the Regular British Army and 172,000 native troops in India. What the attitude of the latter would be in the event of war with Japan is an interesting question, and the fact that they are not brigaded separately, but with British regiments, shows that the British Government has considered it.

To make the Nationalist Movement really effective, military support from the outside is required. Japan should therefore join with Russia to provide it.

(3) *England Russia's Enemy*

Japan could not send troops to India by sea while at war with England unless she had complete command of the Indian Ocean. If, therefore, she proposes effectively to help the Nationalist Movement she will have to send them by land. That makes it necessary for her to act in concert with Russia.

India is bounded on the north and north-west by the range of the Himalayas, and the southern part of her western frontier is a desert. Neither district lends itself to military operations. There remains but 500 miles of the north-west Afghanistan frontier for an invasion by land. The country in that part is mountainous, being intersected by spurs from the high tableland of Central Asia, but leading through it are four principal roads along which an invader could pass. This being so, Russia has always had her eye on Afghanistan and has for long been competing with England in attempts to win that country over. She has already established a protectorate over Bokhara, which lies to the north of it, with a view to eventual penetration into India. In the event of an Anglo-Japanese war, Afghanistan, in doubt as to what course to take,* and with England occupied elsewhere, would undoubtedly succumb to Russian influence.

Russian schemes to create disturbances in India.

Russia, who this long while has preached that small and weak nations should be freed, has done everything she can to instigate a revolt in India as the best way of overthrowing British capitalism. The following extracts are from a proclamation addressed by the Bolshevik Government to all Asiatic labourers and Mohammedans and dated December 7, 1917.

We declare that henceforth all your racial and cultural institutions are free and inviolable. . . .

* Like a rat peeping out of its hole.

Mohammedans of the Orient, Persians, Turks, Arabians, and Indians ! People of all countries that have been partitioned among the greedy plunderers of Europe in the wars in which they have staked your lives and your goods, your freedom and your heritage ! We declare that the secret treaty of rapine to seize Constantinople made by the Czar whom we have overthrown, and confirmed by the fallen Kerensky, is torn up and denounced ! The Russian Republic and its committee of government are opposed to the seizure of the territories of others ! . . .

The imperialist European despoilers have seized your countries to make them their colonies and to enslave you ! Drive them out !


This startled capitalist Europe, and especially England, with her precious possession of India. It brought from Mr. John Buchanan, the British Ambassador in Moscow, the indignant remark, "They are inciting our Indian subjects to revolt."

Another event that alarmed England was the Grand Congress of Eastern Races, opened at Baku in September 1920. It was a gathering of twenty races—Turks, Chinese, Indians, Armenians, Persians, Afghans. The President, Zinoviev, said that the Russians were prepared to assist every revolt against capitalist Europe and against England in particular. Among the personalities present at this meeting was the former Turkish leader, Enver Pasha. His object in life was the overthrow of England, and he got a supply of money and arms from the Russians for a body of high-souled Indian refugees he was raising in Afghanistan.

On account of all this, there has been a great increase in the number of Indian students at the Communist School at Moscow.

The Russian attitude to India being as described, she would hardly hesitate to make an Anglo-Japanese war the opportunity to seize in India the warm-water port she has so long desired. But what Japan would have to look out for would be to make quite sure that Russia herself did not supplant England in India.

However, India is not the only place where a warm-water port could be found, one in the Persian Gulf would be far safer for Russia. We should have to be quite clear about this in any tacit understanding at which we might arrive.



“NACHI”
“NACHI”
TON CRUISER
TON CRUISER
JAPANESE
JAPANESE
Above :
Below :

Russian schemes to expand to the southward.

It will be of interest in the above connexion to say something about Russia's traditional policy of expansion to the southward.

Anglo-Russian relations have an unfortunate history : the two countries seem fated to be enemies.

As has been explained before, Russia's exit to the North Sea through the Baltic is blocked, and she has tried to find others in warm water, through the Dardenelles into the Mediterranean, through Persia into the Persian Gulf, through India to the Indian Ocean, through Manchuria into the Yellow Sea. So far, she has met with no success ; in the first attempts she was stopped by England, in the last she was balked by Japan.

In both Persia and Afghanistan, Russia and England have come into collision. In the former, where Russia has tried to come south to warm water, she has been checked by England coming north. The latter is the country through which Russia could enter India. Both countries are buffer States, and even in this twentieth century Afghanistan has no railways, because both Russia and England would regard them as built for military purposes and therefore do not want them. The issue is of vital importance to England, and I will endeavour to give some account of what has happened.

Russia and England in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan is the road along which invaders of India have travelled from the times of Darius, King of Persia, in the sixth century B.C., and of Alexander the Great.

Anglo-Russian troubles go back to 1807, when Napoleon, in league with Alexander I of Russia, planned to invade India through Persia and Afghanistan, and England sent a mission to both those countries to make a defensive alliance with them. Since then Russia and England have continually endeavoured to win over Afghanistan, sometimes one, sometimes the other gaining an ascendancy.

In August 1907 Sir Edward Grey took advantage of Russia's inability to engage in further activities, after her heavy defeat by Japan, to make a Treaty with her and to check her advance towards India for the time being. In this Treaty Afghanistan was recognized as a British protectorate whose

foreign affairs were to be conducted by England. The conflict that had gone on for one hundred years ceased for a while.

After the Great War, however, the talk about self-determination had its effect in Afghanistan as elsewhere. The ruler, Amanullah Khan, hoping to free himself from the British yoke, raised an army with the help of Russia, declared himself independent and, massing his troops on the Indian frontier, demanded recognition. This was in May 1919: in the end England gave way and granted him recognition.

This British retreat meant a Russian advance, for the Soviet Government, following in the steps of the Imperial Government, altered its policy to one of territorial expansion. Its championship of the cause of racial equality and of oppressed nations appealed to Afghanistan, who concluded a Treaty with it in February 1921, by which she received an annual subsidy. Russia continued to be conciliatory and, in 1926, entered into a further Treaty, in which it was agreed that if one party were at war the other would remain neutral, that neither of them would invade the territory of the other, and that neither would ally itself with a third. Russian influence continued to predominate until 1929, when the situation was reversed by the advent of a new ruler, Nadir Khan. This man is intensely pro-British and anti-Russian. He has been supplied with arms and ammunition from India by the British, to assist him in suppressing the disorderly factions in his country, and for other purposes. He is, none the less, a true Afghan, and has no intention of becoming a vassal of Britain. It will, however, be many years before his country can stand alone as independent.

This being so, Japan should, in the event of war with England, league herself with Russia. For the British troops in India would be so fully occupied in suppressing the Nationalist activities which would burst into activity that they would have no time for anything else, and Afghanistan might very possibly dip her hand into a dish offered her by Russia.

Russia and England in Persia.

There has been a stubborn contest between Russia and England in Persia for many years. Everyone knows of the dispute that arose over the railway from Tiflis in the Cauca-

sus to Tabriz, built by Imperial Russia with a view to invading Persia. Also, financial incompetence had so depleted the Persian treasury as to leave an opening for foreign interference, which was definitely invited by the Government. Tehran, the capital, lies in the north, within easy reach of a Russian expedition, but out of reach of a British one. Russia was, therefore, at a diplomatic advantage, and when a British Minister endeavoured to win over the Shah, that potentate is said to have put a bow-string round his own neck to indicate how his country stood in relation to her.

Every expansion of Russian influence in Persia increased British anxiety. For, if Russia came out into the Persian Gulf, she would be in a position to attack the trade routes across the Indian Ocean and also to threaten India itself. England was compelled to uphold the independence of Persia so that she might, like Afghanistan, serve as a buffer State. When, then, Sir Edward Grey made a Treaty with Russia in 1927, he included in it an agreement for a divided control of Persia. The part on the Indian side was to be regarded as the British zone and the rest as a Russian zone. By this means the safety of the Indian frontier was secured.

The whole of the Persian Gulf was not included in the British zone. That was where British diplomacy was so clever. After preventing Russia from obtaining an ice-free port in the Far East by means of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, it would have been unreasonable to deny her one in the Middle East. So England gave up the Gulf and made it into a neutral zone with which neither Power was to interfere. In effect, she prevented Russia from coming out into the Gulf, a diplomatic victory.

During the Great War there was a good deal of fighting in Persia, for all that she was neutral, over the possession of her promising oil-fields. England has, among other things, been much concerned to extend the activities of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, which may be described as one of her branch shops. The oil-fields were found to be in what the Anglo-Russian Treaty defined as a neutral zone, so, in a secret Treaty with France and Russia, England got her zone extended to include them, and in exchange agreed to let Russia take Constantinople after the War.

The Russian Revolution rendered this secret Treaty inoperative, but did not put an end to Anglo-Russian antagon-

ism at Tehran. For although at the time the Russians denounced imperialism and withdrew their troops from Persia, the Soviet Government had not abandoned the old policy of expanding southwards, and after a while threw off the mask and was at it again.

After the War, the wind of self-determination blew in Persia, too, and one Palwai used it to overthrow the old form of government by the Khans and to make himself king. Further, before the War Russia had this much in common with England, that both, for all their quarrels, were imperialist, but when she went Red even that disappeared. Palwai took advantage of this new antagonism between the two to set up a new and progressive Persia. The first blood-sacrifice to it was the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. On November 27, 1932, the Persian Government announced that the privileges of the Company were cancelled. It stated that the old agreement was one-sided, and that in making it the interests of the Persian people had been ignored. A new agreement was to be made and the old one torn up and publicly burned. In days gone by England would have sent an expedition to teach this new Government a lesson, but she recognized that the times have changed and, instead of requiting violence with violence, is quietly carrying on negotiations. A remarkable instance of virtue in a country that has hitherto relied on military force.

England and Russia irreconcilable enemies.

The struggle between Russia and England is not confined to that in India, Afghanistan, and Persia ; the two countries are at variance in many other directions. In brief, Russia is bent on destruction in British preserves, for the easiest and most effective way of getting what she wants is by attacking England.

Before the Great War Germany thought to conquer the world by the sword, but the sword of Red Russia is, in some senses, far sharper. The German relied on a weapon pure and simple : the Russian relies on doctrines of self-determination, of equality, of freedom, and on red gold, all of which have a special appeal for oppressed nations. Therefore the Balkans, Persia, Afghanistan, China, Outer Mongolia have ranged themselves together under the standard that Russia has raised with these as its device.

The emancipation of oppressed races amounts to tearing off half, if not all, of England's wings. If Russia made use of it to secure for herself an outlet into warm water, the injury would be still more serious.

To Russia, England is an enemy whom even the angels could not forgive : the two can no more agree than two persons whose incompatibility derives from previous existences.

In May 1927 the Baldwin Government had Arcos House, the Russian commercial offices in London, raided, because a secret map had been stolen, and, on the grounds that the place was a Red propaganda organization, broke off diplomatic relations. To a third party the whole thing seems somewhat childish, but it is not surprising to one who understands what inveterate enemies the two countries are.

Well, then, war between Japan and England would be a unique opportunity for Russia to get the warm-water port after which she hankers and which she has for so long endeavoured to obtain. There is no reason why she should ally herself with England, for that would mean abandoning her cherished desire. She would, of course, remain neutral for a while to see how things went and to get as much as she could out of both belligerents. But, as anyone can see, directly there was the least indication that Japan was going to win, she would come in on her side and start to come south into the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. What Japan has to do is to discover what Russia's real object is, and suitably adapt her own policy to get her on her side.

I repeat that Russia would be of the greatest assistance in defeating England. There is a lot of irresponsible, dangerous, silly talk about war with her. Those who indulge in it are obsessed with a view of one part only of the question : they are too blind and too ignorant to see it as a whole.

CHAPTER XII

BRITAIN NOT TO BE FEARED

(1) *Naval Force that England Could Send to the Far East*

As a first step towards an estimate of the result of a war between Japan and England that might arise in 1936 out of the circumstances already described, it is necessary to determine what naval force England could send to the principal theatre of war, that is, to the South China Sea. However much she might desire to send out a Fleet large enough to decide the war at a single issue, she could not afford to leave unprotected her trade routes, which extend all over the world. I will endeavour to forecast the number of ships she would require for this purpose.

As we have already seen, there are four principal trade routes : (i) to N. America, (ii) to S. America, (iii) to Africa, (iv) to the Pacific. Of these, that to the Pacific would be interrupted eastward of India by the circumstances of the war. But trade with Australia and New Zealand could still be continued by the route round Cape Horn, and the traffic on both routes to America would be increased accordingly. Consideration of these facts and of the positions of British naval bases leads us to suppose that ships would have to be detached for the protection of trade to : (1) Home waters, (2) the Mediterranean, (3) the Cape of Good Hope, (4) the Red Sea, (5) Bombay, (6) Colombo, (7) Calcutta, (8) Rangoon, (9) N. America, (10) S. America, (11) the Pacific coast of Canada, (12) Australia and New Zealand.

Assuming that Australia and New Zealand kept their own ships in their own waters, we may estimate that between 18 and 20 cruisers and between 54 and 60 destroyers would be required. This would leave an insufficient number of those ships to accompany the Battle Fleet to the Far East.

Again, the anxiety of Australia and New Zealand about the safety of their own coasts would lead to a demand for more ships to protect them, which England could hardly refuse, though it would lead to a further depletion of the Battle Fleet. This is one of England's many troubles.

As to submarines, England has a dozen or so of under 700 tons, most of which would be required for harbour defence, but few of which would be able to accompany the Battle Fleet.

Strength that could be sent to the Far East.

To sum up, the Fleet that England could send to the Far East to bring that of Japan to a decisive action may be taken as consisting of: 12 battleships, 3 battle-cruisers, 10 or 11 cruisers of 10,000 tons with 8-inch guns, 2 cruisers of 8300 tons with 8-inch guns, 24 smaller cruisers, 60 destroyers, 40 submarines, and 4 or 5 aircraft-carriers.

Against this Japan could oppose 6 battleships, 3 battle-cruisers, 12 'A' class cruisers (including 8 of 10,000 tons with 8-inch guns), 21 'B' class cruisers, 60 destroyers, 37 submarines, and 6 aircraft-carriers.

This shows that although Japan would have fewer big cruisers and heavier ships, she has nothing to fear on account of numbers in the lighter ships. England's inferiority in light cruisers and destroyers would make it easier for Japan to conduct a war of attrition, and would place Japan at a tactical advantage in the decisive theatre of war.

The essentials of victory.

If Japan made a good start by sinking three or four of the China Squadron cruisers at the outset, and got half a dozen battleships by her torpedo attacks, she would be able to meet the British Fleet on equal terms and to make sure of success in a decisive action. If, through diplomatic ineptitude, she should find herself obliged to fight after a superior British Fleet had assembled at Singapore, she would have but a poor chance of destroying those six battleships and three or four large cruisers on which the whole issue turns. For there would be no opportunities for sporadic attacks, and the cruisers of the China Squadron would have left Hongkong on or before the outbreak of war and have joined the main Fleet at Singapore. Should, then, the war

begin under these conditions—those of the first case in Chapter X, section 1—England could look forward to the decisive action without misgivings, in spite of her shortage of lighter ships. But our diplomats are much too prudent to mismanage in this manner, and the circumstances in which war would break out are far more likely to be those of either Case (ii) or Case (iii). I will try to forecast the result in Case (ii): that is, when the superior British Fleet is in the Indian Ocean on its way east at the outbreak of war.

(2) *Attack on Australia by the Japanese Fleet*

With the outbreak of war Japan would, we may suppose, descend on Hongkong and Singapore like a thunderbolt and capture them. But there are other British possessions within range of attack by the Japanese Fleet; British Borneo and Australia, for instance, would be dealt with.

Attack on Australia.

Japan could not attempt to occupy Australia or New Zealand until she had destroyed the British Fleet and gained command of the sea. Until the anticipated decisive action in the South China Sea had been fought, she would have to be content with bombarding from the sea or bombing from the air parts of those countries, in the hope of destroying public works and of intimidating the people. Considerations of distance would confine such attacks to the north, and limit other naval operations to those possible to submarines. Sydney, which is the chief naval port and which may be described as the brains of Australia, would be a most useful place to attack. But it would take ten days to get there, and the Japanese Fleet lying in wait for a powerful enemy coming east across the Indian Ocean would be very rash, if not utterly foolish, to attempt it. Cities like Sydney and Melbourne on the east and south coasts would, then, be open to attack by submarines only, and we could not expect to do them much damage. On the other hand, the north coast is well within range of our Fleet, which could deliver its attack and withdraw at its leisure to expect that of the east-bound British Fleet. I will now describe a possible attack on Australia at the beginning of the war.



Above : JAPANESE FIRST CLASS DESTROYER "HARUKAZE"

Below : JAPANESE FIRST CLASS DESTROYER "SHIMAKAZE"

Australia shouts for help.

Japan declares war on England on September 3, 1936. Six days later a Japanese squadron of three 10,000-ton cruisers and one aircraft-carrier appears off Port Darwin in the early morning. A dozen or more aeroplanes are sent up and first of all bomb the town, creating a panic. They next drop bombs on the forts, the buildings of the naval establishment, the wireless station and the storehouses, and start fires.

A light cruiser and three destroyers, who are in harbour, come out. The Japanese cruisers open fire on them with 8-inch salvos at extreme range. A chance shot hits the cruiser and sets her on fire. Seeing that she is overmatched, she runs in under cover of the forts.

The Japanese cruisers then close the range and open fire on the forts and the harbour.

About twenty minutes after the Japanese 'planes have started bombing, several British 'planes leave the ground. An air battle ensues. More British 'planes get up and more are sent from the Japanese aircraft-carrier. Some of the British 'planes try to drop bombs on the cruisers. They are attacked by Japanese 'planes and by high-angle fire, and meet with no success.

After about forty minutes the Japanese 'planes draw off to the westward. The cruisers follow them. The British 'planes pursue, but are beaten off by the Japanese, some are shot down and the remainder return to Port Darwin.

While this is going on, Derby, on the west coast, some 600 miles farther south, is also attacked by Japanese cruisers and aircraft.

Two light cruisers and a carrier appear off the place at dawn, bombard it with 6-inch guns and bomb it from the air. As no attack has ever been anticipated, the place is practically undefended, one old destroyer only being in harbour. The Japanese squadron meets with no interference, and after about thirty minutes makes off to the westward and disappears.

Send ships !

The report that Port Darwin and Derby have been bombarded sends a shudder of fear throughout the whole of Australia. The shock is more severe and the lamentations are more loud because the people of Australia, having

unlawfully expelled the Japanese, have been looking forward to the greedy enjoyment of a dream of 'ample clothes and warm food' in a land rich in heaven's bounty. The result is a demand for ships. Owing to the absence of railways, the people of the coast towns can only escape by sea, and that they imagine to be covered with Japanese Fleets and ships. Their only hope for their lives and goods lies in their own Navy. Demands for ships pour in on the Government from every part of the country. One place peremptorily demands a dozen at once to save it from being reduced to ashes.

What ships, then, have the Australians got? If only they had taken Admiral Henderson's advice and built those 52 ! But that is all past history, and now they have but 2 10,000-ton cruisers, 2 light cruisers, 6 destroyers, and 2 submarines. England, with her present shortage of light cruisers, cannot send more than four, with, perhaps, from twelve to eighteen destroyers. And the more she depletes her Battle Fleet, the more she jeopardizes her chances of success in the decisive action in the South China Sea. Further, thirty-four or thirty-five ships at least would be required adequately to defend both the east and the west coasts of Australia.

When one comes to think of it, such demands for ships are unreasonable. To comply with them would be contrary to fundamental principles. To station ships all round the coasts so as to leave no place undefended is bad strategy and dangerous. It would be to invite defeat, for it would enable the enemy to destroy them all, one after the other. During the Spanish-American war, at the first rumour that a Spanish Fleet was about to cross the Atlantic, the people on the east coast of the United States fell over one another with their demands for protection. Many ships were mobilized on that account, and had the Spaniards, following the dictates of sound strategy, taken advantage of this mistake, they could have destroyed the whole American Fleet.

In the Russo-Japanese war, some of our people got so excited over the 'atrocious behaviour' of the Vladivostok squadron that they stoned Admiral Kamimura's private house.*

* A Russian squadron from Vladivostok succeeded in evading Admiral Kamimura's squadron in the Sea of Japan and in raiding Japanese communications with Korea.—Translator.

In neither case did the people understand the principles of war, nor did they realize that by their precipitate and ill-considered action they were playing into the hands of the enemy.

To continue, the British Government is, as might have been expected, in no hurry to comply with the Australian demands, for all their urgency and insistence. The coasts of England themselves have been raided before this, time and again. The position is explained to the Australians and their unreason is reproved. But they are face to face with the realities of war and are not in the mood to listen to cold-blooded philosophical arguments. They raise a cry for an independent Australia and ultimately clamour to leave the British Empire and join America. The Conservative Churchill says that Australia is ratting.

(3) *Occupation of British Borneo*

British Borneo, the north-west corner of the island, is occupied by the Japanese as one of the first undertakings of the war, for certain reasons which are explained below.

Occupation necessary.

The great influence the attitude of Holland would have on the result of an Anglo-Japanese war has already been discussed. She would probably remain neutral, but with a bias towards England, with whom she has intimate political and commercial relations. The occupation of British Borneo might induce her to change her attitude and be more complaisant to Japan. For the adjoining Dutch Borneo could be overawed and its native population incited to rise against its tyrannical masters, with reverberations throughout the other islands.

On the strategical side several purposes would be served. The excellent harbours of Brunei and Sarawak would be available for use as bases for Japan's war of attrition in the Greater and Lesser Sunda Isles, and for the Fleet covering her expedition to Singapore. The problems of obtaining oil fuel and supplying it to the Fleet during its operations in the South China Sea, and of obtaining rubber for the munition factories in Japan, would be simplified.

Note on Borneo.

For purposes of government, British Borneo is divided into three parts—North Borneo, Brunei, and Sarawak. The territory is mountainous, the arable areas being in the south-west in the basins of the Rajang and Sarawak Rivers.

North Borneo became a British protectorate in 1888 by agreement with the Sultan, and since then has been administered by a British resident. It is fertile and produces timber, rice, rubber, cocoa, and coffee. Our firms of Kuhara and Mitsui have estates there, and several rubber plantations are owned by Japanese. The principal commercial ports are Sandakan and Jesselton.

Brunei is between North Borneo and Sarawak. It has been British since 1888, the Sultan here, too, having been won over. Brunei, the chief town, is on an arm of a bay of the same name and has a large wireless station. The principal products are oil and rubber.

Sarawak is the most westerly of the three divisions and, like the other two, was made a British protectorate in 1888. The name of the present Sultan is C. V. Brooke. The inhabitants are principally savage Malays and Dyaks. The chief products are oil, coal, and rice. The capital, which is also the chief port, is known as Kuching and also as Sarawak.

The Japanese occupy Borneo.

At dawn on September 5 six 10,000-ton cruisers and several destroyers, escorting two transports full of troops, appear off British Borneo. They separate into two parties, of which one proceeds to Brunei Bay and the other to Sarawak. Aircraft sent up from the cruisers bomb the harbours. Destroyers, with naval landing parties on board, run in, preceded by mine-sweepers. The parties land and rush up the beaches cheering. The transports come in and land 1000 men at each place. These join forces with the naval landing parties and advance on the towns. As the defence in each case consists only of a small guard, the advance of the Japanese forces is uninterrupted; it is like 'a bamboo splitting'. By nightfall both places are in Japanese hands.

The officer in command of the expedition issues a proclamation to the effect that Japan is at war with England and the English only, not with the natives, who have no

need to be alarmed and are to carry on with their normal occupations. Any action hostile to the Japanese and any attempts to pass information to the English will be punished with death.

Awakening of the people of Borneo.

The Japanese occupation of British Borneo has a far-reaching effect on Dutch Borneo. The natives, observing the excellent discipline of the Japanese troops and hearing that they have come to rescue small races from their oppressors; look upon them as their saviours. They determine to free themselves from the harsh rule of Holland. The Dutch authorities take alarm and issue one order after another as soon as they get wind of what is going on. Anyone suspected of being concerned in the movement is promptly to be thrown into prison without further inquiry. Some are executed, some are imprisoned on the ground that they have sold food to the Japanese. The result is that native hatred of the Dutch grows worse from day to day.

The Government of the Netherlands protests to that of Japan that its troops are stirring up revolt. Our Government repudiates the accusation and alleges that the Dutch officials are ill-treating the natives, and makes an appeal in the name of humanity.

But there is a limit to everything, and at last the natives band themselves together, take to their weapons and attack the Dutch authorities. The guards are defeated and several officials butchered. Finally, the natives succeed in gaining control of Dutch Borneo. Their leader, Pengilan Bendullah, sends a mission to the officer in command of the Japanese forces and states quite frankly that he intends to set up an independent state under Japanese guidance.

The other islands react at once, as to an electric impulse, and by the time the British Fleet from Europe reaches the Straits of Sunda, the Celebes have shaken off Dutch fetters and both Java and Sumatra are in the throes of rebellion.

(4) *Escape of Mackeen's Squadron*

It will be of interest to leave the Battle Fleets for a time and to follow the fortunes of Vice-Admiral Mackeen in his

dangerous but enviable position as Commander-in-Chief, China. We will imagine that a state of strained relations exists between Japan and England, and that on August 25 the Admiral, who is at Hongkong, receives the following telegraphic instructions from the Admiralty :

INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, CHINA

1. The situation as regards Japan is very delicate. It is feared that the worst may happen and war may break out.

2. The attitudes of other countries are somewhat as follows :

- (a) China has concluded a secret alliance with us and the U.S.A. appears well disposed. Some time may, however, elapse before either of these countries declare war on Japan.
- (b) Holland will ostensibly be neutral, but we have reached an understanding with her whereby she will give us all facilities.
- (c) Other countries may be expected to remain neutral, but many will join us in an economic blockade of Japan.
- (d) The attitude of Soviet Russia is still uncertain, but she inclines to favour Japan.

3. The Fleet under your command should be prepared for war and you should be guided by the following general instructions :

- (a) Such ships as you may consider suitable should be sent at once to Japanese waters to watch and report on the movements of the Japanese Fleet, and to attack it if war breaks out.
- (b) Ships should be sent to Japanese waters, to the Straits of Korea, the Sea of Japan, the Yellow Sea, and the China Sea in particular, to attack Japanese communications.
- (c) With your big cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, you should endeavour to prevent the Japanese from attacking Hongkong and Singapore and to keep the Japanese Fleet in northern waters.
- (d) The Battle Fleet is leaving European waters at once to support you and the garrisons of Hongkong and Singapore.

- (e) The Australian and New Zealand squadrons will remain in their own waters to defend their coasts, unless special orders are given to the contrary.

Admiralty,
2.8.36.

CHELMSFORD,
First Lord.

On receipt of these instructions, Admiral Mackeen sends 8 submarines to Japanese waters to watch the Japanese Fleet and to attack shipping. He details the cruiser *Craddock* (4180 tons), 3 destroyers, and 2 submarines for the defence of Hongkong, and sends his remaining destroyers and submarines to Singapore for a similar purpose. He keeps with him 5 10,000-ton cruisers and 1 aircraft-carrier to act as occasion demands.

Japan's enveloping movement.

The Great General Staff had devised a plan to surround Admiral Mackeen's squadron so as to sink his five large cruisers as soon as possible. The squadron was practically certain to be at Hongkong at the outbreak of war, and was expected to retire on Singapore. With the declaration of war, 3 battle-cruisers, 6 10,000-ton cruisers, and 1 aircraft-carrier were to be sent to surround Hongkong at a distance of 30 miles, and 2 smaller cruisers were to be sent close in as a bait to lure the enemy to his destruction.

But on September 2, two days before the declaration of war, Admiral Mackeen takes his 5 cruisers and 1 aircraft-carrier to sea, and his whereabouts is unknown. The plans have to be changed, and it is assumed that the Admiral has gone :

- (i) East through the Batan Straits* into the Pacific, or
- (ii) Direct to Singapore, or
- (iii) To British Borneo.

In consequence, 6 battleships and 1 aircraft-carrier are sent to the Batan Straits, 3 battle-cruisers, 2 light cruisers, and 1 aircraft-carrier are sent to follow the direct route from Hongkong to Singapore, and 6 10,000-ton cruisers and 1 aircraft-carrier are sent to British Borneo. If the enemy is

* Between Formosa and the Philippines.—Translator.

not sighted by any one of these squadrons, that sent to Borneo is to proceed to the Straits of Sunda, there to lie in wait to deliver a surprise attack.

A golden opportunity missed.

About 3 o'clock in the afternoon of September 5, five or six aeroplanes appear over Nagoya and bomb it. The city is thrown into confusion and fires break out in several places. The raid is entirely unexpected and the people are very puzzled, some of them jumping to the conclusion that the machines are American. But all doubts are dispelled two hours later by a W/T message from one of our merchant ships, reporting five large British cruisers in the Enshū Nada.* Japanese aeroplanes go up and attack the British 'planes, who, after continuing to drop bombs for some time, make off to the eastward. They are pursued, and there is further air-fighting over the British cruisers who are waiting for their 'planes in the Enshū Nada. The Japanese 'planes come under heavy fire from the cruisers' high-angle guns and, finding themselves overmatched, draw off to the westward.

On receipt of the report of this affair, the Great General Staff sends the battle-cruiser squadron to the Formosa Channel and orders two battleships and four cruisers of the *Kako* class to proceed to the Enshū Nada with all despatch to search. The enemy, however, has disappeared, and the two battleships and four cruisers are ordered to the Formosa Channel.

Mackeen's squadron upsets our plans.

The Great General Staff gets no further news of Mackeen's squadron, which has vanished into the blue. But on the 8th it suddenly appears off Hongkong, sinks one of our light cruisers, which is being used as a transport, and disappears to the southward. Fortunately, this transport was on her way back to Japan, having landed her troops, so the loss is not serious. But Mackeen's daring impresses even our Japanese officers, who regard him as a worthy opponent. At great risk he came through the chain of our south-west islands into the Formosa Channel and appeared off Hongkong. In fact, he upset all our calculations.

* Nagoya is at the head of a bay; Enshū Nada is the open sea outside it.—Translator.

Fresh instructions are sent to the Admiral commanding the battle-cruiser squadron, two light cruisers and one aircraft-carrier are to proceed to Singapore at full speed, the squadron of big cruisers in Javanese waters is recalled to the neighbourhood of Banka Island, there to lie in wait for the enemy. But Admiral Mackeen is too clever to fall into any of our traps.

From his own report it appears that after leaving the neighbourhood of Hongkong he proceeded down the west coast of Mindoro, in the Philippines, where he got some information from the Americans, passed through the Straits of Macassar and Lombok and joined the Fleet coming out from Europe at a rendezvous to the west of Sumatra. Further, we found out afterwards that when he passed through the Straits of Lombok, our squadron of two 10,000-ton cruisers and one aircraft-carrier, which had been raiding Australia, was quite close. In view of its great disparity of strength, it was fortunate not to be sighted.

We can sympathize with our officers and men in their disappointment at missing this golden opportunity.

(5) *Japan's War of Attrition*

Attack off Colombo.

When war seems inevitable, but before it is declared, Japan takes time by the forelock and sends submarines towards the Red Sea to attack the enemy Fleet in the hope of reducing the disparity of strength between it and her own. Owing, however, to the difficulty of keeping in touch with Japan, the telegram saying that war is declared is not received until too late, and the commanding officer of one of our submarines has the exasperating experience of seeing the British Fleet steam by on its way east. He can do nothing but 'set his teeth and roll up his sleeves' in impotent rage.

After passing Sokotra, the British Fleet fights its way east through typical Indian Ocean weather, the destroyers and the lighter ships being tossed about like leaves. Ceylon is sighted in the dim light before dawn, and the tired crews heave a sigh of relief.

Some twenty aeroplanes go up from the Fleet, and destroyers are sent on ahead to search the approaches to the harbour for enemy submarines. At 0510 a W/T message from Colombo reports no sign of the enemy, and the reports from the aeroplanes and destroyers are to the same effect. The C.-in-C., Admiral Wilson, decides to go in, and after detailing a cruiser squadron and a destroyer flotilla for the necessary patrol outside, leads the Fleet, escorted by destroyers, straight for the entrance. The battle squadron, with *Nelson* and *Rodney* leading, is about 20,000 metres from the entrance when a submarine is sighted about 800 metres to one side of the line. She fires two torpedoes in quick succession. The Fleet at once alters course towards her to avoid them, but the range is too close, *Malaya* is hit and begins to heel over to starboard. Destroyers immediately rush to the spot whence the shots were fired, and aeroplanes come over to help in the search. The destroyers steam about all over the place dropping depth-charges, hoping to sink the submarine. After about thirty minutes, the C.-in-C. decides that the danger is past and orders the battle squadron to proceed into harbour.

The Japanese submarine is the cruiser I3, of 1955 tons displacement, with a surface speed of 17 knots. Her commanding officer has cleverly kept in touch with Japan through a Chinaman in Colombo, and has received the message that war has been declared. He has remained submerged for two days outside Colombo awaiting his opportunity. The increased activity in the air and on the surface of craft searching for submarines has given away the fact that the Fleet is expected.

The Fleet spends two days at Colombo completing its preparations for war, and on September 10 leaves for the Straits of Sunda. *Malaya* is left behind, and the most exhaustive precautions are taken on going out of harbour.

Another Japanese cruiser submarine, I4, is lying in wait off Dundra Head, expecting that the Fleet will round that point close in. But Admiral Wilson is taking no risks and keeps well out to sea.

British plans to force the Straits.

The question with which Admiral Wilson is now con-

fronted is that of forcing the Straits of Sunda. The most determined and persistent torpedo attacks are to be expected, and should the losses occasioned by them be heavy enough to deprive him of his superiority over the enemy Battle Fleet, the fate of Hongkong and Singapore will be sealed, and Australia and New Zealand will be endangered.

The first point he has to decide is whether to make the attempt in daylight or after dark. If made in daylight, his movements would be seen by the enemy, whose submarines could operate more freely and would be more likely to inflict serious damage. Darkness, on the other hand, by concealing his movements, would diminish the risk from submarines, but would facilitate attacks by surface craft, which, when delivered in the dark, might cause great confusion and even collisions in a large Fleet in narrow waters. Some loss is inevitable, and the difficulty of handling the Fleet in the dark, and of keeping its several units in touch, decides Admiral Wilson to make the attempt in the early morning.

The time being settled, it remains to see what may be done to make matters easier by diverting enemy forces and by getting command of the approaches to the strait. It would, for instance, be well if the enemy could be left in doubt as to which of the many straits will be forced. The passage, too, will be very dangerous unless the strait and its approaches on both sides are commanded on the sea and in the air. Admiral Wilson's plans are made accordingly.

Wilson gets information.

In the evening of September 14 Admiral Wilson, who is then some 200 miles west of Siberoet Island on the west coast of Sumatra, is met by two aeroplanes from Singapore with a detailed intelligence report. According to it, Singapore has been invested since the 7th ; heavy fighting continues ; the morale of the troops is excellent ; the garrison is determined to hold out till the Fleet arrives. Holland is still friendly, but a native rising followed the Japanese occupation of Brunei and Sarawak on the 5th. Dutch Borneo and the Celebes have already broken away from Dutch rule ; the Japanese have been stirring up the natives in Sumatra and Java, and both these islands are in open revolt. Nothing is

known of Admiral Mackeen's squadron, which may have been sunk.

The staff of the sorely tried Fleet is somewhat depressed by this report.

British attempts to confuse the Japanese.

To deceive the enemy and to facilitate the passage of the straits, Admiral Wilson sends one cruiser squadron to the western entrance to the Straits of Malacca and one to each of the Lombok and Allas Straits. Each is accompanied by aircraft to make it appear that the Fleet will follow it.

My readers will recall how, during the Russo-Japanese war, nothing was heard of the Baltic Fleet under Admiral Rozhestvenski after it left Honkoe Bay, in French Indo-China, for the north. Admiral Tōgō, who was waiting for it in Chinkai Bay, at the south-east corner of Korea, was in a quandary. It had not been sighted when the time that he had allowed for it to reach the Korean Strait had elapsed. He was beginning to think that it must have gone north about, and was on the point of taking his Fleet up to Hokkaidō when he got a report that a Russian transport had put into Wusung. Then, for the first time, he knew that the Russians were making for the Korean Strait, and he abandoned his intention of proceeding to Hokkaidō. But Admiral Rozhestvenski's strategy was, after all, very simple; all he did was to send one or two armed merchantmen round the Pacific side of Japan to create a diversion. But the ruse was too obvious and ordinary to induce us to alter our dispositions. If he had first taken his Fleet out into the Pacific and sent cruisers or armed merchantmen to our southwestern islands, to the Straits of Tsugaru and to the waters of Hokkaidō, he would have thrown us into such doubt and confusion that, had he then come through the Korean Strait, the battle of Tsushima might have been a very different story. Unfortunately, he had not the necessary genius and decision, and, after passing through the strait, encountered our whole Battle Fleet and, small wonder, was defeated.

Admiral Wilson, however, is well aware of all this, and, so as to puzzle the Japanese as much as possible, sends some of his cruisers to each of several different straits, while he keeps his Fleet at sea well to the westward of Sumatra.

BRITAIN NOT TO BE FEARED

Two days are devoted to these operations and then, 17th, the Admiral makes his attempt.

The Japanese not deceived.

However, our Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Su is no ordinary man easily to be led astray. He expects the enemy will attempt to deceive him, and has decided he will do. He realizes that the real object of the is to bring his Fleet to action and to destroy it, and they fail to do so Hongkong, Singapore, Australia, British Borneo will be at the mercy of the Japanese. He thinks it best to make the most of the geographical figuration of the islands and to induce the enemy to be in the position that suits him best. This position he chooses to be to the north of Banka Island. To reach it, the Fleet must come through the Sunda, Bali, Lombok, and Allas Straits. But the farther east the strait chosen, the longer the distance to be covered and the more numerous the opportunities for sporadic and surprise attack. The most direct route is through the Straits of Sunda, and the Admiral makes his plans on the assumption that the enemy will take it. He supplements them with an alternative route to provide against the possibility of their coming through the more easterly straits and attempting to reach Singapore via the Sunda and Java Seas. His plans receive the approval of the General Staff at the Navy Department.

Preliminary skirmishing.

On the 15th, British aircraft are seen approaching Sumatra, Java, and the Lesser Sundas to search for the Japanese aircraft. They go up to meet them and heavy fighting ensues. When the British approach, the Japanese attack them and drive them off to the southward.

Shortly afterwards the British destroyers accompany the cruisers appear off the several straits to which they have been sent and start to search them. The cruisers sent to the Straits of Malacca do not venture too far in, as it is too dangerous. At the Straits of Sunda, first of all the destroyers try to get through ; they are met by our flotillas and closely engaged. The covering cruisers on both sides come up, and a general action begins.

At the other straits, Japanese action is confined to the air and to that by submarines. British cruisers try to rush the Straits of Lombok, they are attacked by submarines and one is sunk.

While this skirmishing is going on, the British Battle Fleet has been proceeding to a position 100 miles due south of Java, which it reaches during the forenoon of the 16th. The move may have been a feint to make it appear that the intention is to pass through one of the straits to the eastward of Bali. At 1300 ships of war are sighted a very long way off, and are eventually made out to be the five 10,000-ton cruisers, the pick of the China Squadron, under Admiral Mackeen, who has so cleverly escaped from the ring put round him by the Japanese. They are quite unexpected and receive a great welcome from the whole Fleet.

Fight in the Straits of Sunda.

The main British Fleet reaches a position forty miles to the southward of Java Head at 0400 on the 17th, just before dawn, after steaming all night at high speed. Aircraft are sent on ahead to search the straits, and are met by Japanese. By about 0500, some hundred 'planes are in the air, all mixed up together like a flock of sparrows, some up high, some down low. An air-fight such as has never been seen before ensues : many 'planes come down, on land or in the sea, some have been shot down, others have been in collision.

A dozen or so British destroyers come up under the air-fight at full speed into the straits. They are met and engaged by similar numbers of more heavily armed Japanese destroyers from the north, who press them hard. British cruisers come up to their assistance and open a heavy fire, like a shower of hail, with their 6-inch guns. These, too, are met and engaged by Japanese cruisers.

Then four British 10,000-ton cruisers come up and open fire at long range with their 8-inch guns. The light cruiser *Ōi* is hit twice and severely damaged. She leaves the line and dashes at the British destroyers, to the admiration of both sides. On seeing this, five Japanese 10,000-ton cruisers come up in support.

The action, which is very hot and determined, extends from Princes Island, at the southern entrance, to the

narrowest part of the straits. The craft engaged range from the big 10,000-ton cruisers to tiny aeroplanes : their numbers steadily increase till they so encumber the straits that the Japanese are at a disadvantage, being unable to manœuvre. They retire to the northward in face of superior numbers, followed by the British, who press home their attacks.

The first British ships to get through are four 10,000-ton cruisers, who are followed by destroyers. But the three Japanese battle-cruisers are waiting for them and give them a hot reception. *Cornwall* and *Suffolk* are put out of action and two destroyers are sunk. After them come three light cruisers, followed by four others. They come under heavy 8-inch fire from the big Japanese cruisers : some are put out of action and others, heavily damaged by torpedo attacks, are run ashore on the island of Sumatra.

On seeing that his cruisers have got through, Admiral Wilson decides to take the main body of his Fleet through. He sends a cruiser squadron on ahead, followed by flotillas to clear the approaches of submarines by dropping depth-charges. These are followed by eight 10,000-ton cruisers in open formation, and last by the battle squadrons escorted by destroyers on all sides.

As the battle squadrons come into the narrowest part of the straits they are attacked by destroyers on both sides. Some of these are sunk by gunfire, some are put out of action, but they push on, determined to drive their attacks home at all costs and ram if may be. One flotilla comes on after the other, regardless of the heavy fire from the British destroyers and cruisers, strenuously endeavouring to close the battle squadrons. Cruisers and destroyers are mixed up all over the strait, and just when the fighting is at its hottest, two Japanese submarines come up, one on either side of the battle squadrons, at about 500 metres. They both fire torpedoes and the battle squadrons immediately alter course to avoid them. Another submarine comes up a few hundred metres astern and also fires. *Warspite* and *Revenge* are hit, begin to heel over, and make for the shore. The battle squadrons are thrown into confusion, some ships turning to port and others to starboard, and *Royal Sovereign* and *Repulse* collide. The latter is holed on her starboard quarter, makes water rapidly, and leaves the line.

Several Japanese destroyers take advantage of this confusion to attempt a torpedo attack, but they are prevented by British destroyers. More fighting at close range occurs and several destroyers collide and sink.

By 1000 the British battle squadrons have managed to fight their way through the straits into the Java Sea and are proceeding northwards. A long way ahead of them, the Japanese battle-cruisers are engaging the British cruiser squadrons at long range. Astern of these destroyer and cruiser actions continue. A lively air battle is going on overhead.

Night action off Billiton Island.

The Japanese squadrons gradually draw away to the northward, leading the British towards the narrow passage between Banka and Billiton Islands, hoping to be able to spring a night attack on them there. But the British are alive to this possibility and shape their course for Singapore, passing to the west [*sic*] of Billiton. To provide against this contingency, the Japanese have stationed submarines along the route and have detailed flotillas to deliver night attacks.

At about 1700 the Japanese battle-cruiser squadron, which has passed to the east of Billiton, is out of sight, and the leading squadron of the British Fleet, consisting of large cruisers, is about ten miles to the south of that island, proceeding north-east.

At sunset the Japanese destroyers dash up to attack. But conditions are very different from those of the Straits of Sunda. Here, there is plenty of room to manœuvre, and the British destroyers drive the Japanese off by a well-executed counter-attack.

At dawn on the 18th the British Fleet is some eighty miles to the north-west of Billiton Island, proceeding north-west. There it encounters another submarine, who fires a torpedo but misses.

(6) *The Final Action*

The 18th dawns clear with good visibility, and Admiral Wilson decides that he has sufficient strength, in spite of his losses on the previous day, to engage the enemy in a decisive

action, as he had intended originally. A great deal is at stake : if he wins, all will be well, he will be able to retake Hongkong and to relieve Singapore. If he loses, Japan will be able to do as she likes in the Pacific and Britain will be unable to interfere until such time as she can return with increased forces and destroy the Japanese Fleet. With this heavy responsibility upon him, Admiral Wilson is determined to fight to the last ship and the last man. To convey this determination to his officers and men, he repeats by W/T the signal that Nelson flew at his masthead before Trafalgar.

He considers that his best plan will be to draw the enemy Fleet, which he takes to be to the northward of him, as much towards Singapore as possible. For then he will have the assistance of the local flotillas and aircraft, and will be near a dockyard where his damaged ships can be repaired.

On the other hand, the Japanese Admiral Suenaga wants to entice the British to the northward, to deliver a final submarine attack on them off the Anamba and Natuna Islands, and then to engage them in a decisive action. In any case, they must be kept away from Singapore, and he decides to get between them and that place.

Air battle begins.

One of the first conditions of victory in a modern sea-fight is to gain command of the air. So, as day dawns, each side sends up aircraft to scout and to drive off those of the other side. Air-fights occur between the different flights all over the place, in different volumes. Above, the air is full of the roar of engines and the rattle of machine-guns. The 'planes, flying about like winged demons,* come under continuous high-angle fire from the carriers and cruisers below. Some collide, some come down, some dive under the enemy formations to engage them with machine-gun fire from below. An awful spectacle of human slaughter !

The Japanese being near their own bases and having occupied British Borneo, are able to send up large numbers

* The reference is to a demon Asura, of Indian and Buddhist mythology, who is continually fighting the others. He is depicted as having three heads.—Translator.

of 'planes. The British, having come 10,000 miles, have only those that they have brought with them in their carriers and the few that have come out from Singapore. The Japanese have, therefore, the advantage of numbers and overwhelm the British, who are reluctantly forced down.

Cruiser action.

A cruiser action takes place at the same time as the air-fight, between a British squadron of five 10,000-ton cruisers, which is ahead of the Fleet, and a Japanese squadron of four similar cruisers and two *Kakos*. The two squadrons are equally matched in gun-power, but the Japanese are at a tactical disadvantage. The action begins with occasional salvos at very long range, and the two squadrons close to about 25,000 metres. The huge projectiles leave a strange moaning sound in the air. Some fall short, some over, and all send up great spouts of foam. An occasional flash followed by a burst of yellow smoke indicates a hit. A turret is knocked out here, a great hole appears in a ship's side there, some ships have made so much water that they cannot keep station. After the action has continued for some thirty minutes both sides have suffered considerably, but as *Kodaka* is sinking and *Kako* is in a bad way, the Japanese appear to have come off worse. Vice-Admiral Satō, in command of the battle-cruiser squadron, on seeing that the Japanese cruisers are hard pressed, rushes up with his three *Kongōs*. He crosses the T of the British squadron and inflicts heavy punishment on it. *Berwick* drops astern and *London* draws out of line with a heavy list to port. Another British cruiser squadron, of four large cruisers, which has been engaged at long range with a similar Japanese squadron, now comes up at full speed to assist the first. But it, too, comes under heavy fire from the Japanese battle-cruisers and has to fall back on its Battle Fleet. It is pursued by the Japanese squadrons, who keep it under fire. *Hood* and *Renown* come up at full speed, and from then on the two battle-cruiser squadrons hold the stage. The British two carry heavier metal than the *Kongos*, and Admiral Satō, in accordance with the plan to entice the enemy to the northward, gradually edges away, taking the cruiser squadron with him. The British give chase.

About this time Admiral Wilson, who is a long way to the southward, learns from his aircraft that the Japanese Battle Fleet is about 200 miles to the south of the Anambas. He tells Vice-Admiral Sampson, in command of the battle-cruiser squadron, to proceed to the north-west and to lead the enemy towards Singapore. The Vice-Admiral complies, taking with him a squadron of large cruisers. The Japanese battle-cruiser and cruiser squadrons respond by altering course sixteen points and opening fire. The opposing squadrons circle round each other, both sides manœuvring, Admiral Satō to lead the action to the north, Admiral Sampson to lead it to the north-west. This gives the covering Battle Fleets time to close.

Daylight destroyer attack.

The first thing that happens as the two Battle Fleets approach the scene of the battle-cruiser action is a massed attack by Japanese flotillas. These have hitherto been engaged in fighting the enemy flotillas or in escorting their own Battle Fleet. On sighting the British Battle Fleet, they rush up to attack it, hoping to reduce its numerical superiority and to throw it into confusion. They are determined to push their attack home regardless of loss and of the attempts of the enemy cruisers and flotillas to drive them off. Some destroyers even ram their opponents and sacrifice themselves to clear the way for their opposite numbers. The escorting cruisers are actuated by the same spirit; they closely engage the British cruisers, sacrificing themselves to clear the way for their destroyers. Their gallantry and daring leave even the British at a loss what to do, and give the others opportunity to close the British Battle Fleet from ahead and from both sides. They come under a perfect hail of projectiles, and the sea, covered with thousands of 'splashes', presents a wonderful sight. The valour of our destroyers passes belief: their crews are supermen. No matter how many are sunk, the rest will go on, determined to close the enemy and torpedo him.

While this attack is in progress, British destroyers are, in similar fashion, attacking the Japanese Battle Fleet, with similar determination and similar disregard of loss, but, assuredly, not with equally desperate valour.

Battle Fleet action.


All this time the Battle Fleets have gradually been approaching one another. Admiral Suenaga, observing the distress of the British and the disorder into which they have been thrown by the gallant attack of his destroyer flotillas, decides to abandon his original plan to lead them northward, and to engage them then and there.

He has learned from his aircraft that the enemy's capital ships have been reduced to seven in number. He proposes, after getting within range, to deliver another destroyer attack and to take advantage of the ensuing disorder to close and fight to a finish.

Fire is opened at about 30,000 metres. The range closes, and each Fleet starts manœuvring to cross the T of the other. Fire is concentrated on the flagships, *Mutsu* and *Nelson*, *Hyūga* and *Royal Sovereign*. Turrets are knocked out, great holes blown in the ships' sides, upper-works and superstructures shot away, fires break out and are with difficulty extinguished. The other ships also are damaged. The battering effect of the projectiles shows the power of modern science: it is enough to cow even the most hardened fighters.

Each side continues to manœuvre to get into a position from which it can concentrate its fire on the other. The range is continually opening and closing. Neither Fleet attempts to proceed in any definite direction. Presently, just when *Nelson* is leading the British Fleet in to close the range, Rear-Admiral Iwanaga sees his opportunity. He is in command of the fourth division of destroyers and has been waiting some distance ahead of the Japanese Battle Fleet. He has lost half his ships on the previous day, but none the less gallantly dashes in to attack at close quarters. He comes under heavy fire from the covering British flotillas, but his destroyers push on determined not to draw off until the last torpedo has been fired and then, when nothing else remains, to do what they can to ram their enemies. In spite of severe losses, they achieve the signal success of torpedoing *Resolution*, who is seen to draw out of line.

It is about 1700 and will soon be dark. The loss of *Resolution*, added to the losses in cruisers and destroyers that he has sustained the previous day, decides Admiral Wilson to break off the action and to make for Singapore, which



JAPANESE SUBMARINE—"KAIGUN" TYPE

is not now far distant. He gives orders accordingly, and the whole Fleet proceeds in that direction, cruisers and destroyers forming a screen, as usual, against torpedo attacks.

The Japanese Battle Fleet immediately gives chase. But the pursuit lacks persistence, and Admiral Matsue is severely criticized afterwards for failing to finish off his victory. He eventually has to resign his high office as Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Combined Fleet. He hesitated to follow the enemy too close in to Singapore on account of the submarines stationed there. Official reports published later on showed that two submarines only were based on Singapore. One was away, having been sent down to the Straits of Sunda, and the other had had a breakdown which she had not had time to repair and was out of action. Had the Japanese Battle Fleet persisted in its pursuit, it would have achieved a far greater success.

The British get in at nightfall and the Japanese retire to Sandakan in Borneo, leaving one cruiser squadron and one destroyer flotilla to watch the approaches to Singapore.

Result of the fight.

Since the Great War, all nations have devoted themselves to increasing the offensive power of their ships of war, armour and protection have been secondary considerations. The damage done in the fight just described was very much greater than had generally been expected. Of the British heavy ships, there remained only *Rodney*, *Ramillies*, *Renown*, and two 10,000-ton cruisers. The rest had either been sunk or had run to neutral ports very severely damaged. Of the light cruisers and destroyers, only a few were left. And of all these, not one was fit to go into action again without extensive repairs, beyond the power of Singapore to carry out.

On the Japanese side, *Mutsu* was damaged beyond hope of going into action again. *Nagato*, *Ise*, *Haruna*, and *Kirishima*, with two 10,000-ton cruisers, were left, but, like their opponents, all severely damaged. Five small cruisers and a dozen or so destroyers were fit for service : enough to enable the Japanese to blockade Singapore.

The Forcing of the Straits of Sunda.

After the war Admiral Wilson was adversely criticized for taking the heavy risk of forcing the Straits of Sunda. It was said that by so doing he lost the war. But is this correct? It may be that he could have avoided, or greatly reduced, the risk by going farther east. It might have been better to try the passage between Timor and Tenimber,* or the wide channel between Tenimber and the Aru Islands. But even if he had succeeded in getting through one of these without appreciable loss, he would still have had to cross the Java and Sunda Seas and to pass to the eastward of Billiton Island, if he wished to bring the Japanese Fleet to action. The distance is 1500 miles, and he would have had to steam for three days and nights through a narrow belt 1500 miles long. During the whole of that time he would have been subjected to continual torpedo attacks, which the number of small islands would have greatly facilitated and which would, in all probability, have inflicted heavy loss upon him.

Risk is an inevitable accompaniment of war. The best way to lessen it is to attack the enemy unawares, to put fear into his heart with unlooked-for audacity, and, above all, to be swift and to strike home by the shortest path.

It may be that forcing the Straits of Sunda meant heavier material losses. But when the moral loss and the disadvantage of going into action with crews who have been, for many days, under long and continued strain is taken into consideration, it is only fair to say that there is not much to choose between the two alternatives.

However, unless the British Fleet has not got as far as the Indian Ocean at the outbreak of war, I think that a sea-fight in the South China Sea will end in a draw, or in a victory for Japan like that just described. Further, on account of the great distance from their Home ports at which the British would have to fight, and in view of the fact that Singapore can never be a really first-class dockyard, a drawn fight would amount to a victory for Japan.

This is a considered conclusion with which every student of the art of war will agree. Therefore, so long as

* Also called Timor Laut.—Translator.

Japan chooses the right moment for her first act of war, she need have little to fear from England.

The British people ought to realize that this is so, and if in spite of it they persist in provoking Japan, they will only have themselves to thank for the consequences.

CHAPTER XIII

WAKE UP, PEOPLE OF ENGLAND !

(1) *England in Crisis*

The affairs of England are in crisis.

DURING the nineteenth century the flood-tide of industrial revolution and of free trade carried England to a position in which she virtually ruled the world, but which she can hardly continue to occupy much longer. She was the industrial, financial, and commercial centre of the world, but America and other countries have deprived her of her supremacy. She was the centre of a world-wide Colonial Empire, but now she is hard put to it to retain her hold on her Self-governing Dominions, Canada, Australia, South Africa, and India.

These are her great difficulties : these are the reasons of her crisis.

England behind the times.

England's bountiful supplies of coal and iron, her abundant capital, her cheap production and the ability of her people enabled her to ignore the competition of other countries, she had nothing to fear from them. As long as coal and steam remained the motive power of industry, as long as trade was free, as long as socialistic legislation did not interfere with the costs of labour, so long she remained the one master country of the world. But the Great War proved a turning point, since when all this has changed. The motive power of industry is oil and electricity, instead of coal and steam. Trade is free no longer, all countries have adopted protection and are striving to form economic blocks. Socialistic legislation in England is interfering with

wages, raising the costs of production and increasing unemployment. And, while the English in their careless way have gone on saying to themselves, 'It will all come right in time', the world has gone on steadily changing. England has fallen behind the times.

Iron, coal, and oil.

Let us consider iron, coal, and oil. As the French critic Michelet put it, England's great masses of coal and iron enabled her to rule the world. But a few years before the Great War the foundations of her supremacy began to crumble. Between 1900 and 1903 America and Germany doubled their outputs of iron and steel, while England increased hers by 20 per cent only. Of coal, while the output of Britain rose a bare 30 per cent, that of America was more than doubled. This tendency was much more pronounced after the Great War, when British output dropped like 'a bucket down a well'. And at the same time heavy oil and hydro-electric power were eating their way into the province of coal. England is deficient in water-power and has to import her heavy oil. Her future does not look bright, especially as she has to compete with America all over the world.

Free trade in difficulties.

So long as England's coal and iron dominated the world, free trade was the most suitable fiscal system for her. She has never been able to exist as a separate and isolated unit, the life and prosperity of her people have always been bound up with that of other countries. The whole of her business is built up on trade. Her industries are closely affected by the international situation, to flourish they require cheap labour and big exports, neither of which can be obtained by a policy of protection. The protectionists say that if England had not adopted free trade she would have been a self-supporting country long before now, and would not have suffered so much during the Great War from shortage of materials. This salvo of facts has silenced the free-traders. Further, the spirit of nationalism and the desire to become self-supporting have spread all over the world and have grown in intensity since the Great War. They have led to

tariff wars, which have left all ideas of free trade far behind and, combined with other causes, have had a very adverse effect on British overseas trade. The post-War balance of British trade has been heavily on the import side. The value of imports exceeded that of exports by £276,000,000 (74 per cent) in 1921, and by £382,000,000 (69 per cent) in 1929. Allowing for invisible exports, this means that England has been paying out at the rate of about £200,000,000 per annum. Exports themselves have fallen off, and in 1929 were but 80 per cent of what they were before the War. No wonder England is showing signs of distress.

Out-of-date industry.

One must not, however, overlook the fact that one of the causes of the industrial depression in England is that she persists in following her antiquated methods. As everyone knows, novelties like motor-cars, radio sets, phonographs, electrical apparatus, cinematograph fittings, and sports gear are at present in very great demand all over the world. But England's manufacturing plant and technique are out of date, she is being surpassed by America and Germany and driven out of the world's markets. Manchester finds so much difficulty in competing with our cotton goods for the same reason.

The following figures for the output of machinery in 1913 and 1925 show what is happening :

				1913 Per cent	1925 Per cent
America	50	57.1
Germany	20.6	19.6
England	11.8	11.6

In actual fact, since 1920 America has been the factory of the world and Germany has outstripped England. What else can be expected from British factories whose antiquated equipment renders them incapable of mass-production. America can pay high wages and keep down costs because of the high efficiency of her equipment, and that is why she, and others, are outstripping England.

Financial depression.

Similar changes have occurred in financial matters. New York has taken London's place as the money market of the world, and London has lost its power of investing money abroad. Before the Great War America was a debtor country, England alone having 3,500,000,000 dollars invested there. Now the position is reversed. Up to 1932 England paid America annually about 165,000,000 dollars on account of war debts, and from 1933 to 1984 she will be paying 185,000,000 dollars. Of recent years America has invested abroad three or four times as much as England, and has already deprived her of her financial supremacy.

Relations with Dependencies and Dominions.

What has been said above indicates why England is gradually losing her lead outside the Empire. Within it, her relations with her Self-governing Dominions and Dependencies are a source of trouble, which may, like a cancer, cause its dismemberment.

I have already described how India and Egypt incline to separation. The same tendency, different only in degree, is to be found in the Irish Free State. But the trouble does not end there : great barriers are growing up between England and her children—Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa. These Self-governing Dominions were originally Dependencies. They had no say in naval or military matters or in foreign affairs, except that they were free to decide for themselves whether they would join in any commercial agreement that England might make. But since the Great War their position has altered, they have become England's sisters and stand to her and to one another in the same relation as the states of a confederacy.

The new Magna Carta.

At the Imperial Conference in 1926 there was a further change. The Self-governing Dominions were regarded as the equals of England, and as independent except in so far as all alike owed allegiance to one King. Their status was raised and their limits of competence widened. England ceased to have any right to interfere in their government,

and they were granted a much greater say in foreign affairs. Resolutions to this effect were passed at the Conference and embodied in a New Magna Carta, of which the chief points were :

- (i) England and the Dominions are self-governing communities.
- (ii) All are members of the British Empire.
- (iii) Each has the same right to manage its home and foreign affairs, none is dependent.
- (iv) All alike bind themselves to be loyal to the King.
- (v) Their Union is the British Commonwealth of Nations, and its spirit is the principle of self-government.

Theory and practice.

Theory and practice, however, do not always go together. The relations between England and her Dominions are no exception. Legally they may be equal and independent, in fact they are far from it. M. André Siegfried has put the matter very clearly in his book, *England's Crisis*. He says :

The Dominions all acknowledge the British tie and allegiance to the Crown, but with varying degrees of enthusiasm. Australia and New Zealand are faithful by sentiment, but also by self-interest ; Canada is loyal at heart, but independent in attitude and geographically American ; South Africa is divided and doubtful in its attachment. Whatever these feelings may amount to, the unity of the system is maintained by sentiment, and even more by acquiescence in the fact that they are all part of the same Empire—this last is a force which foreigners are apt to neglect or underestimate.

Coinciding with this acquiescence is an intransigent desire for independence in each of the Dominions, though its expression and tone vary considerably. In spite of the minorities who are passionately British and deplore these tendencies, Canada and South Africa never miss an opportunity of proclaiming their independence, having it publicly stated, acknowledged, and increased. Australia, too, likes to have her independence acknowledged, but she willingly accommodates herself to the existing state of affairs. Only New Zealand is completely satisfied. This brief review indicates the geographical distribution of both the conservative and progressive schools of thought.

When England is confronted with her youthful partners, who have now come of age and have lost even their feelings of deference towards her, she finds herself appealing to a most incongruous set of loyalties. Economic interest, however, is always there, and where the Dominions rely almost entirely on England as a market for their export trade, they are bound to her by an exceedingly solid tie. It is in England that New Zealand finds 78.9 per cent of her overseas customers, South Africa 54.4 per cent. Australia, on the other hand, with 40.7 per cent, Canada with 35.4 per cent, are less exclusively tied down, although these proportions are heavy. The British market gives them all an ideal outlet for their raw materials. Canada and Australia export their wheat ; Australia and New Zealand their meat ; Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa their wool. Except for Canada, which is steadily exporting more manufactured goods, the Dominions are all complementary to an industrialized Great Britain, and this even applies to Canada in so far as she, too, sells raw materials.

Another factor of economic dependence, no less important, is that the Empire finds in the Mother Country its main source of capital, for when the Dominion Governments wish to borrow they naturally turn to London. Canada has been completely absorbed in the American orbit, having now only 11 per cent of her public debt placed in England, but the proportion for Australia, on the other hand, is 48 per cent, for New Zealand 56 per cent, and for South Africa 61 per cent. Australia, though practically in default in 1930, was still able to carry on financially through the help of the City.

Let us not be misled by the solicitous attitude that England often adopts in Imperial discussions. By habit now deeply ingrained, she invariably gives way to her partners' demands without seriously attempting to teach them the reality and the extent of their responsibilities, though they badly need the lesson. The result is that the Mother Country—if such we may still call her—is apt to play the rôle of a reticent old partner who is on the defensive, while the Dominions talk big, insinuate, and dogmatize in a fashion that they themselves would never tolerate for a moment.*

Attitude of the Colonies to the British Empire Economic Block.

To strengthen some of the weak links in the chain that binds England to her colonies, a conference was held at

* *England's Crisis*. André Siegfried. Tr. by H. H. Hemming and Doris Hemming. Pp. 187-192.

[References to Ireland and India have been omitted.—Translator.]

Ottawa in July 1932, and it was proposed to form a British Empire Economic Block. Up to that time England's policy had been that of Free Trade, and she had had no exclusive markets of her own, like America and Germany, who had adopted Protection. As, however, her industries were declining and the markets were being invaded by others, she decided to try the economic block system to provide herself with closed markets. She invited the co-operation of all members of the Empire in supporting her textile industries, and proposed that they should grant increased preference to British goods and that the duties imposed should be specific instead of *ad valorem*. Resolutions designed to protect the wool, cloth, and iron industries were passed. And, in fact, a uniform tariff policy was agreed upon.

But there were many obstacles and difficulties in the way of translating these principles into practice.

So long as England's relations with her Dominions were those of an industrial with an agricultural country, co-operation was possible, but they were rapidly ceasing to be so. The Dominions were prepared to put England before a foreign country, but not before themselves. Canada had openly adopted the slogan, 'Canada first', and in this respect the others were not far behind her.

A question at issue has been the decline in the amount of wheat exported from Canada to England since the Ottawa Conference. All the Dominions have their own interests to consider, and harmonious co-ordination of the whole is extremely difficult.

The relations between England and the Self-governing Dominions, and between the Dominions themselves are so complicated that the resolutions of the Ottawa Conference do not fulfil the fundamental requirements of an economic block.

Father and sons.

As M. Siegfried has so well put it, England and the Self-governing Dominions are like a father and his sons who have married and set up for themselves. The sons will not allow the old man any say in the family affairs. They are jealous of each other's success. The father is proud of the way they have got on, and never tires of saying 'Look what I've done !'

Most old gentlemen, with the ripe experience of their seventy odd years behind them, don't make a fuss when they find their sons supplanting them.*

But with England it is different : there the father, for all that his sons pay no attention to anything he says, is always referring to the trouble he has had in bringing his children up, and persists in trying to enforce his parental authority.

This describes very well one of England's many difficulties. She is, as it were, at the edge of a precipice and a single false step will take her over the edge.

(2) *A Matter of Life and Death for Japan*

England is already on the down grade : Japan has started on the up grade.

The two come into collision because England is trying to hold on to what she has, while Japan must perforce expand.

Territorial possessions and natural resources England has in abundance, she can afford to relinquish some. Japan has neither, and to her they are a matter of life and death.

Japan's policy in the Far East.

What, then, is Japan's policy in the Far East ? In a word, she aims at national safety and prosperity, and hopes to secure for her people the means of livelihood. Peace in the Far East is essential to her and it is her duty to maintain it. Manchuria is of vital importance for defence on the continent and to secure the economic independence that she desires. So long as Russia hovers a mysterious spectre in the north, Manchuria is an essential outpost of defence and stands to Japan much as Belgium stands to England. Japan's population is increasing very rapidly, her area is strictly limited, her sources of supply are poor. Without colonies and emigration on a large scale she cannot attain to economic independence and cannot secure to her people the means of livelihood. Raw materials and markets are

* This passage will, perhaps, be more clearly understood if it is remembered that it is a common practice in Japan for the old men to retire, not only from business, but from the management of family affairs.—Translator.

essential. It is as a source of supply and as a market that Manchuria is so important to her.

But for all its importance, Manchuria alone is not enough : with it alone Japan cannot go on. There are, at the present day, many shallow but persistent talkers who would have us make expansion on the continent of Asia the keynote of our policy, who see in Manchuria our only hope of salvation, who are bemused with such fine phrases as self-determination, independence, our own ring-fence, and who will have nothing of compromise or agreement. So long as these so-called patriots obtain credence among us, we are riding for a fall. We must take a wider view and not think that Manchuria alone can secure the future for us. We must look farther out into the wide world, and we must not forget that our future prosperity lies on the sea.

The rapid advance made by Japanese goods in all parts of the world is not due solely to the fact that we are strong in war. It is evidence that in peace as well our race can win its victories. We may open up Manchuria and it may suffice for a while, for twenty or for thirty years, but as time goes on our prosperity will depend more and more on what we do farther afield.

That we may adopt a policy of economic development on and across the sea we must, in amity with other countries, advance under the banner of peace, of mutual prosperity, of the Open Door. Under this just and righteous flag we must rouse all peoples to cease to think racially and exclusively. This must be the basis of Japan's foreign policy : this is her great duty to the world.

The Japanese people must take wider views and abandon the narrow outlook that has actuated them ever since the Manchurian affair.

The Manchurian affair and foreign countries.

Manchuria is of such importance to Japan, that when the Chinese upset all her commercial arrangements there and showed no regard for the safety of the lives and property of her subjects, matters assumed a most serious aspect. China's disregard of our reasonable contentions, and her evident intention to drive us out of Manchuria, have been enough to rouse our indignation, apart from the murder

of Lieutenant Nakamura. The unfortunate affair of September 18 was the result.

Disputes are a disease of international life, the cause of them is the unhealthy state of international relations. For a sick human being there are two treatments, internal and external. The corresponding treatments for the ills of international life are the methods of peace and the extreme measure of war. In most cases the peaceful method of treatment is successful, but in some, war alone can give relief. China is an exceptional country, and our troubles with her are of the latter kind.

Japan maintained in the affair with China that morality was the basis of international relations : that without it Treaties were impossible : that her mission was to keep the peace in the Far East : that her struggle in defence of international justice was in accord with the highest principles of international morality and in conformity with the dictates of law : that the real object of the No-War Pact was to bring peace to the whole world : that the aim of the Covenant of the League was to encourage international co-operation in establishing the peace of the world : that China was anti-foreign, inclined to turn Red, and in a state of disorder : that her efforts to correct these faults had been made on behalf of the whole world and not solely to advance her own interests : that the object of the Nine Power Treaty was to maintain peace in the Far East, to preserve the integrity of China, and to protect the trade of the Powers, and that her action was taken with the same object.

She argued, further, that the Far Eastern question could not be solved by legal arguments and by insisting on the close observance of a set of rules. If peace was to be maintained, the main purport of the Treaty must be kept in sight and not lost behind a mass of arguments about procedure.

No country could deny that these contentions were both fair and honourable.

But when we come to Japan's action, we find that what her soldiers did was not in accord with what her diplomats said, and that she frequently found herself misunderstood by other Powers. Her military action went farther than was necessary. While she was evidently carrying

on a war, she persisted in arguing that she was not. She tried to justify her action by describing China as a country without any effective Government. When she signed the No-War Pact, she made no reservations as to Manchuria, she waited until something happened and then refused to allow any other country to intervene. All these were weak points, any one of which was sufficient to involve her in difficulties. But Japan was hemmed in on all sides and the matter was one of life and death for her. Let those who criticize her remember that.

Every country has made its mistakes, and it is not surprising that Japan should have done so in her desperate position. The Japanese are a sensitive and clever people; they may for a time be influenced by fashion or impressed by power and lose their judgment. But after a while they regain it, they recollect themselves and return to the right path, for among them are many whose ideas are both moderate and sound. Water runs downhill and out on to the sands, where it sinks in and loses all semblance of a stream, but in the end it reaches the sea and spreads over half the globe. Human beings whose ideas are moderate and sound are much the same. At times they are as quiet as a grove of trees and to a blusterer may even seem craven-hearted. But quietness does not necessarily imply weakness, it may be the outcome of confidence in ultimate victory. National security is not based on force, but, I truly believe, on mutual trust between peoples.

It is all a question of time, which may bring its own solution. Foreigners should try really to understand the Japanese. Before the nations of the West condemn her, let them examine themselves.

Justice for all the world.

Let these nations consider whether the basis on which they hope to establish world peace is sound or not. Unless they build on the principle of justice for all, they are doomed to disappointment. Justice for all means allowing all peoples equally to enjoy the world's natural resources, throwing open the world's markets and finding a way along which all alike may pass to prosperity. Peace that is not thus founded on justice is but a house built upon the sand.

But what are they doing today? Every country, great

and small without distinction, has built its fence and set up its great notice-board, 'Strangers not Admitted' !

If they really desire world peace, they must first reform and, above all, do away with racial discrimination and social inequality. In closing their eyes to this fundamental fact, and in trying to establish peace by international discussions and formal Treaties, they confuse cause with effect.

I repeat that Manchuria is of vital importance to Japan, but its economic value will last but twenty or thirty years. As a source of supply and as a market it will not be sufficient for all time. Japan must look to the sea for her future prosperity. If peace is to be preserved in the Pacific, she will, in the future, have to have other outlets for her population and other markets for her goods. She cannot get them without international justice.

Of all countries, England is best placed to give us what we want. But if she will not recognize that we are placed as we are and attempts to thwart us in Manchuria, or if, further, she directly provokes us, or stirs up others to do so, war is inevitable.

The chances of victory and defeat in such a war have been discussed in a previous chapter. But what has either side to gain ? This I will consider now.

(3) *Wake Up, People of England !*

Countries when they go to war all too frequently think solely of victories, of winning battles ; they do not stop to consider what they have to gain by them or what the effects of the war may be. That is why so many vain and fruitless wars are recorded in history.

America, France, Russia, and China want Japan and England to fight.

An Anglo-Japanese war would turn to the advantage of America, of France, of Italy, of Russia, and of China, so much so that all of them would like to see it. For a war which left these two champions exhausted would leave the others in a stronger position than before without any effort on their part.

The Russian attitude has already been explained. The

fall of England would be as a godsend to America, her chief competitor, for it would leave her mistress of the world at no expense to herself.

If England were defeated, or left unable to recover for many years, France and Italy would have Europe at their feet, which is just what they most desire.

There is no need to repeat what China would gain.

In other words, such a war would have the twofold effect of eliminating both Japan and England from among the Great Powers and of raising the status of the others.

Well, then, what has either Japan or England to gain?

If England wins.

Much of what I have said in my earlier book, *Japan Against the World*, when I discussed what America would gain if she won, applies to an Anglo-Japanese war in which England wins.

A victorious England would, we may imagine, demand that Japan renounced her policy and relinquished her rights in Manchuria, returned Port Arthur and Dalny, turned over the South Manchurian Railway to England and America, withdrew all troops stationed in China and refrained from further military activity in that country. By this means England would be able firmly to secure her privileged position in China and positively to give effect to the Anglo-American policy of the Open Door. As a further step, she might give Korea independence and divide the southern half of Saghalien with America.

What would be the result?

Japan's population is increasing at the rate of about 700,000 a year. Unless she were made to adopt a compulsory system of birth-control, or were given the colonies and the raw materials and capital that she lacks, there would be another and possibly a world war in a few years' time. Compulsory birth-control is easier said than done, and if Japan were driven out of Manchuria, Korea, and Saghalien, it is as clear as day that, with her population and her insufficient resources, it would not be long before she had to draw her sword and stand up to fight for her life.

To forestall further wars, a third and even a fourth, to prevent Manchuria and Korea from becoming a second Alsace-Lorraine, to remove, in fact, the root of the evil,

would it not be far wiser to allow Japan to continue her policy in Manchuria and to retain her rights there, and in this way to secure British interests in China and a real Open Door? And, as a further precaution, to throw open part of Australia to Japanese immigration?

Were the matter dealt with in this way there would be no need to appeal to the sword : an appeal that would be made at incalculable cost and would leave some third party to collect the 'fisherman's gains'.

If England refuses to see the very evident justice of this contention and goes to war with Japan, she will have to be prepared, if, as we are supposing, she wins, for reprisals, for a third, a fourth, and possibly a world war.

As a precaution against a war of reprisal, she might deprive Japan of the Pescadores, of Formosa, and of the chain of islands between it and Japan, of the Ogasawara Islands (Bonins), and of the mandate for the Pacific Islands north of the equator. She might take these herself, or share them, or their mandate, with America. To keep Japan shut in she might make some of these islands as nearly as possible impregnable. As a further step, she might possess herself of the oil-fields in the southern half of Saghalien, or she might take over the part of guardian of China.

But what would England gain by taking over the mandate for the Pacific Islands? They are of no economic value : they are over-populated : they could only be of strategic value.

To make the Pescadores, Formosa, the Loo Choos, or the Ogasawara Islands impregnable would be to threaten the Philippines and Guam, and would get England into difficulties with America.

In other words, there would be more danger than ever of war in the Far East, where the situation would be greatly complicated.

The result of the attempts at the Paris Peace Conference to place restrictions on Germany shows very clearly what would happen if England were to act as outlined above. The war to end wars seems like enough to have been a war to make other wars. To attempt to repress the activity of a spirited and rising nation is more likely to cause war than to prevent it. For England to exploit her victory to bind Japan hand and foot and to check her expansion and pro-

gress would be but to repeat the mistake made by the Allies in dealing with Germany.

England could not expect to get an indemnity from Japan. To attempt to extort one by force would, again, be to repeat the Allies' mistake. I am sure England has had enough of that !

England, America, and China.

There would be more troubles in store for a victorious England. As has been explained before, her interests clash with those of America. The world is not big enough for two great heroes ; that is the teaching of history. Japan is as a wedge, preventing the two from coming into actual collision. If the Japanese Navy were destroyed, no one would have the casting vote. The two countries would be left directly confronting each other, and a fierce struggle for the mastery would ensue.

Again, if England should win, China would be more intractable than ever and her anti-foreign movement would be turned against England, who would suffer again the pain of disillusionment. If China makes trouble, Japan is near enough to send an expedition to teach her a lesson. England is in a very different position, and one need not be an expert to see what would happen.

If Japan wins.

If Japan should win, what then ? In a word, the collapse of the British Empire.

Let us take India first. If England went to war with Japan, she would try her time-worn trick of promising the Indians independence if they sided with her. But now they have learned far too much to be taken in. They would ignore her offer and seize the opportunity to take for themselves the independence they so greatly desire. If England were defeated, India would break away from her, nothing is more certain. England would then lose her vital treasure house.

Next, England would lose her markets in China, which have figured so largely in her fortunes, she may be sure of that. She would have to cede Hongkong to Japan, and that would undermine the very foundations of her China trade.

But more serious than all else, Australia and New

Zealand would pass into Japanese hands. After destroying the British Fleet in the battle of the South China Sea, Japan would at once send expeditions to both those places and capture them. There is no need to explain what their loss would mean to England. She may entertain some faint hope that America would intervene, but America is not going to risk a war with Japan for the sake of Australia and New Zealand. And if she did in any way protect them, it would be with the object of getting them for herself, not of keeping them for England.

To say that the British Empire would collapse is far from being empty talk. Englishmen should quietly and soberly consider what I have said.

England, make way !

The British Empire is on the down grade, or perhaps at the parting of the ways that lead to salvation and destruction. To fight Japan is to court destruction. England had better swallow her pride and make way. That is the wisest thing she can do to protect herself : she has territorial possessions in abundance.

After the Great War the weary belligerents hoped to restore everything to its pre-War state, but now, when ten years and more have passed, we know that they have hoped in vain. In the clash between the young countries, who want everything altered, and the old, who want nothing changed, lie the seeds of a second world war.

International relations are not crystallized, they are in a state of flux, of continual organic change. Peace can only endure if founded on recognition of this fact. By ignoring it, by refusing to make way for the younger countries, by using the beautiful word Peace as a cover for the unreasonable retention of their present position and possessions, by clinging to the old and unjust ideas of international relations, the older countries will keep disputes and conflicts alive until they finally explode in war.

Peace in the Pacific.

Japan, England, and America are the three great Pacific Powers : harmony and co-operation between them will bring peace. If the Pacific should prove to be the scene of another world war, it will be because the influence and

possessions of these three are not evenly balanced and because two of them, England and America, persist in endeavouring to have everything their own way at the expense of the third. A condition precedent to the preservation of peace is that England and America should give way and enable a balance to be maintained.

Let each of the three reign supreme in its own domain, America in the eastern, Japan in the western, England in the southern Pacific. Let each keep to its own allotted area, there to guide and guard the other Powers. Let each respect the wishes of the others, honestly assist their progress and development, finally abandon all ideas of racial discrimination and hatred, remove all tariff walls and restrictions on migration, encourage the settlement of differences by an efficient system of arbitration. Then limitation of armament will present no difficulties, mutual confidence will increase, and the Pacific Ocean will not belie its name.

But unless America and England, and especially the latter, who is the more likely to come into collision with Japan, make way, all this is but so much froth.

England holds the key to the peace of the Pacific. Whether that ocean belies its name, whether it becomes the scene of another world war, depends on the attitude of the British people.

Wake up, people of Britain ! The times have changed ! You cannot go on as you have done in the past !

THE END

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